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The choice of law revolution is under attack.' In a familiar pattern,
once-new critiques have become old verities, and are now themselves ripe
for dethronement. This Article is one piece of that revisionist campaign. It
differs from some of the rest of the genre, however, in both focus and
intent. To my mind, the vested rights tradition in whose overthrow the
current orthodoxy was born combined a jurisprudential core with a set of
1. See, e.g., Brilmayer, Interest Analysis and the Myth of Legislative Intent, 78 MICH. L. REV.
392 (1980); Cavers, Contemporary Conflicts Law in American Perspective, 3 RECUEIL DES COURS 75
(1970); Ely, Choice of Law and the State's Interest in Protecting Its Own, 23 WM. & MARY L. REV.
173 (1981); Korn, The Choice-of-Law Revolution: A Critique, 83 COLUM. L. REV. 772 (1983); Mc-
Dougal, The New Frontier in Choice of Law-Trans-State Laws: The Need Demonstrated in Theory
and in the Context of Motor Vehicle Guest-Host Controversies, 53 TUL. L. REV. 731 (1979); Reese,
Choice of Law: Rules or Approach, 57 CORNELL L. REV. 315 (1972); Twerski, Enlightened Territo-
rialism and Professor Cavers-The Pennsylvania Method, 9 DuQ. L. REV. 373 (1971).
1192
Vol. 96: 1191, 1987
Vestedness and Choice of Law
further premises and details. The American choice of law revolution at-
tacked the core and the additional premises and the additional details.
The reassessment now beginning to stir has on the whole taken the cri-
tique of the core for granted, while attempting to revivify some of the rest.
My own strategy, by contrast, will be to concede most of the periphery
and to work at tightening, explaining, and justifying the core.
In setting out these ambitions, I do not claim that my efforts are more
profound or thoroughgoing than those of others. For one thing, my core
may be someone else's periphery. Quite apart from that, a jurisprudential
core may not amount to all that much; it may turn out to be small, or
indistinct, or even empty. That brings me to the intent of this Article,
which is not only to say something about choice of law, but also to work
through an exercise-an experiment-in applied jurisprudence.2 By ap-
plied jurisprudence, I mean the effort to examine fundamental ideas about
the nature of law, not primarily for the sake of either justifying or refin-
ing them, but in order to generate specific conclusions about the shape of
legal doctrine and institutional practice. The aim of such an exercise is
twofold: to say something practical, and also to say something about how
much of practical value can be said. In the case at hand, my conclusion is
that certain ideas about the nature of law-ideas as basic as the proposi-
tion that law is about the recognition and enforcement of norms-can
yield a thin but relatively solid foundation for choice of law. I call this
foundation "vestedness"-to mark it as an offspring but not a clone of
traditional vested rights theory. Although my account of vestedness offers
nothing close to a full-fledged reconstruction of choice of law doctrine, it
does advance some ideas about the paths such a reconstruction might take.
This exercise in applied jurisprudence also turns out, if in a limited
way, to be an exercise in intellectual history. The story of choice of law,
as told in this Article, is a story of intellectual lag. The choice of law
revolution was solidly grounded in one theme within the larger movement
of American Legal Realism. Legal Realism, of course, no longer holds a
monopoly on sophisticated legal thought, and what remains of it has ma-
tured in ways that cast doubt on some of its original claims. Modern
American choice of law doctrine, however, while by no means idle, has
not kept up with the further progress of the important debates in whose
atmosphere it was conceived. To a large extent, it is trapped in assump-
tions that should no longer be considered self-evident. Hence my claim
that the old critiques have become the new verities, and hence the need for
a forward-looking counter-revolution.
2. Cf Lowenfeld, Revolt Against Intellectual Tyranny, 38 STAN. L. REV. 1411, 1411 (1986)
("conflict of laws is applied jurisprudence").
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Section I of this Article provides something of the historical background
for the problems that I will address. Section II defines the counter-
revolutionary notion of vestedness and discusses its attributes and conse-
quences. Section III is a necessary digression that establishes, by way of a
distinction between "Norm-Based" and "Decision-Based" views of law,
the broader jurisprudential framework within which my defense of vested-
ness will proceed. Section IV, the most important section of the Article,
undertakes that defense. Section V concludes the discussion with some
thoughts on the road ahead.
I. THE STORY So FAR: ORTHODOXY AND REVOLUTION
IN CHOICE OF LAW
The saga of orthodoxy and revolution in the development of American
choice of law doctrine is well-known.' My skeletal and selective version of
that story will focus on Joseph Beale and A.V. Dicey, two of the great
masters of classical Anglo-American vested rights theory, and on Walter
Wheeler Cook and Brainard Currie, two of the leaders, in succeeding
generations, of the choice of law revolution.
A. Orthodoxy
In the view of Beale and Dicey,4 the problem of choice of law was
presented whenever a case arguably involved the application of the law of
one or another jurisdiction, or the law of a jurisdiction foreign to the fo-
rum.5 Their analysis was grounded in an often explicit but rarely sepa-
rated conglomerate of ideas that can be distilled into four basic, concep-
tually distinct premises.
First, Beale and Dicey were convinced that-subject to the forum's con-
trol over procedure and its right to refuse to entertain a cause of action at
all-the aim of choice of law was to discover the place, whether the forum
or some other regime, whose law governed the set of facts at issue in an
adjudication, and by whose law legal rights "vested" with regard to those
3. For standard accounts of that history, see, for example, E. SCOLES & P. HAY, CONFLICT OF
LAWS §§ 2.4-.17 (1982); Korn, supra note 1, at 802-20.
4. I do not intend, by treating "Beale and Dicey" as almost a single entity in my account, to deny
the differences between them. Over and above divergences of tone and emphasis, Beale and Dicey
disagreed sharply about a number of important issues in choice of law doctrine. See, e.g., infra note
11 (role of lexfori in allowing cause of action in tort); infra note 34 (renvoi); infra note 94 (rights/
remedy distinction).
5. 1 J. BEALE, A TREATISE ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS § 1.1, at 1 (1935); A. DICEY, A DIGEST
OF THE LAW OF ENGLAND WITH REFERENCE TO THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 1-2 (2d ed. 1908). As I
discuss in more detail, see infra text accompanying notes 33-34, Beale and Dicey argued that, in
applying a foreign legal norm, a court does not, strictly speaking, enforce the foreign legal order as
such, but only enforces rights created under that foreign law.
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facts, at the time that those facts occurred.6 (Hence, of course, the term
"vested rights theory."17 ) To exponents of the classical tradition, this aim
of choice of law followed inevitably from the more general axiom that a
court's task in adjudicating the merits of any case, whether or not the case
raises questions of choice of law, is to determine and enforce the law that
applied to a set of facts, and the rights created under that law, not as of
the time of the litigation, but as of the time of the occurrence of those
facts.8
Second, Beale and (to a somewhat lesser extent) Dicey, in setting out to
describe the rules of choice of law, held that the law governing a given
legal interaction was almost always the law of the place in which certain
discrete, specified events in that interaction took place. In articulating this
so-called territorial view of choice of law,9 Beale and Dicey did not en-
tirely rule out reference to other variables such as the domicile of one or
more of the parties.10 Indeed, they even seemed willing at times to look to
variables that eventually came to be associated with the choice of law
revolution."" Nevertheless, for Beale and Dicey, a fundamentally territo-
rial system of choice of law was a natural consequence of the fundamen-
tally territorial character of legal authority in the modern world. 2
Third, in the spirit of their times, Beale and Dicey sought-insofar as
consistent with the decided cases, which they took to be their data-to
treat choice of law as a self-contained, deductively derived system of rules,
6. 1 J. BEALE, supra note 5, § 1.1; A. DICEY, supra note 5, at 23-27, 58-59.
7. See L. BRILMAYER, AN INTRODUCTION TO JURISDICTION IN THE AMERICAN FEDERAL SYS-
TEM 218-23 (1986) (discussing vested rights approach in choice of law).
8. 1 J. BEALE, supra note 5, § 1.1, at 2; 3 id. § 378.5; A. DICEY, supra note 5, at 9.
9. I say so-called because there are very different views of choice of law that might equally well
be characterized as "territorial." Cf infra text accompanying notes 21-25 (discussing Cook's cri-
tique); Cipolla v. Shaposka, 439 Pa. 563, 267 A.2d 854 (1970) (advancing neo-territorial view).
10. 1 J. BEALE, supra note 5, § 9.3 (discussing importance of domicile in choice of law); 2 id. §§
119.1-149.1 (discussing status and its relationship to domicile); A. DICEY, supra note 5, at 463-68
(discussing domicile as partial determinant of status and status-related rights).
11. See, e.g., 2 J. BEALE, supra note 5, §§ 121.2, 129.4, 130.1 (alluding to state "interests" and
other policy concerns in discussion of choice of law rules for marriage); id. §§ 333.2-.4 (canvassing
both "theoretical" and "practical" considerations in discussing various possible rules for determining
law that should be applied to contract); A. DICEY, supra note 5, at 645-49 (arguing that, under
English choice of law, tort only actionable if both wrongful where it was done and actionable as tort
in England). Indeed, it might be argued that Dicey's account of a "lex loci plus lexfori" rule in the
context of torts compromises not only his territorial purism but also his commitment to vested rights.
The short answer is that Dicey's scheme essentially establishes (though he did not put it this way)
nothing more than a general "public policy" limitation on the enforcement of foreign-created rights in
tort, see infra text accompanying note 64, and thus does not violate the basic principle "enjoining the
recognition of rights acquired under the law of any civilised country." A. DiCEY, supra, at 646.
In Beale's case, his occasional forays into discussions of "policy" sometimes led to analyses that a
modern reader would almost certainly find repugnant. See, e.g., 2 J. BEALE, supra, § 132.3 (discuss-
ing choice of law rules for "miscegenation").
12. See, e.g., 1 J. BEALE, supra note 5, §§ 2.1, 5.2.
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operating at a relatively high level of abstraction, and grounded in a
small, relatively fixed and self-evident set of concepts.13
Finally, Beale and Dicey, though committed to the enforcement of fixed
rights that "vested" on the basis of abstract, territorial rules, insisted that
every forum was the master of its own efforts at choice of law. In particu-
lar, they believed that: (1) the law of choice of law-that is, the body of
rules directing a court to apply the law of one or another jurisdic-
tion-was a part of the law of the forum, and not a branch of public
international law or a law imposed on the forum by some other jurisdic-
tion;1 and (2) different jurisdictions could, without contradiction, employ
different rules of choice of law.15 Interestingly, these ideas were disputed
within the general classical tradition to which Beale and Dicey belonged.
A number of authors were determined, unlike Beale and Dicey, to link
private international law to public international law; others, uncon-
strained by Beale and Dicey's brand of legal positivism, searched for a
common law of choice of law, grounded in fundamental principles and
applicable in all places.1"
B. Revolution
1. Cook's Critique
Walter Wheeler Cook, whose work in choice of law dates mostly from
the 1930's, was one of the leading practitioners of the great "Realist"
movement in American legal scholarship. In his work on conflict of laws,
Cook embraced the once-debated notion that forums were masters of their
own efforts at choice of law, but assailed each of the other basic threads of
the classical approach represented by Beale and Dicey. Cook was often no
more anxious to untangle these strains than were Beale or Dicey, but
distinct arguments can be extracted from his work. For my own purposes,
13. See, e.g., id. § 3.4, at 25 (law "in great part . . . consists in a homogeneous, scientific, and
all-embracing body of principle"); id. § 4.12, at 48 ("common law was systematic; that is, it consisted
of a system of thought based upon principles which covered every possible occurrence"); A. DICEY,
supra note 5, at 20-21 ("the number of well-established rules with regard to the choice of law. . . is
small . . . . [Choice of law] is no mere mass of incoherent maxims; it is rather a system of rules, all
of which have a relation to each other"). The extent of Beale's and Dicey's conceptualism was not,
however, quite as extreme as their critics sometimes suggested. See, e.g., 1 J. BEALE, supra note 5, §§
4.7-.8 (discussing legal change); A. DICEy, supra, at 16-21 (discussing tension between "theoretical"
and "positive" methods of treating choice of law). In Beale's case, part of his reputation as the arche-
typical conceptualist was based on an outline of choice of law that he appended to a casebook he
edited more than thirty years before the appearance of the treatise relied on in this Article. See 3 J.
BEAiE, Summary of the Conflict of Laws, in A SELECTION OF CASES ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS
501 (1902).
14. See 1 J. BEALE, supra note 5, §§ 5.1, 5.3; A. DIcEY, supra note 5, at 3-4, 9-10, 14-15, 20.
15. See 1 J. BEALE, supra note 5, § 5.1; A. DICEY, supra note 5, at 19-20.
16. See generally 1 E. RABEL, THE CONFLICT OF LAWS: A COMPARATIVE STUDY 8-11 (1958)
(citing authors).
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it makes sense to build something of a chiasmus by proceeding, as I have
already begun to do, in reverse.
Cook's critique of the conceptualist pretenses of traditional choice of
law was of a piece with functionalist "realist" analyses of other fields of
law. Cook tried to show that much of choice of law learning was arbitrary
or driven by faulty logic and word fetishes, and that it reached conclusions
required neither by principle nor by policy.17 He also suggested that the
real work of choice of law was often performed, not by the celebrated
rules that pronounced which law would govern a contract or a tort, but by
the low-visibility process of characterization that assigned disputes to one
or another legal category in the first place.18 Cook argued that many of
the terms used in choice of law, such as domicile, movable property, or
procedure, were only useful as shorthand for the considerations underly-
ing their use, and that there was no good reason to expect those words to
bear the same meaning in all their uses."' More generally, he urged atten-
tion to concern for clarity, policy, and contextuality, and was skeptical of
the ability of even the best abstract rules to meet the needs and challenges
of choice of law.2 0
Cook agreed with Beale and Dicey that law in the modern world was a
territorial phenomenon.2 1 He saw little connection, however, between that
idea and the resolution of many live questions in choice of law. Cook
pointed out that any case in which choice of law was an issue was likely
to contain elements connecting it to more than one territory, and that
there was rarely a logically exclusive way of pinning down such a case to
one or another of those territories.2 2 Thus, for example, Cook argued that
when various parts of an allegedly tortious chain of events take place in
different jurisdictions, there is no justification, within the logic of territori-
alism alone, for the traditional common law identification of the place of
the wrong with only the last event in that chain.23 Even more subversive
of the territorialist tradition, though, was Cook's rejection of the notion
that the law governing a legal interaction must be identified by reference
to a particular predetermined dispositive event; he was thus quite willing
to propose, in the case just described, that courts should apply "whichever
of the two (or more) domestic rules is most favorable to the plaintiff."2
17. See, e.g., W.W. COOK, THE LOGICAL AND LEGAL BASES OF THE CONFLCar OF LAWS 42-44,
154-57, 281, 350-88 (1942).
18. Id. at 214-25.
19. See, e.g., id. at 158-67, 194-203, 301-10.
20. See, e.g., id. at 30-31, 35, 42-46, 159-70, 185-86, 201-03, 244-51, 311-46, 417-19.
21. Cf. id. at 41 n.76 ("The present territorial organization is of course not the only possible
form, though probably most of us would regard it as the only convenient one.").
22. See, e.g., id. at 311-22, 351-70, 433-37.
23. See, e.g., id. at 314-18, 321-23, 345.
24. Id. at 345.
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Finally, Cook suggested that reference to domicile (which, after all, also
reflects the connection of persons to territories) would best reflect the pur-
poses of certain legal rules and the actual grounds for their enforcement.2"
Cook's critique was most thoroughgoing, if not obsessive, with regard to
the first, most jurisprudential, premise of the orthodox choice of law tradi-
tion. Cook challenged the whole notion that courts go about enforcing
rights, created by foreign law, that somehow "vest" well before trial and
accompany their bearer into court. Part of his analysis was descriptive, or
even definitional: Cook understood notions such as "law" and "rights"
functionally (he claimed "scientifically" 26), as referring to nothing more
than predictions of what courts would in fact do.17 Thus, a set of facts in
the world could not, in Cook's view, create any single set of vested rights,
but rather "as many 'rights,' all growing out of the one group of facts
under consideration, as there are jurisdictions which will give the plaintiff
relief."' 28 Moreover, Cook argued that when a forum purported to be ap-
plying the law of another sovereign, it was in fact doing no such thing,
because it was making no effort actually to behave as the court of that
other sovereign could be predicted to behave in adjudicating the case at
hand.29
In Cook's analysis, a forum purporting to apply foreign law or enforce
a foreign-created right only enforces "a right created by its own law,"3 0
though incorporating, as part of that law,
a rule of decision identical, or at least highly similar though not
identical, in scope with a rule of decision found in the system of law
in force in another state or country with which some or all of the
foreign elements are connected, the rule so selected being in many
groups of cases . . . the rule of decision which the given foreign state
or country would apply, not to this very group of facts now before
the court of the forum, but to a similar but purely domestic group of
facts involving for the foreign court no foreign element. 1
Cook also observed that the assimilation of foreign rules of decision into
25. See, e.g., id. at 435-36.
26. See id. at 29.
27. Id. at 29-31.
28. Id. at 33.
29. See, e.g., id. at 32, 241-42, 330-31. The most glaring, though by no means the only, example
of this purported gap between rhetoric and reality was the practice, enshrined at least by Beale, see
infra note 34, of rejecting the renvoi-that is, enforcing vested rights on the basis of a definition of
foreign law that often excluded any consideration of the foreign legal system's own rules of choice of
law, with the result that a forum might recognize a "foreign" right that a court actually sitting in that
foreign legal system would, on the basis of its own choice of law doctrines, refuse to recognize. See id.
at 31-33, 330-35.
30. Id. at 21.
31. Id. at 20-21; see also, e.g., id. at 31, 222, 342-43.
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a forum's law rarely had anything to do with the "'power' or 'jurisdic-
tion' of the particular court or state to decide the case before it in a certain
way. Cases involving power arise only where some limitation is imposed
by some system of positive law-such as the federal constitution. Other
limitations on power do not exist.""2 Thus, a forum's choice of law deci-
sions could be nothing but expressions of its own policy, and any law that
the forum applied would have to be, in a real sense, local law. To claim
anything more was to engage in obfuscation and delusion.
At first glance, it might appear that this part of Cook's analysis was
merely quibbling. After all, Beale and Dicey themselves argued that
choice of law was local law in the sense of being in the forum's hands."
They even insisted, in language echoing Cook's own, that a court cannot,
strictly speaking, enforce foreign law, but only foreign-created rights, and
that it does so through operation of its own law. 4
Cook was not simply quibbling, however, in his account of choice of
law as local law. For Cook insisted that, if rights did not vest, and if
"law" applied only in court and not before, and if a rigid, deductive, terri-
torial system of choice of law rules was neither possible nor desirable,
then choice of law was not only local in some finicky sense, but could only
be, in its entire theory and practice, a reflection of the forum's own princi-
ples and policies. Consequently, cases in which choice of law was an issue
could only be decided, in Cook's view, "by the same methods actually used
in deciding cases involving purely domestic torts, contracts, property,
etc.,"3 5 and intelligent choice of law doctrine could only develop if
grounded in pragmatic and wise "social and economic policy."3'
32. Id. at 41.
33. In fact, David Cavers argued many years ago that Cook himself often confused his own local
law theory with other local law accounts that were really much more akin to vested rights theory. See
Cavers, The Two "Local Law" Theories, 63 HARV. L. REv. 822 (1950). In the rest of my account, I
will (with some regret) subordinate the power of Cavers' argument to expositional convenience, and,
unless the context indicates otherwise, continue to associate the term local law exclusively with Cook's
theory and its offspring.
34. See 1 J. BEALE, supra note 5, § 5.4 ("The law of the forum is the only law that prevails as
such. The foreign law is a fact in the transaction."); A. DICEY, supra note 5, at 25 (when courts are
"popularly said to enforce a foreign law, what they do, in reality, is . . .to enforce not a foreign law,
but a right acquired under the law of a foreign country"). Moreover, although Beale and Dicey
disagreed with each other on the renvoi question, compare 1 J. BEALE, supra, § 7.3 (forum should
only adopt internal rules of law of foreign legal system, and not its choice of law rules) with A.
Dicm', supra, at 79-81, 715-23 (contending that English courts look to "whole law" of foreign legal
systems, including their choice of law rules), they both recognized, in any number of contexts, that a
court looking to foreign law was by no means always obliged to act as if it were itself a foreign court.
35. W.W. COOK, supra note 17, at 43.
36. Id. at 46.
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2. Of Rules of Assimilation
By almost any standard, the notion that some choice of law doctrines
might be, in the strictest sense, matters of local law, has to be recognized
as a valuable contribution to clear thinking about choice of law. Consider,
-for example, the question of marriage. An interested forum might, as a
matter of its own policy, want to recognize only those marriages entered
into according to some standard of solemnity or publicity. It might, how-
ever, be less concerned with how a marriage is solemnized than that it is
solemnized. If so, it might make sense, as a matter of the forum's own
policy, to look to the law of the place in which a marriage was celebrated
as one guide to its validity. Similarly, in contract law, a forum might, as a
matter of its own policy, want to respect the presumed intentions of the
parties, looking to the law of the place where a contract was made as a
guide to those intentions. These examples could be multiplied, and might
well encompass not only a forum's policies about specific substantive areas
of law, but also considerations of fairness or convenience of a more gen-
eral sort.
I will refer to these sorts of strictly local choice of law rules as "Rules
of Assimilation." Clearly, a good deal of choice of law can be understood
in terms of Rules of Assimilation, and the old texts were deficient in pay-
ing too little attention to their role.37 In particular, the existence of Rules
of Assimilation suggests that, in some cases, there is no real need to choose
between the forum's substantive law and some foreign substantive law,
since the former, sensitively interpreted, assimilates the terms of the latter.
This happy result is what later theorists came to call a false conflict.
The question that remains, however, is whether all choice of law rules
must be Rules of Assimilation. What should a court do when, even after it
has exhausted its battery of Rules of Assimilation, it is faced with a true
conflict between its own social and economic vision and that of some other
legal system connected with the case? Inevitably, Cook's theory implied
that, at that point, a forum could do nothing but apply lex fori (that is,
"local law" without assimilation). If this conclusion was not always clear
in Cook's writing, it was probably because he often overlooked, in his
37. It bears noting, though, that it was not Cook but Wesley Hohfeld who seems to have first
clearly articulated the possibility that some choice of law rules could best be understood in terms of
what I have called Rules of Assimilation. See Hohfeld, The Individual Liability of Stockholders and
the Conflict of Laws, 9 COLUM. L. REV. 492, 515-22 (1909); cf. W. TWINING, KARL LLEWELLYN
AND THE REALIST MOVEMENT 416 n.55 (1973) (discussing possibility that some of Cook's ideas on
conflict of laws derived directly from Hohfeld). Hohfeld's aim, however, was to distinguish between
Rules of Assimilation and other rules of choice of law, not to argue that choice of law was nothing but
Rules of Assimilation. See also A. DICEY, supra note 5, at 59-63 (discussing difference between
choice of law principles that look to foreign law as source of alleged right, and those that look to
foreign law as interpretation of alleged right).
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pragmatism, the possibility that there might be deep and profound sub-
stantive differences among nations or states.
Put another way, Cook first argued that judicial decisions purporting to
enforce foreign-created vested rights did no such thing, and that courts in
fact did no more than incorporate into the forum's law "a rule of decision
identical . . . in scope with a rule of decision found in force in another
state or country." 38 He then assumed that this account was inconsistent
with the possibility that a court might apply a set of rules that did not
take the forum's vision regarding the outcome of a case to be dispositive,
but rather inquired, on the basis of some set of second-order criteria,
whether that vision or some other should govern the case at hand. Why
Cook might have made this assumption, and whether a convincing alter-
native story can be told, are among the questions that this Article will
have to face.
3. Currie's Critique
Brainerd Currie, working in the 1950's and 1960's, was in many re-
spects not a Legal Realist.39 But he was a disciple of Cook's and a firm
believer in Cook's jurisprudence. Currie wrote that "Walter Wheeler
Cook discredited the vested-rights theory as thoroughly as the intellect of
one man can ever discredit the intellectual product of another,"4 and
cheerfully took Cook's "local law" view of choice of law as the only alter-
native theory worth considering. Currie brought out more clearly than
Cook some of the implications of the "local law" view. For one thing,
Currie explicitly rejected the possibility that choice of law might operate
through the use of second-order rules that, though local in their source,
operated on the rest of local law from without, so to speak, and were
therefore incommensurable with it.41 There might be policies justifying a
forum's reference to foreign law, but those policies had to pass muster in
light of the totality of the forum's law, and not the other way around.
More particularly, Currie argued that the assimilation of foreign rules of
decision into the forum's practice could be justified only on the basis of the
forum's own policies and values, and that such justifications would have to
38. W.W. Coox, supra note 17, at 20-22.
39. See Hill, The Judicial Function in Choice of Law, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 1585, 1588 n.6
(1985); Kozyris, Interest Analysis Facing Its Critics-And, Incidentally, What Should Be Done
About Choice of Law for Products Liability?, 46 OHIo ST. L.J. 569, 577-78 (1985); cf. Currie, The
Materials of Law Study (pt. 3), 8 J. LEGAL EDUC. 1, 64-78 (1955) (sympathetic but critical exami-
nation of effects of certain aspects of Realist Movement on American legal education).
40. B. CURRIE, SELECTED ESSAYS ON THE CONFLICT OF LAws 6 (1963).
41. See, e.g., id. at 52-53, 616-17, 706.
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overcome the presumption that a forum would, as a matter of course, ap-
ply its own domestic rules of decision.42
All of this was preliminary, however, to Currie's own two distinctive
contributions to the choice of law revolution. First, Currie developed, in a
way that Cook never did, a complete theory of false conflicts. This theory
began with the claim that the purposes underlying particular laws could
most usefully be understood in terms of state interests in achieving certain
ends on behalf of certain persons.43 Which persons? Obviously, persons
within the state's political community, whose own interests may have had
something to do with the enactment of the legislation in the first place.44
Thus, implicit in every law is a built-in limit on the range of situations to
which it purposefully can be applied: A state allowing for survival of ac-
tions in tort suits, for example, will have no interest in applying that doc-
trine on behalf of plaintiffs not domiciled in the state, while a state not
allowing for such survival of actions will have no interest in applying its
doctrine when neither the tortfeasor nor the tortfeasor's estate nor the
beneficiaries of that estate have anything to do with the state.45
With these premises in hand, Currie concluded that there was a class of
cases in which-by virtue of the particular configuration of parties to the
dispute relative to the configuration of state interests represented by vari-
ous rules of decision invoked by those parties-only one state had any real
interest in the application of its law to the facts at hand. These cases
represented "false problems. ' 46 They were also the cases in which tradi-
tional choice of law rules, with their arbitrary focus on the situs of certain
discrete events, were most likely to lead to results not in the interests of
any legal regime, including the legal regime whose rules of decision were
being applied.47 Currie's own solution to false conflicts was relatively sim-
ple: If only the forum had an interest, it should apply its own law without
hesitation or compunction; 48 if only some regime other than the forum had
an interest, the forum could dismiss the suit, or in the alternative could
display some mild deference and fellow feeling by incorporating the for-
eign rules of decision into its own law.49
Currie's second contribution to the choice of law revolution was his
proposed solution of true conflicts. Again, his suggestion was simple:
42. See, e.g., id. at 52-53, 183-84.
43. See, e.g., id. at 117-18, 143-46.
44. See, e.g., id. at 85, 143-46, 719. But cf. id. at 186 (recognizing possibility of "rational
altruism").
45. Id. at 144-45.
46. See, e.g., id. at 107, 163, 189, 726.
47. See, e.g., id. at 107-10, 151-52, 180-81.
48. Id. at 184.
49. Id. at 61-63, 184, 607-08.
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There might in principle be policies that would lead a forum with an
interest in applying its own rules of decision to a case to defer to the rules
of decision of another state.50 Such policies, however, are too vague, tenta-
tive, and intangible to count for much, and courts are ill-equipped to con-
duct the sort of balancing of interests that serious attention to such policies
would require.5" Thus, in Currie's view:
The sensible and clearly constitutional thing for any court to do,
confronted with a true conflict of interests, is to apply its own law.
In this way it can be sure at least that it is consistently advancing the
policy of its own state. It should apply its own law . . . simply be-
cause a court should never apply any other law except when there is
a good reason for doing so.52
4. Of Rules of Scope
Much of Currie's work has been severely criticized. His analysis of
state interests, for example, is often arbitrary, dogmatic, narrow, and
vaguely unrealistic. Indeed, Currie's domiciliary-centered scheme of choice
of law is in many ways as rigid and unconvincing as the territorial catch-
phrases of Beale and Dicey.53 Moreover, a number of commentators have
suggested that Currie's analysis of true conflicts slighted both the impor-
tance of values such as comity, reciprocity, and uniformity," and the fact
that courts often balance competing policies and interests and might be
expected to manage the task as well in their efforts at choice of law.55 My
own interest in Currie, though, is somewhat different.
One of Currie's basic claims was that a purposive reading of legal rles
may suggest limits, of a sort relevant to choice of law, on the range of
situations to which those rules sensibly should be applied. I will refer to
the sorts of considerations that might justify such limits as Rules of Scope.
The claim that Rules of Scope might exist (as opposed to any specific
50. Id. at 93-94.
51. See, e.g., id. at 52-53, 181-82, 272-82.
52. Id. at 119.
53. See, e.g., Brilmayer, supra note 1, at 405; Juenger, Conflict of Laws: A Critique of Interest
Analysis, 32 AM. J. COMp. L. 1, 35-37, 50 (1984).
54. See, e.g., E. SCOLES & P. HAY, supra note 3, § 2.6, at 19-20; Baxter, Choice of Law and the
Federal System, 16 STAN. L. REv. 1, 3, 9-10 (1963); Korn, supra note 1, at 777, 965-69; von
Mehren, Recent Trends in Choice-of-Law Methodology, 60 CORNELL L. REV. 927, 938-44 (1975).
55. See, e.g., Baxter, supra note 54, at 21-22; Peterson, Weighing Contacts in Conflict Cases:
The Handmaiden Axiom, 9 DuQ. L. REv. 436, 440-44 (1971).
Critics have also pointed out that Currie's formula for resolving true conflicts contains at least one
significant, perhaps fatal gap: It does not provide any guidance to a "disinterested" forum required to
choose between the laws of two or more other "interested" jurisdictions. See infra note 225 and
accompanying text.
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description of their content) is surely right. Indeed, the kind of law-
reading that Currie suggested (whatever one thinks of how he went about
it) may not be all that different from the gamut of purposive interpreta-
tions that help us match legal rules to particular sets of facts in contexts
unrelated to choice of law. Moreover, the old choice of law tradition made
little effort to identify Rules of Scope, and Currie deserves credit for artic-
ulating issues that should have been obvious all along.
A number of questions remain, however, to which this Article will try
to respond. The first of these exactly parallels the puzzle provoked by
Cook: Assume that a court, having exhausted its stock of Rules of Scope
with respect both to the forum's law and to one or more foreign laws, still
confronts a true conflict. Why was Currie, like Cook, so sure that, in
order to resolve the conflict, the court could not coherently apply second-
order criteria that are neutral with regard to the forum's own first-order
rules of decision and are incommensurate with-that is, cannot be
weighed against-those first-order rules? The second question is more
specifically aimed at Currie: Why was Currie so committed to the view
that courts, in adjudicating particular legal disputes, were primarily
charged with "consistently advancing the policy of [their] own state[s]?" 6
Is that really all there is to it? Or is it possible to draw a very different
picture?57
56. B. CURRIE, supra note 40, at 119.
57. The tale I have just told has been scandalously selective. Choice of law had a history before
Beale and Dicey. See 3 J. BEALE, supra note 5, §§ 21-78; E. SCOLFS & P. HAY, supra note 3, §§
2.1-.4. Moreover, the transition from orthodoxy to revolution was by no means as clear as I made it
appear, particularly since Beale wrote some of his most definitive works well after his opponents had
already made their own views well known. In addition, my account has essentially ignored any subtle
changes that may have occurred in the views of Dicey, Beale, Cook, and Currie during the course of
their careers.
Finally, the history of choice of law since the revolution has been particularly complicated. See
Ehrenzweig, A Counter-Revolution in Conflicts Law?: From Beale to Cavers, 80 HARV. L. REv. 377
(1966); Korn, supra note 1, at 802-20. The old orthodoxy has, of course, had its defenders, here and
there, more or less. See, e.g., Briggs, Utility of the Jurisdictional Principle in a Policy Centered
Conflict of Laws, 6 VAND. L. REV. 667 (1953); Carswell, The Doctrine of Vested Rights in Private
International Law, 8 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 268 (1959) (mixed evaluation); de Sloovere, The Local
Law Theory and Its Implications in the Conflict of Laws, 41 HARV. L. REv. 421 (1928); de Sloovere,
On Looking Into Mr. Beale's Conflict of Laws, 13 N.Y.U. L.Q. 333 (1936) [hereinafter de Sloovere,
Mr. Beale's Conflict of Laws] ("moderate defense"); Griswold, Renvoi Revisited, 51 HARv. L. REv.
1165 (1938) (policy-based defense); Stimson, The Law Governing the Creation of Rights and Duties
Between Persons Subject to Different Laws, 48 VA. L. REv. 643 (1962) (proposing, without much
reasoned argument, that applicable law is law to which obligor was territorially subject at "significant
time"). Meanwhile, the victorious insurgency has embraced a dizzying variety of views other than
those of Cook and Currie, including views that combine support for revolutionary theory with practi-
cal prescriptions that revert, in one way or another, to older patterns. See, e.g., Hill, supra note 39;
Rosenberg, The Comeback of Choice-of-Law Rules, 81 COLUM. L. REv. 946 (1981). And judicial
practice, unusually responsive to academic ferment, see generally J. MARTIN, CONFLIcr OF LAWS
206-59 (2d ed. 1984) (casebook survey of judicial reception of modem scholarly theories), has never
quite settled down, see Hill, supra note 39, at 1600; Kay, Theory into Practice: Choice of Law in the
Courts, 34 MERCER L. REV. 521 (1983); Korn, supra note 1, at 820-958, and seems resolved princi-
pally to avoid the subject of choice of law as much as possible. Cf Keene Corp. v. Insurance Co. of N.
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II. VESTEDNESS
In the remainder of this Article, I will explain and defend a specific
counterrevolutionary normative proposition in choice of law, which I call
"vestedness." The notion of vestedness represents a reworking of the first
principle in the constellation of ideas that I described in Section I as asso-
ciated with the vested rights theory of Beale and Dicey. This reworking,
although faithful to its forebear in many respects, differs in formulation
and tone. In particular, it substitutes relatively precise operational criteria
for metaphors, and it incorporates in the logic of a single proposition vari-
ous notions that, in their original form, might have appeared as statements
and counter-statements strung awkwardly together. More important, the
part of vested rights theory with which I associate vestedness is only a
part of that tradition, and I ignore or reject much more of what I de-
scribed earlier as important to that theory. My hope is that the new label
will simultaneously acknowledge the connection and let me define my own
more narrow path.
A. Vestedness Defined
Subject to various interpretive glosses I will introduce shortly, vested-
ness can be defined as a principle of law requiring that the court of any
forum should, in selecting the criteria governing the substantive elements
in an adjudication, apply choice of law criteria that could be expected to
generate the same set of substantive criteria if they were applied by any
other forum in an actual adjudication. Thus, a choice of law rule re-
quiring a court in an auto collision case to apply "the law of the place of
the crash" is consistent with vestedness because any other forum, if it em-
ployed the same choice of law rule, could be expected to find the same
crash-site and apply the same substantive law. On the other hand, a rule
requiring a court to apply, either as a first or last resort, "the law of the
forum" is not consistent with vestedness, because the application of exactly
Am., 667 F.2d 1034, 1041 n.10 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (avoiding choice of law determination by deciding
that all possible state laws on question of first impression were identical), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1007
(1982); Islamic Republic of Iran v. Pahlavi, 94 A.D.2d 374, 464 N.Y.S.2d 487 (1983) (dismissing suit
against deposed Shah, in part because of difficulty of determining and applying Iranian law), afd,
62 N.Y.2d 474, 478 N.Y.S.2d 597, 467 N.E.2d 245 (1984), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 783 (1985);
Comment, Choice of Law in Right of Publicity, 31 UCLA L. REv. 640, 640, 646 (1984) (observing
that courts have generally ignored potential choice of law issues in right of publicity cases). In the
meantime, two Restatements have appeared, the first drafted principally by Beale, and the second a
theoretical hybrid that has been attacked by all sides. RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS
(1934); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS (1971).
For all this, Beale and Dicey, Cook and Currie, provide the most convenient reference points for
my own enterprise, the former because buried somewhere in their problematic vision is the core of
what I want to say, and the latter because they give voice, so eloquently and uncompromisingly, to
much of what I most want to reject.
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the same rule by other forums would lead each forum to apply its own,
possibly very different, substantive law.
A simpler way of putting the matter might be that the principle of
vestedness fundamentally rejects the notion of lex fori (and along with it
Cook and Currie's theories of local law) and requires that a forum decide
choice of law questions on the basis of second-order criteria that are in
themselves forum-neutral, which is to say, based on the assumption that
the merits of a case should not depend on where it happens to be brought.
This alternative formulation, however, is woefully imprecise and inade-
quate. The opportunity to explain why this is so should allow me to ex-
plain some of the terminology used in the more formal definition of ves-
tedness, spell out its implications, and illustrate some of the deep points of
connection between vestedness and traditional vested rights theory.
Although vestedness is grounded in a rejection of lexfori, that rejection
is complex. In some respects, vestedness is broader than a simple rule of
forum-neutrality. Vestedness, for example, does more than disqualify
choice of law rules that explicitly refer to the forum; it also excludes more
clever efforts at referring to the law of the forum by nominally forum-
neutral criteria, such as "the law of the place in whose courthouse the
piece of paper that started the lawsuit happened to be lodged." 8 Such
criteria would necessarily change their reference if the identity of the fo-
rum were different, and could not therefore be expected to generate the
same set of substantive criteria if they were applied by any other forum in
an actual adjudication. 9 Similarly, because vestedness applies to choice of
law "criteria" at any level of abstraction, and not just isolated choice of
law rules, it would also cut out, for example, a principle requiring a fo-
rum to apply "the law of the place selected by that choice of law rule-in
58. An even more clever example would be "the law of the place where the parties or their agents
were last to be found in the same room."
59. Too much should not be made of this result, however. Vestedness excludes choice of law
variables whose reference is rigidly tied to the identity of the forum-that is, variables that would
change if the identity of the forum happened to be different. It does not exclude variables whose
reference only correlates with, or influences, the choice of a forum. Thus, for example, even if most
fender-bender suits were brought in the jurisdiction in which the fender-bender occurred, and even if
this correlation were in fact causal, that would not exclude a choice of law rule looking to the "law of
the place of the fender-bender," because in any given case, the choice of a different forum could not
change the place of the collision.
(I am fully aware that lurking here are deep philosophical issues having to do with "possible
worlds," "non-rigid designators," and other such notions. See generally S. KRIPKE, NAMING AND
NECEssrrY (rev. ed. 1980). 1 doubt, however, that a more rigorous analysis, even if I were qualified to
give it, would contribute much to my argument, and I ask unconvinced readers to treat this part of the
analysis as a definitional gloss. I should add, though, that if notions of reference and identity were
rigorously brought to bear here, they might well reveal that the kinds of examples with which the text
at this footnote has been concerned would violate even the looser formulation of vestedness as forum-
neutrality.)
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itself consistent with vestedness-that in the aggregate of cases most often
results in the application of the law of the forum."
In more important respects, however, vestedness is a narrower notion
than simple forum-neutrality. In particular, vestedness-like the classic
articulations of vested rights theory60 -does not, despite the strictures of
the previous paragraph, require a forum to adopt choice of law criteria
that will generate outcomes at trial identical or even similar to those in
other forums. The most important reason for this result is that the con-
straint of vestedness is addressed to each forum individually. It does not
assume that different forums adopt the same choice of law regime. It only
requires that whatever regimes are adopted, they be such that, if they
were employed by other forums, they would be expected to generate the
same substantive criteria.
Even in a world in which every forum adopted the same choice of law
rules, adherence to vestedness would still not guarantee identical results.
Recall first that vestedness applies only to the "substantive elements" in
an adjudication. By substantive elements, I mean, in a traditional sense,
the criteria by which a court evaluates the primary or out-of-court con-
duct or status of the parties. Substantive elements, of course, should be
distinguished from "adjective" issues such as procedure, evidence, and ju-
risdiction.61 They should also be distinguished from those aspects of the
law of remedy that do not directly reduce to statements about substantive,
out-of-court duties that parties owe to each other as a result of the viola-
tion of other substantive, out-of-court duties.62 And even if this brief ac-
60. See supra text accompanying notes 14-15.
61. Cf Risinger, "Substance" and "Procedure" Revisited, 30 UCLA L. REv. 189 (1982) (pro-
posing model for distinguishing between substance and procedure in various contexts).
62. For example, to the extent that rules about the measure of damages for breach of contract
reflect the actual out-of-court obligation that the breaching party has to the breached-against party as
a result of the breach, they constitute, for present purposes, substantive elements of a case. On the
other hand, a court's choice between an injunction and a declaratory judgment would be non-
substantive, and could not be constrained by vestedness. This classification roughly accords with tradi-
tional American choice of law doctrine. See RESTATEMENT (FIRsT) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS ch. 12
(1934). It also roughly accords with the scheme in Risinger's valuable essay, supra note 61. Risinger
convincingly distinguishes the rights/remedy distinction from the substantive/procedural distinction,
id. at 190-203, and defines the latter in terms of the difference between rules (including rules of
remedy) that we would tell an omniscient, omnipotent factfinder and rules that we would not need if
we had an omniscient, omnipotent factfinder. Id. at 204-11. Risinger thus ends up treating most
aspects of the law of remedy (as distinguished from the laws of procedure and evidence and so on) as
substantive. To the extent that I differ with Risinger, it is not only because my definitions do not
match his perfectly, but also because I think that there might well be contexts in which, even under
his scheme, principles of remedy might reflect the lack of an omniscient, omnipotent factfinder rather
than a direct substantive judgment about legal relations in the world. For a more precise and less
conclusory discussion of the character of the law of remedy, which takes advantage of the conceptual
apparatus I develop later in this Article, see infra note 94.
The substance/procedure distinction as understood here should also be distinguished from the more
outcome-determinative test applied by federal courts in drawing the line between federal and state law
in diversity litigation. See, e.g., Walker v. Armco Steel Corp., 446 U.S. 740 (1980); Guaranty Trust
1207
The Yale Law Journal
count leaves room for debate at the margins, the determination of even
undeniably non-substantive questions of law clearly can affect an outcome
at trial.6" For that matter, vestedness is consistent with (though it does not
require) the "public policy exception"-that much-maligned escape-hatch
in vested rights theory-because the exception in its classic formulation is
related only to a court's decision to accept or decline jurisdiction, and not
to its decision on the merits once it takes a case.64
In addition, recall that vestedness only requires choice of law criteria
that can be "expected to" generate identical sets of substantive criteria.
The phrase "expected to generate the same" is meant to be taken primar-
ily in a formal, rather than a purely descriptive, sense. Clearly, two judges
sitting in different forums could in fact look at the same accident and find
two different crash sites or find the same crash site but differ over what
the law of the crash site actually is. In both of these cases, though, the
differences in the judges' conclusions would be the result of some disagree-
ment between them, not of a variable uncontroversially apparent in the
task of determining the crash site. Indeed, two judges sitting in the same
forum might just as easily disagree about the location of the crash site or
the requirements of a substantive regime. By the use of the phrase "ex-
pected to," I mean to focus on the structure of choice of law criteria rather
than the vagaries of their application.
The constraint of vestedness is satisfied so long as forums can be "ex-
pected to" apply the same substantive criteria, even if they disagree about
the content of the criteria they are "expected to" apply. For example,
federal courts of appeals in the United States generally follow their own
interpretations of federal law without feeling bound by the views of courts
of appeals in other circuits.6" When disagreements occur, however, the
Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99 (1945). Why the federal rule is the way it is is in itself an interesting
question of intellectual history, fortunately beyond the scope of this Article.
63. The substance/procedure distinction also suggests that the phrase "in selecting" in my formal
definition is more complex than it appears at first glance. Certain procedural constraints, such as issue
preclusion, law of the case, and pleading requirements can, in fact, preclude a particular court from
selecting much of anything for itself. The requirement of vestedness, therefore, can only apply to the
extent that a court is procedurally unhampered from "selecting the criteria governing the substantive
elements in an adjudication." This qualification, however, is less profound than it may seem. First,
the sort of procedural obstacles I have in mind are limited and doctrinal, and they do not or need not
pose a problem in the general run of cases in which courts have jurisdiction. Second, each of these
procedural obstacles assumes that whatever issue or issues cannot now be litigated on the merits could
have been litigated were it not for the neglect of one or another party, or were in fact litigated in a
prior proceeding. See also infra text accompanying notes 198-201.
64. See Bradford Elec. Light Co. v. Clapper, 286 U.S. 145, 160 (1932); RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 90 comment a (1971); 3 J. BEALE, supra note 5, § 612.1; see also E.
SCOLES & P. HAY, supra note 3, § 3.15.
65. See, e.g., United States v. Carson, 793 F.2d 1141, 1147 (10th Cir. 1986); Continental Sec. Co.
v. Interborough Rapid Transit Co., 165 F. 945 (2d Cir. 1908). But cf., e.g., Factors Etc., Inc. v. Pro
Arts, Inc., 652 F.2d 278, 281-83 (2d Cir. 1981) (holding that one federal court of appeals should
generally defer to other courts of appeals on interpretation of laws of states within their circuits); Gill
1208
Vol. 96: 1191, 1987
Vestedness and Choice of Law
issue is not framed as one of choice of law, but rather of the interpretation
of the same law: Each court does not consider the other courts to have
made a different choice of law, but to have adopted a mistaken view of the
same law. 6 If and when the Supreme Court decides the issue, its views
are taken as an authoritative correction of one or another lower court's
substantive mistake. At no point in this process would vestedness
intervene.6
7
The rather specialized way in which vestedness seeks to achieve forum-
neutrality becomes even more sharply etched in light of the most impor-
tant operative difference between vestedness and traditional vested rights
theory: Vestedness is nothing like a full-fledged choice of law system in
itself, but only a thin constraint on choice of law regimes. To construct a
full-fledged choice of law system would require not only a whole set of
further principles specific to the choice of law enterprise itself, but also an
array of political and legal principles that go well beyond and behind that
enterprise, and very likely some arbitrary conventions to fill in the details.
Put another way, vestedness requires that the content of choice of law
criteria should be forum-neutral, but has-at least on the surface 68-1ittle
to say, in itself, about a forum's selection of one set of forum-neutral
choice of law criteria rather than another.
Vestedness has nothing whatsoever to say, for example, about the sort
of "territorialism" that was understood by many of its adherents, as well
as many of its critics, to be part and parcel of vested rights theory." Thus,
although a rule requiring a court to apply the "law of the place of the
crash" satisfies vestedness, so would a rule requiring a court to apply "the
law of the place of the injured party's domicile," or "the law of the place
in which the alleged injurer's paternal grandmother was born," or "the
law of the place nearest in alphabetical order to the name of the make of
v. Austin, 157 F. 234 (1st Cir. 1907) (taking view, since discarded, that circuit court would generally
follow precedent set by other circuits).
66. Note, though, that even if two courts have different views of the same body of law, one may
consider the other's views to be relevant to an adjudication, not by virtue of vestedness, but by virtue
of the sorts of Rules of Assimilation discussed in Section I, at supra text accompanying note 37. See,
e.g., FTC v. Grolier Inc., 462 U.S. 19, 26-27 (1983); cf Note, Using Choice of Law Rules To Make
Intercircuit Conflicts Tolerable, 59 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1078 (1984) (proposing that federal law inter-
pretations by courts of appeals be subject to special set of choice of law rules).
67. In the text, I have assumed for the sake of simplicity that neither substantive criteria nor
choice of law criteria can be "expected to" allow for some measure of discretion. The assumption is
controversial, even within the jurisprudential tradition in which this Article falls. Eventually, I will
relax the assumption by partially bracketing issues arising out of the possibility of at least one sort of
judicial discretion. See infra text accompanying notes 138-42.
68. But c. infra text accompanying notes 237-51 (discussing view that choice of law is single
trans-jurisdictional entity, and possible implications of that view).
69. I am, of course, not the first to suggest that Bealian territorialism can be separated from the
rest of traditional vested rights theory. See, e.g., de Sloovere, Mr. Beale's Conflict of Laws, supra note
57, at 346.
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the plaintiff's car." For that matter, a choice of law rule, in order to be
consistent with vestedness, need not invoke the notion of place at all. Con-
sider, for example, a rule instructing the forum to look to "the law of the
parties' common religious community." 70 Nor need it even be outcome-
neutral. Consider, in this connection, a rule instructing the forum to look
to "the law favoring recovery." ' Nor need it refer to any positive system
of law at all. It would not violate vestedness, although it might pose other
problems, for a choice of law rule simply to require a court to "apply
natural law."
The thinness of vestedness can be illustrated with particular force by
the following example: Although it would violate vestedness for a Cana-
dian court to employ a choice of law rule that required it to look to the
"law of the forum," it would not violate vestedness for the Canadian court
to apply a choice of law rule that required it always to look to the "law of
Canada." The difference is that the latter rule, if it were applied by any
other forum, would yield the same law-namely, the law of Canada. In-
deed, a choice of law rule requiring a court to apply "the law of Canada"
is in this respect structurally similar to a choice of law rule requiring a
court to apply "the laws of nature and of nature's God."
What renders the "law of Canada" rule implausible is not vestedness,
but certain quite uncontroversial features of contemporary political theory,
in particular the idea that no one nation or state has a monopoly on sover-
eign authority. 2 Indeed, most choice of law analysts of any stripe would
70. Cf Palestine Order in Council, arts. 47, 51 (1922) (matters of personal status governed by
law of religious community), reprinted in 3 LAWS OF PALESTINF, 2580-81 (rev. ed. 1934); Shava,
The Nature and Scope ofJewish Law in Israel as Applied in the Civil Courts as Compared with Its
Application in the Rabbinical Courts, 5 JEWISH L. ANN. 3 (1985) (explaining role of civil courts in
applying aspects of religious law); Kedroff v. St. Nicholas Cathedral, 344 U.S. 94 (1952) (deferring to
ecclesiastical determination in intra-church dispute); Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S. 679 (1871) (same);
Dayton Christian Schools v. Ohio Civil Rights Comm'n, 766 F.2d 932 (6th Cir. 1985) (barring on
constitutional grounds assertion of jurisdiction by state civil rights commission over religiously-
inspired employment practices in pervasively religious school); Cabinet v. Shapiro, 17 N.J. Super.
540, 86 A.2d 314 (1952) (defining kashrut in context of libel suit brought against local rabbinical
council); Pramatha Nath Mullick v. Pradyumna Kumar Mullick, 52 I.A. 245 (P.C. 1925) (referring
to religious law to define Hindu idol as legal person). The variety of sources just cited is meant to
illustrate, among other things, that a secular court can, in many cases, apply religious law whether or
not it chooses to defer to the interpretations placed on that law by particular religious authorities. It
would also bear some analysis, in each of these contexts, whether what is at stake is a full-fledged
choice of law rule, or something more akin to a Rule of Assimilation.
71. For accounts suggesting this or a similar principle, see, for example, D. CAVERs, THE
CHOICE-OF-LAW PROCESS 166-76 (1965); W.W. COOK, supra note 17, at 345; M. HANCOCK, Three
Approaches to the Choice-of-Law Problem, in STUDIES IN MODERN CHOICE-OF-LAW 1, 3, 8-15
(1984).
72. Note that I am referring to this sort of proposition as a matter of political rather than legal
theory. I realize that the dichotomy is somewhat perilous, and that my own use of it may be somewhat
idiosyncratic. As should become apparent in the course of the Article, though, it serves my exposi-
tional purposes to limit the phrase "legal theory" to understandings of the status of law and the
nature of adjudication, and to relegate to "political theory" equally important questions about, for
example, the nature of sovereignty, the sources of law, legislative competence, and the like.
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probably go further and find implausible any choice of law rule that did
not, at least in formal terms, treat all legitimate sovereigns equally. On
the other hand, if we put vestedness aside, and just looked to a political
principle positing the equality of sovereigns, a lex fori rule (although not
a "law of Canada" rule) would pass with flying colors. A proponent of
lex fori is willing, after all, to grant any forum the privilege of applying
its own law; a Canadian court employing lexfori becomes entitled to ap-
ply Canadian law because Canada is the forum, not because Canada is
Canada. Only when the principle of equality of sovereigns is combined
with the principle of vestedness do both "the law of the forum" and "the
law of Canada" lose their plausibility.
This example suggests an even deeper point. Although the "Canada"
rule itself might seem a trifle unrealistic, any choice of law criterion will
limit the decisionmaker to some finite set of possibilities, with a typical
such set being a list that begins with "the law of Afghanistan" and ends
with "the law of Zimbabwe." In other words, the political theory needed
to fill in any choice of law regime-particularly if it is constrained by
vestedness-must include some conception of the nature of sovereignty and
the identity of legitimate sources of law, and that conception by its nature
may not admit of an infinity of legitimate sovereigns.7 Moreover, the po-
litical theory will have to determine what the notion of a legitimate source
of law or legitimate sovereign power entails-whether, for example, it ex-
cludes choice of law rules favoring recovery in tort suits, or allowing par-
ties to a contract to select the law by which the contract should be gov-
erned, or refusing to recognize the institution of slavery, or subordinating
individual sovereign choices to certain trans-jurisdictional substantive
principles, or constraining positive law as a whole by some theory of natu-
ral law.
In this Article, I will from time to time invoke, and on the whole take
for granted, the commonplace and common sense political theory that
treats nation-states (and certain of their subdivisions) as possessing the
exclusive power to make and enforce law; that supposes that each inde-
pendent nation-state is, at least in formal terms, the equal of any other;
and that restricts the limits on the law-making power of those nation-
states to a narrow set of formal and substantive constraints. This common-
place account is not, however, required by vestedness. Nor does it reflect,
if the truth be told, my own view of the matter."' It simply provides a
73. Similarly, the principle of equality of sovereigns presupposes some view of which sovereigns
are to be considered equal.
74. Cf Note, Religious Exemptions Under the Free Exercise Clause: A Model of Competing Au-
thorities, 90 YALE L.J. 350 (1980) (my student Note, proposing choice of law analogy for free exer-
cise clause of First Amendment).
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relatively clean and minimally distracting framework for going about my
business.
I have contended that a "law of Canada" rule is implausible, and that a
host of other choice of law criteria consistent with vestedness might or
might not be plausible depending on a forum's political and legal commit-
ments. In this account, vestedness is a thin constraint in principle, but its
practical effect on the shape of choice of law doctrine can be, by way of its
interaction with other principles, powerful and profound.
But is this really so? Notice that the instruction to apply the "law of
Canada" is, as far as a Canadian court is concerned, in some sense
equivalent to the instruction to apply "the law of the forum," since both
instructions, when employed by a Canadian court, generate the same re-
sults. Moreover, a Canadian court might argue that because it has neither
the power nor the desire to tell other forums what choice of law criteria to
adopt, the "law of Canada" rule does not, in fact, "violate" the principle
that all sovereigns are equal.
My own initial inclination would be to dismiss this sort of maneuver as
nothing more than intellectual bad faith, a cheap example of trying to
have it both ways.7 5 If a legal regime adopts a rule, after all, it should
mean it. And the "meaning" of a rule telling a Canadian court to apply
"the law of Canada"-or at least the meaning invoked to support the
claim that the rule is consistent with vestedness-is that the law of Can-
ada should apply regardless of the forum. To then retreat from this posi-
tion by arguing that the rule is also consistent with the principle of equal-
ity of sovereigns is to confuse the content of a rule with mere institutional
limits on its application.
On further reflection, however, I realize that this response, as well as
other notions I have advanced, may well reflect nothing more than my
own jurisprudential biases. Who is to say, after all, that the meaning of a
rule, or its consistency with one or another constraint, is found in its con-
tent rather than its application? Let me then do what I have done before,
and resort to definitional fiat, leaving any more explicit justification for
later: The (counter-factual) assumption that a particular forum's choice of
law criteria would be applied by other forums should be understood not
only as the device for testing those criteria against vestedness itself, but
also as an indispensible ingredient in the forum's understanding and eval-
uation of those criteria in light of whatever other political and legal prin-
ciples (themselves consistent with vestedness) the forum may find impor-
tant. With this addendum in place, there remains nothing in the
75. To be sure, an actual Canadian court would never think of resorting to such a game; it would
either accept the principle of vestedness in good faith or reject it in good faith. But that, of course, may
be another way of stating my point.
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principles of vestedness to prevent Canada from adopting "the law of
Canada" as the universal substantive benchmark. But it could do this only
if Canadian decision-makers really believed that Canada is the world's
only legitimate source of positive law. Similarly, vestedness requires that
whatever notions of sovereignty and legitimacy a forum may adopt, it
must actually "mean" them, and mean them-whether or not anyone else
chooses to listen-universally.
B. Vestedness (Not Quite) Defended
The principle of vestedness might be defended in any number of ways.
My own defense is laid out in Section IV of this Article, and will require
some preliminary stage-setting in Section III before it can get underway.
It might be useful, however, to canvas some other possible approaches,
and see where they might lead.
To begin with, it is conceivable that vestedness could be fit into a
scheme of Rules of Assimilation and Rules of Scope of the sort that I have
suggested were a lasting contribution of the choice of law revolution. I do
not dismiss this possibility, but it strikes me as either unlikely or unil-
luminating. Rules of Assimilation and Rules of Scope, after all, are not
choice of law meta-principles, but rather readings of domestic law
grounded in the patchwork of individual substantive and institutional con-
cerns manifested by sovereign governments. There is no immediately ap-
parent reason why these concerns should give rise to anything like vested-
ness. Even if they did, it is even harder to imagine vestedness being
enshrined as a universal, overriding principle rather than one factor
among many in courts' decision-making. More important, if such a result
could somehow be defended, it might well only point to some deeper justi-
fication-that is, a meta-principle-that would invite examination on its
own terms.
One very specific sovereign interest, which might be characterized as
either within or outside the set of Rules of Assimilation and Rules of
Scope, is that elusive and confused aspect of foreign relations called "com-
ity."7' 8 As many traditional vested rights theorists recognized long ago,
however, the problem with basing a defense of forum-neutrality on the
notion of comity is that the two ideas fit together only imperfectly." First,
76. For the classic Anglo-American articulation of comity as the foundation for choice of law, see
J. STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS, FOREIGN AND DoMESTIc § 35 (1834). The
rhetoric of comity has by now lost most of its cachet in choice of law scholarship and cases, although it
remains important in such related areas as recognition of judgments, trans-national litigation, and the
act of state doctrine.
77. Both Beale and Dicey suggested that the notion of comity was either vacuous, or-to the
extent it suggested that the enforcement of foreign-created rights was a matter of discretion, politeness,
or judicially-managed foreign relations-potentially mischevious and confusing. See J. BEALE, supra
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traditional vested rights theory, as well as my reformulation of one part of
it, may well require that a forum stand ready to apply the law of a juris-
diction with which it seeks no comity at all, or with which it is even at
war, as long as that jurisdiction remains somehow legitimate.7 8 Second,
neither theory depends on reciprocal behavior by other forums. Third, a
foreign forum might well be more offended by the specific content of a
choice of law regime than by its compliance with one or another abstract
overarching constraint, and vestedness leaves most questions of content
open. Fourth, as Currie demonstrated quite convincingly, it is not even
clear why one or another version of lexfori-openly and unapologetically
employed-would always be more damaging to friendly relations or recip-
rocal respect than one or another version of vested rights." Finally, even
if vestedness did serve the cause of comity, it remains unclear why vested-
ness should be an overarching constraint on a legal regime's choice of law
apparatus. After all, comity, however important, must surely give way in
certain very large classes of cases to other interests of equal or greater
importance.80
All this is not to say that foreign (or interstate) relations are irrelevant
to choice of law. Vestedness, even if it primarily manifests some other
imperative, may well also serve the cause of comity or enlightened self-
interest. But, on the whole, vestedness itself, to invoke the words of Dicey
only somewhat out of context, "does not arise from the desire of [a] sover-
eign . . . to show courtesy to other states. It flows from the impossibility
of otherwise determining whole classes of cases without gross inconve-
nience and injustice to litigants, whether natives or foreigners."81 So once
again, we are left looking for those underlying conceptions of justice that
will animate the enterprise.
One possible source of justice might be found in a body of super-
note 5, § 6.1; A. DIcEY, supra note 5, at 10-11; accord Loucks v. Standard Oil Co., 224 N.Y. 99,
159 N.Y.S. 282, 120 N.E. 198 (1918) (Cardozo, J.).
78. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES §
113 (1965) (arguing that United States courts should apply laws of unrecognized but politically effec-
tive foreign regimes, if required by normal conflict of laws rules, to extent that those laws relate to
matters of essentially private nature, or to transfer of local property among local nationals); J.H.C.
MORRIS, THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 6, 505-06 (3d ed. 1984) (citing English cases applying law of
enemy country in time of war).
79. See, e.g., B. CURRIE, supra note 40, at 121-23, 188-92, 278-82, 489-90, 524-25.
80. The reason comity is a relatively unsure guide in choice of law is not only that comity is a
vague and uncertain notion. To the contrary, the objections raised in the last paragraph would still
hold-and might even be demonstrable-if we shifted from the vocabulary of "friendly relations" to
the relatively more precise game-theoretic vocabulary of "long-term self-interest" and "joint max-
imization." Indeed, unromantic game-theoretic analysis might suggest a set of additional variables, not
the least of which turn on asymmetries of power and interest, that render it unlikely that the search
for a winning strategy would hit upon as unitary, abstract, thin, and crotchety a principle as
vestedness.
81. A. DICEY, supra note 5, at 10-11.
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jurisdictional positive law such as international law, or, in the American
interstate context, federal constitutional law. The problems here, however,
are similar to those already canvassed. First, even if vestedness is impor-
tant and commendable, international law and constitutional law may well
have good and sufficient reasons for not mandating it, unless we imagine
that these bodies of law render compulsory everything that is important
and commendable. Second, even if international law or constitutional law
do mandate vestedness, their reasons for doing so might be too specific.
International law, as relevant here, is generally concerned with the special
characteristics of nation-states and transnational actors in a violent world.
American constitutional law, as relevant here, is concerned with the spe-
cial characteristics of a federal system within one relatively unified nation-
state. Why should either of these speak in terms that would resonate with
the concerns of all forums in all cases? Finally, if international law or
constitutional law did resonate in this way, that would certainly point to a
more fundamental set of principles, and we would be better off looking
directly to those principles in the first place. Indeed, without committing
myself one way or another, I will simply assume in this Article that ves-
tedness is not required of nation-states by public international law, or re-
quired of States of the Union by the Constitution.
In turning to more fundamental principles, one that quickly comes to
mind is "equality." After all, isn't vestedness just a variation on the notion
that like cases should be treated alike, or, more relevant here, that like
cases should be treated alike regardless of the forum in which they happen
to be heard? This sort of account8 2 begins to approach the argument I
actually have in mind. Equality, however, is not the best underlying idea
to serve in this case. In the first place, I have already demonstrated that
vestedness does not guarantee actual equality in judicial outcomes. It
guarantees only one somewhat narrow form of hypothetical equality, and
it is not at all clear on the face of things why this is the sort of equality
with which a legal regime should be concerned. Even more important,
invoking the principle of equality provokes but does not really answer the
fundamental debate within choice of law regarding exactly what is meant
by equality. The norm of equality seems violated when the fortuity of
where a case is brought determines the outcome. But it also seems violated
when a single forum treats two cases differently simply because of the
fortuity of where some event took place or where some party is domi-
82. See, e.g., Lauritzen v. Larsen, 345 U.S. 571, 591 (1953); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CON-
FLICT OF LAWS § 6 (1971); Griswold, supra note 57, at 1184-87; von Mehren, Choice of Law and
the Problem of Justice, 41 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Spring 1977, at 27. But cf. O'Connor v.
O'Connor, 201 Conn. 632, 519 A.2d 13 (1986) (uniformity of result sometimes must be subordinated
to other goals of choice of law); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 6 comment i
(1971) (uniformity sometimes purchased at too great a price).
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ciled.83 The first intuition points to something like vestedness. The second
intuition leads straight to lex fori, and the rejection of vestedness. To
choose between these two intuitions will require a set of ideas more de-
tailed than the slogan of equality.
A similar response is evoked by a variation on the equality
theme-namely, the aversion to forum-shopping.8 4 To state the obvious
one more time, vestedness bears only the most attenuated connection to
preventing forum-shopping, since it by no means guarantees that different
forums will decide the same case the same way. Even if vestedness could
eliminate forum-shopping, it is unclear why forum-shopping in the adju-
dicative context should strike us as inherently distasteful, while other
types of jurisdiction-shopping-from the establishment of corporate resi-
dence to the flight for freedom by political refugees-give us little pause.
In admitting my skepticism about these various ways of defending ves-
tedness, I do not mean to reject them out of hand. The part of me that
wants to defend the notion of vestedness out of intuitive loyalty is eager to
seize any ammunition. This Article is not just a brief, however. I have
outlined some alternative approaches in order to map the territory. In
presenting my own argument, I will try to uncover the important, if very
general, attitudes of mind that led me to an intuitive acceptance of vested-
ness in the first place.
III. BACK TO BASICS: VESTEDNESS AND THE
NATURE OF LAW
My attempt to provide a principled, jurisprudentially-grounded argu-
ment in favor of the principle of vestedness in choice of law depends on a
rather particular strategy. I begin by identifying two general types of ap-
proaches to the nature of law, which I call Norm-Based and Decision-
Based. 5 This classification is not wholly original," particularly in its
83. For two very different instances of this sort of intuition at work, see In re "Agent Orange"
Prod. Liab. Litig., 580 F. Supp. 690 (E.D.N.Y. 1984) (holding, in major product liability class action
in which plaintiffs were exposed to allegedly toxic chemical in one of three countries and arguably
suffered their injuries in all 50 states and several foreign countries, and defendants' manufacturing
and other activities also took place in numerous places, that all interested states would agree on single
"national consensus" law to apply to all plaintiffs and defendants in suit), and Foster v. Leggett, 484
S.W.2d 827 (Ky. 1972) (holding that, as long as forum has some substantial connection to case,
court's "primary responsibility is to follow its own substantive law" regardless of situs or domicile).
84. See, e.g., Meeker v. Meeker, 52 N.J. 59, 243 A.2d 801, 806 (1968); Reich v. Purcell, 67 Cal.
2d 551, 432 P.2d 727, 63 Cal. Rptr. 31 (1967); Baxter, supra note 54, at 9-10; Brilmayer, supra
note 1, at 399, 427; cf. Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 468 (1965) (discouragement of forum shop-
ping one aim of federal Erie doctrine in diversity cases). But cf., e.g., R. WEINTRAUB, COMMENTARY
ON THE CONF.IT OF LAWS 2-3 (3d ed. 1986) (expressing skepticism about importance or possibility
of discouraging forum-shopping).
85. A natural question at the very start is whether my account of these two types of theories will
treat them as normative or positive forms of explanation. Actually, my discussion cannot easily be
characterized as either strictly descriptive or strictly prescriptive. Sometimes, and particularly in a
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broad outlines, and it simply identifies two families of legal theories (not
in and of themselves directly concerned with choice of law), each of whose
adherents often disagree with each other on important details but usually
recognize their common cause against the other camp.17
Roughly speaking, the Norm-Based view is the more venerable of the
two, finding expression in both the classical idealist and positivistic theo-
ries of law. After being somewhat eclipsed in the early part of this cen-
tury, the Norm-Based view has recently regained support from a varied
group of theorists and other scholars. In my account, I rely largely on the
writings of scholars such as H.L.A. Hart, Lon Fuller, and Ronald Dwor-
kin-a diverse group in and of itself-but this focus should not be taken
to be a full inventory of Norm-Based theories, or an implicit limit on the
shape these theories can take. Also roughly speaking, the Decision-Based
view is best identified with certain strains in American Legal Realism and
its offspring."' For my own purposes, however, I will define the class of
Norm-Based theories as broadly as I can, and define the class of Decision-
brief attempt at justification contained in a set of footnotes near the end of this part of the Article,
infra notes 186-91, I simply juxtapose the two types of arguments. More often, my account combines
"is" statements with "ought" statements. As a number of scholars have pointed out, attempts to de-
scribe certain phenomena, in particular "institutional facts" or practices subject to "thick concepts,"
inevitably generate normative or evaluative conclusions about the boundaries of those phenomena. See,
e.g., J. SEARLE, SPEECH ACTS 50-53, 175-88 (1969); B. WILLIAMS, ETHICS AND THE LIMITS OF
PHILOSOPHY 140-42 (1985); P. FOOT, Moral Arguments, in VIRTUES AND VICES AND OTHER Es-
SAYS IN MORAL PHILOSOPHY 96, 99-105 (1978); cf. H. PUTNAM, REASON, TRUTH AND HISTORY
127-49 (1981). Indeed, the is-ought distinction may not even make much sense as an organizing
principle in these sorts of accounts.
Of course, skepticism about the classic is-ought distinction does not necessarily warrant, and I do
not take it to warrant, attempts to infer an entirely general "ought" from an entirely specific "is." In
other words, the prescriptive statements in this and similar accounts are not of the form "ought, all
things considered," but rather, "ought, considering the nature of law." Cf. J. SEARLE, supra, at
187-88; B. WILLIAMS, supra, at 126.
86. See, e.g., G. CHRISTIE, LAW, NORMS, AND AUTHORITY 1-31 (1982); Bingham, What Is the
Law?, 11 MICH. L. REV. 1 (1912); Hart, Problems of Philosophy of Law, in 6 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
PHIL 264, 266 (1967); cf. Kornhauser & Sager, Unpacking the Court, 96 YALE L.J. 82, 92-97
(1986).
87. I do not claim that all legal theories fall easily into one or another of these grand divisions;
some may best belong in a gray zone in between, and others may define themselves in terms to which
my criteria simply do not apply.
88. The distinction that I am drawing between the Norm-Based and Decision-Based views of law
is obviously analogous to the often-drawn distinction between rights-based and consequentalist theo-
ries of morality. The analogy is deceptive, however, because the controversy in legal theory that I am
identifying is over the structure rather than the substance of a particular set of norms. Moreover, it is
entirely possible to hold divergent views on the two sets of issues, and embrace, for example, a rights-
based view of morality and a Decision-based view of law and judicial responsibility.
Along similar lines, the distinction between the Norm-Based and Decision-Based views of law
might be analogized to the distinction that Bernard Williams draws between "morality"-thought of
as a system of obligations-and the broader, richer realm of "ethics." See B. WILLIAMS, supra note
85, at 174-96. This analogy is equally deceptive, however, if only because the powerful claim that
obligation-based theories of morality impoverish themselves by treating moral questions too much like
questions of law, see id. at 190-92, does not necessarily have any bearing on whether law itself can
appropriately confine itself to the consideration of questions of law.
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Based theories as narrowly as I can. I do so because the next, more im-
portant step in my argument tries to demonstrate that accepting the basic
elements of any Norm-Based theory should lead one to embrace the notion
of vestedness in choice of law.
I do not try in these pages to construct a full-fledged defense of the
Norm-Based view of law itself; but the intentionally inclusive way in
which I construct that view will, I hope, sweep in a healthy proportion of
the relevant audience. Moreover, much of the ambition of the Article will
have been fulfilled if I can demonstrate that vestedness is at least respecta-
ble-that it is supported by a broad and prominent jurisprudential tradi-
tion-and that its rejection depended historically, and continues to depend,
on adopting an alternative tradition that is relatively narrow and decid-
edly controversial.89
A. The Norm-Based View of Law
If I wanted to be provocative, I might describe the Norm-Based view of
law as representing, above all, a commitment to the rule of law. Since I
have other aims, however, I will organize this composite account of many
different Norm-Based theories by focusing in the first instance on a more
mundane theme-separation. To be precise, Norm-Based theories posit
the centrality of two basic distinctions or separations in the enterprise of
law. Neither is necessarily absolute, but, even when partial and hazy, they
establish the spirit of the enterprise and help explain its strange appeal.
The first distinction, to use John Rawls' phrase, is between "justifying
a practice and justifying a particular action falling under it."9 Particular
legal norms may be promulgated to achieve any number of goals-such as
maximizing utility, wealth, or fairness; manifesting natural reason; effect-
ing a symbolic statement or a political compromise; or serving the interests
of the ruling class. Once promulgated, however, a legal norm becomes
part of a normative system that determines the legal status of various
events and conditions in human life. According to the Norm-Based view of
law, the reason for applying that norm in any particular case is not so
much to achieve the underlying goal of the norm, but to uphold the nor-
mative system itself and the rights and duties created by that system. To
paraphrase Rawls, when a child asks a parent a question about a rule of
law, the parent can give any number of justifications for that rule. But
89. I should say that I will be forced during the course of my argument to make explicit some
premises in addition to those articulated in my original account of the Norm-Based view. If I do not
feel burdened by this admission, however, it is in part because one of my goals is to use the discussion
of vestedness to reflect back on some conclusions about the Norm-Based view itself, and the course of
the argument, detours and all, will serve me well in that effort.
90. Rawls, Two Concepts of Rules, 64 PssL REv. 3, 3 (1955) (footnote omitted).
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when the child asks "Why was J put in jail yesterday?," the parent can
only answer something to the effect of "Because he robbed the bank at B.
He was duly tried and found guilty. That's why he was put in jail yester-
day." '91 To such a question, "there is nothing one can do but refer to the
rules."'9
2
The powerful implications of this vision of the law are not always ap-
parent. Vindicating a legal norm and vindicating its underlying purposes
often amount to the same thing. When the two do diverge, however, the
Norm-Based view upholds the importance of the norm as a goal in and of
itself, and finds a fundamental purpose, and a special nobility, in its
vindication.
The second distinction posited by a Norm-Based view of law is between
the existence of legal norms (and resulting legal rights) and the enforce-
ment of those norms by particular institutions in particular cases.9 That
is, legal norms can be said to have an "objective" meaning that exists
apart from the content of compulsory judicial judgments. In fact, not only
can norms exist apart from their enforcement, but the very notion of their
existence entails the possibility that they will not always be enforced.
This distinction has at least three important consequences. First, it sup-
ports the crucial notion in legal culture that courts and other official
tribunals are normally engaged in the business of trying to discover pre-
existing legal rights. Second, it renders intelligible the claim that particu-
lar judicial decisions regarding such rights can be "wrong"-not just mis-
guided or contrary to expectations, but inconsistent with the objective an-
swer required by the legal norm at issue.
Third, the distinction between norms and their enforcement helps give
content and plausibility to a set of further distinctions that are important
to both the theory and practice of the law. One of these distinctions, which
plays a part in the definition of vestedness, is between the substantive
merits of a case, which involve the out-of-court obligations of the parties,
and adjective, in-court issues such as standing, jurisdiction, procedure, and
evidence. Another distinction, just as important if less well understood, is
91. Id. at 5.
92. Id. at 27; see also, e.g., R. DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 82-88 (1978); H.L.A.
HART, PUNISHMENT AND RESPONSIBILITY 11-13, 19-23 (1968); R. WASSERSTROM, THE JUDICIAL
DECISION 138-71 (1961).
93. See, e.g., I J. BEALE, supra note 5, § 4.6; H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 79-84,
132-35 (1961); H. KELSEN, GENERAL THEORY OF LAW AND THE STATE 30, 39-40, 118-19 (A.
Wedberg trans. 1945); Kantorowicz, Some Rationalism About Realism, 43 YALE L.J. 1240, 1248-51
(1934) ("The law is not what the courts administer but the courts are the institutions which adminis-
ter the law."); cf. Sager, Fair Measure: The Legal Status of Underenforced Constitutional Norms,
91 HARV. L. REV. 1212, 1221 (1978) (arguing in context of American constitutional law that "norms
which are underenforced by the federal judiciary should be understood to be legally valid to their full
conceptual limits").
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between primary legal rights and the remedies by which they are
vindicated.94
The two fundamental separations I have discussed-between the goals
of legal norms and the goal of the rule of law, and between the existence
of legal norms and the fact of their enforcement-are, of course, closely
related. If the task of courts is to vindicate rights and duties that attach to
events in the world, then it makes sense, even if it may not be logically
required, to suppose that those rights and duties exist even if a court fails
to enforce them. In other words, the Norm-Based view of law views the
legal process in terms of three fundamental stages: the coming-into-being
of a legal norm, 5 the occurrence of an event or condition to which that
norm applies, and the institutional enforcement of the attendant legal con-
sequences. 6 The relationship between these three events is not necessarily
94. Both the substantive/adjective and the rights/remedy distinctions, and particularly the rela-
tionship between them, are subject to a number of interpretations within the Norm-Based discourse.
See generally Risinger, supra note 61. Joseph Beale described a process in which the violation of
primary rights (for example, the right not to be assaulted) gives rise to secondary rights (a claim on
damages from the assaulter), which in turn can be enforced by virtue of remedial rights available in
one or another tribunal. 1 J. BEALE, supra note 5, §§ 8A.25-.28; see also Hohfeld, The Relations
Between Equity and Law, 11 Mici-. L. REv. 537, 553-54 (1913) (distinguishing primary (or antece-
dent) relations, secondary (or remedial) relations, and tertiary (or adjective) relations). In this account,
secondary rights are substantive, defining real-world obligations of the parties apart from the process
of judicial enforcement. Moreover, most of the content of what is conventionally described as the law
of remedy resides in these substantive secondary rights. See also id. So-called remedial (or in
Hohfeld's parlance, tertiary or adjective) rights, by contrast, pertain only to a party's entitlement to
couple the terms of already-defined secondary rights to the engine of state power, subject to rules of
jurisdiction, procedure, and the like that are not themselves part of the law of remedy.
A quite different analysis, suggested in part by Dicey's treatise and in part by developments in
American public law, would locate considerably more of the law of remedy on the adjective side of the
substantive/adjective distinction, either by supposing that secondary rights are not always specific
enough to generate fully determinate judicial remedies without some further inquiry, see, e.g.,
Califano v. Westcott, 443 U.S. 76, 89-93 (1979) (unconstitutionally underinclusive statute can be
remedied by extension, nullification, or an intermediate solution, depending on equitable and institu-
tional consideration); Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 HARM. L. REV.
1281, 1292-94 (1976) (certain forms of equitable relief "pretty thoroughly" disconnect rights and
remedies), or by supposing the possibility of a direct line between primary rights and judicial reme-
dies, cf., e.g., A. DICEY, supra note 5, at 645-49 (under appropriate circumstances, tort suit may be
maintained in England for conduct wrongful, though not actionable, under law of place where that
conduct occurred); id. at 708-12 (law of forum governs questions of remedy; thus, suit could be
maintained in England for breach of foreign contract, even under circumstances in which breach
would not be actionable under relevant foreign law); Dellinger, Of Rights and Remedies: The Consti-
tution as a Sword, 85 HARv. L. REv. 1532 (1972) (discussing judicial creation of damage remedies
for constitutional violations), or by emphasizing that the content of judicial remedies might well be
constrained by exigencies of litigation and enforcement that are not-and could not be-captured in
the simple articulation of either primary or secondary rights, see, e.g., Gewirtz, Remedies and Resis-
tance, 92 YALE L.J. 585, 596 (1983) (even "Rights Maximizing" judge cannot always avoid remedial
imperfections resulting from "instrumental difficulties in achieving remedial goals"); Note, Judicial
Right Declaration and Entrenched Discrimination, 94 YALE L.J. 1741, 1742 (1985) (arguing that
controversy over remedial costs should not obstruct full articulation of substantive rights at stake).
95. "Coming-into-being" is an intentionally vague term, which is meant to accommodate a whole
set of views about how laws do in fact come into being.
96. The third of these stages-enforcement by an independent adjudicator-is not strictly neces-
sary to all Norm-Based views of law. Moreover, I do not mean to suggest that the three stages always
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simple or static. What is crucial is that the Norm-Based view identifies
the second of the stages as itself pregnant with legal action: Law-making
is usually forward-looking, enforcement is usually backward-looking, but
between them is the here and now crystallization of the stuff to which
they both refer.
Stated otherwise, the combined effect of the two distinctions characteriz-
ing the Norm-Based view of law is to draw a sharp line between the
adjudicative function 97 and other things that governments do. In fighting
fires, building roads, shooting fleeing felons, and waging limited nuclear
wars, the agencies of government act on the demands of the moment to do
the good as they see it, subject to constraints of practicality and ideology.
In specific adjudications, however, the point is not to achieve an ideal bal-
ance of goods, but to judge human beings on the basis of a previously
defined conception of the good to which they were expected to adhere.
Law is, in that sense, an autonomous discipline, never entirely reducible
to economics or politics or even general moral philosophy.9" In Dworkin's
terms, the adjudicative process vindicates "principles" rather than "poli-
cies"; 99 in Fuller's terms, it is constrained by the morality of law rather
than the calculus of allocation; 100 in Hart's terms, it seeks to enforce rules
"meant to be taken seriously as standards of behavior."1 1 Or, to switch to
occur in some simple chronological sequence; in particular, some forms of legal enforcement may come
before the fact. See, e.g., MAss. CONST. pt. II, ch. 3, art. 2, as amended by Article 85 of the Articles
of Amendment (providing for advisory opinions by supreme judicial court); 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201-2202
(1982) (providing for declaratory judgments in federal courts); Responsa, in 14 ENCYCLOPEDIA
JUDAICA 83-95 (1972) (discussing history and role of responsa in Jewish law).
97. Note that the adjudicative function is not necessarily coextensive with everything that judicial
institutions legitimately do. Cf District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462,
476-82 (1983) (discussing distinction between judicial and administrative or ministerial court
proceedings).
98. See Fried, The Artificial Reason of the Law or: What Lawyers Know, 60 TEX. L. REv. 35,
38 (1981). This is not to say that law is in every sense autonomous, or that it is not at all reducible to
other forms of inquiry.
99. R. DWORKIN, supra note 92, at 82.
100. L. FUI.LER, THE MORALrrY OF THE LAW 15-30, 170-77 (1964); cf. Fletcher, Paradoxes in
Legal Thought, 85 COLUM. L. REv. 1263, 1284-92 (1985).
101. H.L.A. HART, supra note 93, at 39. Some Norm-Based theorists take this claim even fur-
ther, arguing that legal norms themselves (at least in traditional areas such as torts, contracts, and
criminal law) should not be concerned with justice writ large, but only with one aspect of justice,
known variously as corrective or commutative justice. See, e.g., C. FRIED, CONTRACT AS PROMISE
(1981); Fletcher, Fairness and Utility in Tort Theory, 85 HARV. L. REv. 537 (1972); Weinrib,
Toward a Moral Theory of Negligence Law, 2 J.L. & PHIL 37 (1983); cf. Gewirtz, Choice in the
Transition: School Desegregation and the Corrective Ideal, 86 CoLuM. L. REv. 728 (1986) (apply-
ing broad notion of corrective justice to equal protection law). See generally J. MURPHY & J. COLE-
MAN, THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 167-209 (1984) (comparing corrective justice theories with other
accounts of the foundations of tort and contract law). The broad account of the Norm-Based view
offered in this Article, however, by no means requires this constraint; the distinction between distribu-
tive and commutative justice, which perfectly captures the nature and limits of adjudication, may or
may not capture the nature and limits of law, and its use for that purpose may actually ignore the
primary distinction, so strongly emphasized here, between the reasons for a rule and the reasons for
applying it in a particular case. See R. DWORKIN, supra note 92, at 83; Kronman, Contract Law and
1221
The Yale Law Journal
the rhetoric of law as hermeneutics 02-a rhetoric profoundly resonant
with, whether or not completely embraced by, the Norm-Based view: Ad-
judication is at its heart an act of reading rather than an act of
engineering.
I have already suggested that the essence of every Norm-Based theory is
not just norms, but a system of norms.10 3 One reason for this is that the
process by which norms come into being is always identified with some
source of legitimacy or validity. For some Norm-Based theorists, the
source is natural reason,"" or- as in the most time-honored theory of nat-
ural law-positive legislation bounded by natural reason. " 5 For others,
the ground of validity consists in the will of a sovereign,106 or the applica-
tion of a basic constituting rule 0 7 or some other fundamental criterion. In
any event, it is quite unexceptionable that one would speak of the norms
justified by natural reason as the system of natural law, the norms justi-
fied by the political process of Grenada as the system of Grenadian law,
and so on.
This account, however, can only go part of the way in explaining why
we think of norms as forming systems. After all, a system of norms is
more than a set of norms. A system of norms fits together. It is capable, as
a whole, of forming the basis for judging behavior and establishing rights
and duties. It is by their membership in a system that norms are evalu-
ated, ranked, and reconciled. Perhaps most important, only through the
existence of a system does it become possible to state and satisfy what may
be the most basic practical requirement of legality-a rule of non-
contradiction, which requires that a given event not be governed simulta-
neously by two directly opposite norms.108 For the Norm-Based view to
Distributive Justice, 89 YALE L.J. 472, 501 (1980).
102. See, e.g., J. WHITE, WHEN WORDS LOSE THEIR MEANING (1984); Dworkin, Law as Inter-
pretation, 60 TEX. L. REV. 527 (1982); Garet, Comparative Normative Hermeneutics, 58 S. CAL. L.
REV. 35 (1985).
103. In this Article, I will use the phrase "normative system" to refer to a system of norms,
understood as relatively abstract entities, and the phrase "legal regime" to refer to a normative system
plus the actors and institutions who most directly apply themselves to its generation, enforcement, or
articulation.
104. See, e.g., 2 S. PUFENDORF, DE JURE NATURAE ET GENTIUM LIBRI OCTO 145-58, 772-78
(1688, Oldfather & Oldfather trans. 1934); cf. R. DWORKIN, supra note 92, at 22-45, 81-123 (argu-
ing that content of law is determined by "principles" as well as "rules").
105. See 28 THOMAS AQUINAS, SUMMA THEOLOGICA, Prima Secundae, Qus. 90, 95 (Blackfriars
ed. 1966); cf. 2 E. COKE, INSTITUTES 50 (4th ed. 1671) (arguing that Acts of Parliament are void if
contrary to common law); Bonham's Case, 8 Co. Rep. 114a, 118a, 77 Eng. Rep. 646, 652 (1610)
(Lord Coke) (same).
106. See J. AUSTIN, THE PROVINCE OF JURISPRUDENCE DETERMINED 133-34 (Library of Ideas
ed. 1954).
107. See H.L.A. HART, supra note 93, at 97-107 (discussing rule of recognition and legal
validity).
108. See L. FULLER, supra note 100, at 65-70; H. KELSEN, supra note 93, at 374-75, 406;
Hohfeld, supra note 94, at 557.
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get off the ground, a judge (or anyone else) who seeks to discover what
norm applies to a set of facts must be directed to that norm by some
procedure, and that procedure in turn defines the system of which the
norm is a part.109
B. Amplifications and Qualifications
I contended at the start of this discussion that the Norm-Based view
encompasses broad and deep currents in jurisprudential thought. To make
that point convincing, I will need to discuss in some detail a number of
amplifications and qualifications on the basic account.1 °
1. Conceptualism
In the first place, the commitment of the Norm-Based view to the rela-
tive autonomy of the law does not necessarily imply a commitment to legal
conceptualism, by which I mean the belief that law is a self-contained
logical system whose contents can be derived by a process of deduction
from a relatively small number of axioms without reference to external
factors such as policy or purpose.1 ' As I have already suggested, a Norm-
Based theorist can acknowledge that legal norms have specific purposes
grounded in one or more social policies, and that those norms can change
over time in response to revised social policies or needs. In addition, some-
one who holds the Norm-Based view need not believe that normative sys-
tems depend on a small number of basic rules that form the axiomatic
ground for all the system's other rules. Finally, and perhaps most impor-
tantly, the Norm-Based theorist can believe that legal norms should be
interpreted, in small or large part, by explicit consideration of the policies
or felt needs that underlie them. 1
109. Cf H.L.A. HART, supra note 93, at 92-93 (discussing how "rules of recognition" tie indi-
vidual primary norms together into single system of law).
110. I should, however, emphasize at this point the limited ambition of this discussion. Not only
am I describing a family of legal theories, which requires that many questions of detail be left open,
but this account is not exhaustive. In writing this Article, I have often been tempted to let the juris-
prudential tail wag the choice of law dog. Insofar as I have not completely succumbed to that tempta-
tion, my intention in the account that follows is to limit myself to themes that are either particularly
important to an understanding of the Norm-Based view, or that will serve a particular purpose at
later points in the Article.
111. See Grey, Langdell's Orthodoxy, 45 U. Prrr. L. REv. 1, 5-20 (1983).
112. At the same time, though, the Norm-Based view does give some intellectual respectability to
conceptualism: If the interpretation of a system of norms is at the heart of the adjudicative process,
then a method of interpretation that seeks to lend some order to that system cannot simply be laughed
out of the arena. Moreover, the Norm-Based view is probably incompatible with a thoroughgoing and
uncompromising I6gal instrumentalism. For one thing, even a hermeneutic that explicitly looks to
policy must, if it is to remain credible as a method of interpretation, recognize that some concern for
the language of a rule-call that concern formalism if you like-is an inevitable part of interpreting
that rule, that the most convincing reading of a rule will sometimes diverge from its underlying policy,
and that the underlying policy of some rules is lost in the mists. Cf R. UNGER, LAW IN MODERN
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2. Enforcement
Nothing in the basic Norm-Based view should be taken to suggest that
Norm-Based theorists are unconcerned with the actual enforcement of le-
gal rights or the actual operation of legal regimes. 113 On the contrary,
their approach provides a particularly compelling perspective from which
to evaluate the performance of legal regimes.11 In addition, Norm-Based
theorists are in general quite prepared to admit that alongside the "inter-
nal"115 or "dogmatic" '16 perspective on law there exists an equally impor-
tant "external" or "sociological" perspective with its own equally legiti-
mate interests and modes of explanation.11 7 They simply argue against the
jurisprudential reductionism that denies the internal perspective its own
day in court.
Finally, any Norm-Based theory founded at least in part on institutions
of positive law-that is, most of the Norm-Based theories in the contem-
porary discourse-will of necessity recognize a link between the content of
a normative system and the course of actual events. At the very least, most
positivistic Norm-Based theories, 1 ' as well as many accounts of natural
law,119 assert that for a norm to be a valid member of a mature normative
system, it must in some way be enacted 2 ° or recognized 2 by the positive
legal authority whose task it is to define that system. 2 Moreover, some
positivistic accounts condition the continued validity of a norm on a gen-
eral pattern of ongoing recognition or enforcement by the same or other
authorities.12 3 Indeed, even Norm-Based views of law that reject these
SoCIET' 209-10 (1976) (discussing "purposive legal reasoning" and arguing that "the policies by
which the modern lawyer wants to justify his elaborations of the law tend either to become abstract to
the point of meaninglessness or to appear as expressions of an effort to manipulate all rules so as to
further the arbitrary preferences of particular interest groups").
113. See supra note 103 (distinguishing "normative system" from "legal regime").
114. This Article itself is, of course, ultimately a study in the enforcement of legal rights.
115. See H.L.A. HART, supra note 93, at 55-56, 86-88; cf. R. DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE 78-85
(1986) (discussing "internal" and "external" forms of skepticism).
116. 1 M. WEBER, ECONOMY AND SOCIETY 311-12 (G. Roth & C. Wittich eds. 1968).
117. Cf H. KELSEN, The Pure Theory of Law and Analytical Jurisprudence, in WHAT iS JUS-
TICE 266, 269 (1957).
118. See, e.g., H.L.A. HART, supra note 93, at 59-60; H. KELSEN, PURE THEORY OF LAW
10-13 (M. Knight trans. 2d ed. 1970).
119. See 28 THOMAS AQUINAS, supra note 105, Prima Secundae, Qu. 90, arts. 3-4, at 13-17.
120. See J. AUSTIN, supra note 106, at 9-21. But cf id. at 31-33 (discussing "tacit" commands).
121. See H.L.A. HART, supra note 93, at 59-60.
122. In some Norm-Based theories, that defining power is located in the judicial rather than the
legislative function. See, e.g., J. RAZ, THE CONCEPT OF A LEGAL SYSTEM 190-202 (2d ed. 1980)
(discussing membership in a legal system in terms of recognition by "primary organs"). Even this type
of Norm-Based account, however, by virtue of its emphasis on a relatively formal notion of legal
validity, clearly maintains the distinction between norms and their enforcement. See id. at 197-202.
123. See, e.g., H. KELSEN, supra note 118, at 11 (minimum of effectiveness as condition of legal
norm's validity, and effectiveness requires that norm be applied by legal organs in concrete cases). But
cf. H. KELSEN, supra note 93, at 119 (as long as legal order as a whole does not lose its efficacy, there
may exist isolated norms which are valid and yet are not efficacious, though doctrine of desuetude can
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conditions and identify the existence and meaning of norms with the ongo-
ing life of an organic normative community, might well recognize that the
instruments of adjudication and enforcement play a major though not ex-
clusive role in that organic process.124
None of this, however, alters the fundamental premise of the Norm-
Based view that the description of a set of norms is not identical with a
description of its institutional enforcement. However complex or subtle
the relationship between legal validity and enforcement may be, they re-
main separate forms of explanation. Although enforcement may, to some
degree, be a prerequisite to validity, the two are not identical. Indeed, the
very notion of a relationship between the two, as long as that relationship
is not one of identity, merely restates the Norm-Based thesis. In any
Norm-Based theory, the case of an unenforced right may be problematic,
even terribly problematic, but it is never incoherent. If a norm is a valid
member of the normative system of a legal regime-however the notion of
validity may be defined-then any individual judge who fails to enforce it
not only deviates from some statistical pattern, but is also, from the point
of view internal to that legal regime, "wrong.'
x2 5
3. Ontology
But what exactly is the status of this legal enterprise? Opponents of the
Norm-Based view have spent a good deal of ink denying the metaphysical
reality of legal norms or rights "existing" independent of their enforce-
ment. 26 This critique, however, naively assumes that if norms and rights
actually existed, they could only be ethereal beings brooding beyond the
stratosphere or perched on top of flagpoles. In fact, Norm-Based theories
may adopt any number of views on the ontology of law. First, they may
eventually render unenforced norm invalid by operation of the negative legal effect of custom). For
more doctrinal discussions of desuetude, see, for example, 1A C. SANDS, SUTHERLAND ON STATU-
TORY CONSTRUTION § 23.25 (1972); Bonfield, The Abrogation of Penal Statutes by Nonenforce-
ment, 49 IOWA L. REv. 389 (1964).
124. See, e.g., F.C.V. SAVIGNY, OF THE VOCATION OF OUR AGE FOR LEGISLATION AND JURIS-
PRUDENCE 24-31, 43-60 (A. Hayward trans. 1831) (describing interrelationships between customary
law and work of jurists); Cover, Folktales ofJustice: Tales of Jurisdiction, 14 CAP. U.L. REV. 179
(1985) (recounting "narratives of jurisdiction" and their role in "anarchic" theory of law).
125. This point suggests yet another reason why Norm-Based theories are concerned with en-
forcement: Precisely because they recognize the possibility of "wrong" judicial decisions, they must
grapple with the status of those decisions. In fact, most Norm-Based theories and most legal regimes
recognize an independent legal obligation to obey even wrong judicial decisions. Indeed, one way of
thinking about judicial jurisdiction is that it confers, within its terms, the right to be wrong. Only in
the absence of jurisdiction, if then, see, e.g., Stoll v. Gottlieb, 305 U.S. 165 (1938), is a "wrong"
judicial decision a nullity as well as a mistake. This topic, of course, requires much more elaboration
than I can provide here.
126. See, e.g., J. FRANK, LAW AND THE MODERN MIND 50-99 (1930); Bingham, Legal Philoso-
phy and the Law, 9 ILL. L. REV. 98 (1914); Gabel, Reification in Legal Reasoning, 3 RES. L. &
Soc'Y 25 (1980).
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bravely commit themselves to the view that norms and rights are in fact
real entities, akin to electrons and complex numbers. Second, they may
take norms and rights to be "real," but only in a different-distinctively
normative-sense. According to this view, legal norms say something true
about what law-abiding persons ought to do and legal rights say some-
thing true about what adjudicators ought to do.127 Third, they may argue
that reference to norms and rights reflects a way of talking or thinking
grounded in a community's shared life, and that norms and rights,
whether or not real, are as good as real. Finally, they may adopt a philo-
sophically pragmatic or contextualist approach to the whole business, es-
chewing any search for ultimate reality, convinced that all relevant reality
is the product of distinctive and equally valid human activities. Those
holding this view would judge the value of thinking in terms of norms and
rights, as well as the value of thinking in terms of tables and chairs or
complex numbers, by whether "they pay." 2"
Whichever approach a Norm-Based theory takes, several things are
clear. First, under none of the four views just outlined, including the first,
are rights a species of invisible gremlins that are spawned in auto acci-
dents and other disagreeable events and come screaming into court on the
heads of litigants. Second, the four views may constitute points along a
continuum, with the fourth view arguably dosing a circle linking back to
the first.1 2 Third, it is possible to do much of what a Norm-Based juris-
prudence requires without definitively deciding which of the four ap-
proaches-or some other approach-is the proper ground for that doing,
just as a scientist may do a good deal of science without committing her-
self to a full-fledged ontology of science. Finally, in light of the first three
observations, a merely ontological critique of the Norm-Based view may
well be not only naive, but also off target. Norms and rights may "exist"
whether or not they are "real," and if belief in their existence pays, then
it may pay to believe it.130
127. This normative view of law should be distinguished, of course, from the proposition that
persons ought to be law-abiding. See generally supra note 85. What is at stake, therefore, is not an
absolute "ought," but rather an "ought" that is internal to a particular discourse.
128. W. JAMES, The Sentiment of Rationalitj, in THE WILL TO BELIEVE AND OTHER ESSAYS
63, 104 (1956); see N. GOODMAN, WAYS OF WORLDMAKING 17-19 (1978); R. RORTY, Pragmatism,
Relativism, and Irrationalism, in CONSEQUENCES OF PRAGMATISM 160, 166 (1982).
129. This point essentially restates, as relevant to the present discussion, more general observa-
tions found in R. RORTY, Nineteenth-Century Idealism and Twentieth-Century Textualism, in CON-
SEQUENCES OF PRAGMATISM, supra note 128, at 139; B. WILLIAMS, Wittgenstein and Idealism, in
MORAL LUCK 144 (1981).
130. Cf. N. GOODMAN, supra note 128, at 120-21 (approximations to truth may be preferred "to
what may be regarded either as truths or as more exact truths").
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4. Interpretation
In a similar vein, something needs to be said (though little original, I
am afraid) about perhaps the central issue in contemporary jurispru-
dence-interpretation. Norm-Based theories posit that legal rules have an
"objective" meaning independent of their enforcement. But legal rules
consist of words, and words, after all, must be interpreted. If interpreta-
tion cannot be detached from the persons doing the interpreting, then the
whole Norm-Based structure may be in trouble.
Unraveling this problem requires two steps. The first step is to give
some content to "objectivity." Simply put, Norm-Based theories need not
reject the deep skepticism found in much of modern thought about the
ultimate objectivity of language, including the language of rules. As others
have pointed out, the aim of the Wittgensteinian revolution-some would
say its reactionary aim 1 1-was not to deny but to explain the social use
of language and rules. 13 2 Although Wittgenstein and other like-minded
thinkers set out to deprive language and rules of a certain epistemological
status, they also established a social explanation for why language, in fact,
works. 13 Whether or not the rules that govern our lives have any inherent
meaning, we are able to understand each other and make common use of
those rules in a given social context by virtue of a more or less shared set
of predispositions. However manipulable language is in theory, interpre-
tive communities are able to find common ground in distinguishing credi-
ble from incredible interpretations. Objectivity is simply the ability to ar-
rive at meanings that, over some range of time and space, are more or less
shared.1 3 4
131. See, e.g., R. UNGER, PASSION: AN ESSAY ON PERSONALITY 11-12 (1984).
132. For arguments in the legal literature similar to mine, but more extended and detailed, see,
for example, Brainerd, The Groundless Assault: A Wittgensteinian Look at Language, Structural-
ism, and Critical Legal Theory, 34 AM. U.L. REv. 1231 (1985); Patterson, Interpretation in
Law-Toward a Reconstruction of the Current Debate, 29 VILL. L. REV. 671 (1984); Stick, Can
Nihilism Be Pragmatic?, 100 HARV. L. REV. 332 (1986).
133. See S. KRIPKE, WrTGENSTEIN ON RULES AND PRIVATE LANGUAGE 86-95 (1982). Inter-
estingly, both Kripke and Unger compare this move to Hume's "skeptical solution" to his "skeptical
doubts" about the reality of causation. Id. at 62-63; R. UNGER, supra note 131, at 46; see also P. F.
STRAWSON, SKEPTICISM AND NATURALISM 14-21 (1985) (discussing continuities and differences be-
tween Hume's and Wittgenstein's responses to skepticism).
134. Indeed, the Wittgensteinian move not only fails to undermine the Norm-Based view of law,
it may even, by the very depth of its claims, bolster the credibility of that view. Wittgensteinian
skepticism extends, after all, not just to rules of law, but even to the rules of addition. See S. KRnIKE,
supra note 133, at 7-22. Thus, a critic who discounts claims of legal "objectivity" grounded on mere
"convention," see Singer, The Player and the Cards: Nihilism and Legal Theory, 94 YALE L.J. 1,
9-25 (1984) (arguing that, although law is indeterminate or incoherent, legal decisions may be pre-
dicted to some extent because they are conditioned by legal culture, conventions, common sense, and
politics), must also grapple with the fate of addition, not to mention the rest of life. See Yablon, Law
and Metaphysics (Book Review), 96 YALE L.J. 613 (1987) (reviewing S. KRIPKE, supra). On the
other hand, a truly contextualist philosophy should be doubly skeptical about any effort to judge legal
reasoning, and find it wanting, according to the criteria of other allegedly more "objective" forms of
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The meaning of legal rules may change over time and across communi-
ties, and the sages of the common law' 35 and other legal traditions"' 6 may
be right to insist that the full meaning of a rule cannot be reduced to a
finite set of propositions.13 7 But in spite of all this-or because of
it-systems of legal rules work. Thus, not only may norms and rights
"exist" whether or not they are "real," but if norms and rules seem to
have meanings, then it may well pay to treat them as if they do.
5. Discretion
But doesn't the task of construing legal language pose special problems?
Surely, common sense tells us that quite apart from the subtleties of mod-
ern philosophy, legal rules often seem ambiguous and problematic. At this
point, Norm-Based theorists38' engage in an important and by now all-
too-familiar intramural dispute about the degree of legitimate discretion
open to those whose task it is to interpret the law." 9 Regardless of which
discourse. See Stick, supra note 132 (arguing that Singer, supra, mischaracterizes legal reasoning and
misapplies work of philosophical critics such as Richard Rorty); cf H. PUTNAM, supra note 85, at
143 (criticizing arguments for moral subjectivism).
I do not mean to suggest that the Norm-Based view of law can only be sustained by this sort of
eclectic contextualism, any more than I think that it is undermined by it. One can believe that scien-
tific reasoning is more "objective" than legal reasoning, cf. B. WILLIAMS, supra note 85, at 138-39,
and still think that legal reasoning is objective enough.
135. See, e.g., 1 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *66 (equitable interpretation necessary to
apply law to particular cases that the law could not have foreseen or expressed); B. CARDOZO, THE
NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 21-23 (1921) ("The common law does not work from pre-
established truths of universal and inflexible validity to conclusions derived from them deductively. Its
method is inductive, and it draws its generalizations from particulars."); Carter, The Proposed Codifi-
cation of Our Common Law (1884), reprinted in THE LIFE OF THE LAW 115, 119-20 (J. Honnold
ed. 1964) ("The fallacy. . . in assertions that whatever is known can be written, and that if a rule of
law can be written by a judge in an opinion, it can be written and enacted in a Code, consists in the
false assumption that courts lay down rules absolutely, whereas, they lay them down provisionally
only.").
136. I have in mind in particular the relationship between the "written" and "oral" Torah in
Jewish law. See T.Y. Sanhedrin 22a ("If the Torah were handed down cut and dried, [the world]
wouldn't have a leg to stand on."); T.B. Hagiga 3b ("just as a plant grows and increases, so the
words of the Torah grow and increase").
137. See H. PrrKIN, WITrGENsTEIN AND JUSTICE (1972).
138. For present purposes, I am leaving the orthodox natural law position out of the debate.
139. According to one view, best expressed by H.L.A. Hart, most norms have a core of settled
meaning and a periphery that may well be horribly indeterminate. A conscientious judge, then, will
be constrained to a point in her decisionmaking by a web of norms, but will be forced, beyond that
point, to exercise her discretion to fill in the remaining gaps. See H.L.A. HART, supra note 93, at
120-27; Hart, Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals, 71 HARV. L. REV. 593, 608-12
(1958). Another view, identified with Ronald Dworkin, argues that, in principle, there is no room for
discretion in the conscientious judge's decisionmaking, as long as the system of legal norms is under-
stood to include not only express "rules" but also a thick collection of equally constraining "princi-
ples." See R. DWORKIN, supra note 92, at 22-39. A good many disagreements about the meaning of
legal norms exist, in Dworkin's account, simply because most of us lack the Herculean faculties of
mind that -are necessary to discern the "right answer" every time. A third view, more orthodox and
more moderate (and perhaps more Wittgensteinian) than either of the first two, agrees with Dworkin
that it is wrong to imagine that norms are determinate to a point and wide-open thereafter, but also
agrees with Hart that norms are not fully determinate. According to this third view, legal interpreta-
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position in this debate makes the most sense, I need only emphasize here
that each is well within the Norm-Based conversation. The general
Norm-Based account does not require that norms be fully determinate,
only that they be determinate enough to exist. More important, even if
discretion plays some role in Norm-Based theories, this role is limited to
hard cases or the hard aspects of all cases. This type of discretion (call it
"residual discretion") differs from a very different type of discretion that
by its own terms grants (and often bounds) that discretion (call it "affirm-
ative discretion")."' 0 The exercise of residual discretion seeks its own
diminishment-its own undoing, so to speak-and in that sense represents
a commitment to the centrality of norms and an explicit rejection of af-
firmative discretion. 41
The debate over judicial discretion, although important in the larger
scheme of things, can largely be bracketed in the context of this Article's
particular project. To the extent that substantive norms are not fully de-
terminate, the "set of substantive criteria" referred to in the formal defini-
tion of vestedness can be thought of as a set of constraints rather than
fully-specified results-particles in a Heisenbergian rather than a
Newtonian universe. But it still remains to choice of law to select which of
those sets of constraints should be applied in a given case. Therefore, as
long as legal norms are at all meaningful, the notion of choice of law
remains coherent, and the articulation of its basic principles remains
desirable.
tion, at every point, is characterized by a shifting and interactive combination of constraint and discre-
tion. See, e.g., E. LEVI, AN INTRODUCTION TO LEGAL REASONING (1961); Fiss, Objectivity and
Interpretation, 34 STAN. L. REv. 739, 744-55 (1982).
140. For attempts to draw similar distinctions, see, for example, Fletcher, Some Unwise Reflec-
tions About Discretion, 47 LAW & CONTEMP. PRoBs., Autumn 1984, at 269; Greenawalt, Discretion
and Judicial Decision: The Elusive Quest for the Fetters That Bind Judges, 75 COLUM. L. REv. 359
(1975).
141. Common law jurisdictions, for example, employ the doctrine of precedent to transform the
discretionary results of one case into non-discretionary constraints on the next. More generally, it
might be said that a responsible judge seeks in the very exercise of residual discretion to narrow that
discretion, in the words of Michael Polanyi,
down to zero by the stranglehold of his own universal intent-by the power of his responsibil-
ity over himself ....
. . . While the choices in question are open to arbitrary egocentric decisions, a craving for
the universal sustains a constructive effort and narrows down this discretion to the point where
the agent making the decision finds that he cannot do otherwise. The freedom of the subjective
person to do as he pleases is overruled by the freedom of the responsible person to act as he
must.
M. POLANYI, PERSONAL KNOWLEDGE 309 (1958). (Note that Polanyi employs this discussion of
judicial method to help explain his theory of scientific discovery.)
This sort of account also suggests that the Hart-Dworkin debate might rest in part on something of
a misunderstanding. Whereas Hart only acknowledges the existence of residual discretion, Dworkin
attacks what he mistakenly reads as a defense by Hart of bounded affirmative discretion as a general
feature of the application of norms. On the other hand, whether or not Hart and Dworkin disagree
about the nature of the judicial office, they definitely disagree about the sources of legal norms, and
their debate about discretion may only obscure that more fundamental conflict.
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A similar story can be told about elements of discretion in choice of law
itself. Vestedness excludes choice of law principles that permit affirmative
discretion, just as it bars choice of law rules that call for random selection.
On the other hand, a vestedness-constrained choice of law regime can ac-
commodate the use of residual discretion in the interpretation of choice of
law rules simply by refining the phrase "expected to generate the same"
to discount for the vagaries of application as well as articulation. 142 And
of course, if there is no such thing as residual discretion, then there is
nothing, at least in principle, to worry about at all.
6. Judicial Lawmaking
This discussion of discretion leads to the next point: Norm-Based theo-
ries need not claim that courts do not "make law." Certainly, the exercise
of residual discretion (if it exists) might be thought of as lawmaking, be-
cause it brings a norm (or a more refined version of an old norm) into
being.1 43 Moreover, a judicial decision might be entirely "wrong" as an
adjudicative act but at the same time legislate valid positive law-"right"
by definition-for the future.1 4 4
Yet while judicial lawmaking is surely admissible in the Norm-Based
universe, it should not be confused with two other distinct phenomena.
First, adjudication generally occurs in the context of a judicial bureau-
cracy. These bureaucracies, for reasons related to the rule of law itself,
generally value not only correct decisions; they also value the correct man-
agement of the decision-making process through the exercise of those parts
of the "adjective" law concerned with imperatives such as consistency, re-
142. For that matter, the first gloss could easily be understood to encompass the second.
143. The exercise of affirmative discretion cannot be thought of as lawmaking because, by defini-
tion, it does not bring a norm into being.
144. This legislative force of a wrong decision should be distinguished from its immediate enforce-
ability. See supra note 125 and accompanying text.
The dynamics of judicial lawmaking are not identical to those of legislative lawmaking. For exam-
ple, single judicial decisions do not, in typical common law theory, carry the same authority as indi-
vidual statutes; to work they must, more so than statutes, fit into the legal landscape. See Boys Mkts.
v. Retail Clerks Union, Local 770, 398 U.S. 235 (1970); Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 89 (1949)
(Frankfurter, J., concurring); State v. Michels Pipeline Constr., 63 Wis. 2d 278, 217 N.W.2d 339
(1974). This may only be a matter of degree, however; many courts, for example, are famous for
conforming statutes to the common law rather than the other way around.
In civil law theory, judicial lawmaking and even stare decisis are particularly suspect, although
some scholars of the civil law have suggested that judicial decisions can become law by virtue of first
being incorporated into "customary" jurisprudence. See generally J. DAWSON, THE ORACLES OF THE
LAW (1968) (discussing trends in various civil law jurisdictions).
Judicial lawmaking poses a range of special problems, not the least of which is the unfairness of
applying retrospectively decisions that are essentially legislative in character. Despite these problems,
nothing in the Norm-Based view requires that the conceptual and practical distinction between the
coming-into-being of norms and their enforcement manifest itself as a strict institutional separation
between the legislative and judicial offices of government.
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pose, and hierarchical accountability.145 There is some tension between
institutional imperatives and substantive justice,14' and the exercise of ju-
dicial lawmaking in the course of decision management can reduce some
of that tension by defining it away. Nevertheless, it would be a mistake to
assume that decision management and judicial lawmaking are co-
extensive. In fact, the clearest example of decision management without
judicial lawmaking is found in the very sort of cases with which choice of
law is most concerned-namely, when a court of one sovereign applies the
law of another, and therefore exercises adjudicative jurisdiction without
any claim to legislative jurisdiction.
The second phenomenon I want to discuss returns us to legal ontology
and epistemology, and their interrelation.147 To believe that norms exist in
some sense independent of their enforcement is not necessarily to believe
that the way to discern the content of those norms must be radically indi-
vidualistic or undeferential 1 48 Every interpreter of the law need not be
entitled a priori to equal respect. It might be reasonable to think that
judges, by virtue of their training, experience, competence, participation in
a process of collective deliberation and institutional transmission, or (in
common law ideology) their opportunity to test their interpretations in the
crucible of actual application, are more entitled to deference on the truth
of their legal pronouncements than the rest of us.1 49 In this sense, judges
145. These values do not, of course, enjoy equal degrees of adherence by all legal regimes. See,
e.g., M. DAMASKA, THE FACES OF JUSTICE AND STATE AUTHORITY 16-70 (1986) (discussing dif-
ferences between "hierarchical" and "coordinate" ideals of judicial organization); M. SHAPIRO,
COURTS 194-222 (1981) (discussing general absence of appeal and hierarchal judicial organization in
traditional Islamic legal culture).
146. Cf. Shea v. Louisiana, 470 U.S. 51, 59-60 (1985) (defending decision to apply newly defined
Fourth Amendment rule retroactively to cases pending on appeal, but not cases on collateral attack:
"The distinction ... properly rests on considerations of finality in the judicial process. The one
litigant already has taken his case through the primary system. The other has not. For the latter, the
curtain of finality has not been drawn. Somewhere, the dosing must come."); Ellison v. Georgia R.R.,
87 Ga. 691, 695-96, 13 S.E. 809, 810 (1891) ("Some courts live by correcting the errors of others and
adhering to their own."); 87 Ga. at 719-20, 13 S.E. at 817 (commenting, on overruling precedent,
that "the able and learned [trial] judge who presided in this case. . . had he been at liberty to follow
his own convictions as to the true law," would probably have decided the case differently. "This is the
second instance in which we have been constrained to reverse him as a consequence of correcting a
misleading decision of this court. His willingness to abide by authority which ought to control him for
the time being, is not the least conspicuous of his many judicial virtues.").
147. See Coleman, Negative and Positive Positivism, 11 J. LEGAL STUD. 139 (1982).
148. Cf. id. at 141 (distinguishing "epistemic" and "semantic" understandings of rule of
recognition).
149. Among the classic expressions of faith in the distinctive legal expertise of judges are E.
COKE, REPORTS, pt. 12, at 63, 65 (4th ed. 1738), reprinted in 77 Eng. Rep. 1342, 1343 (1907) (legal
causes "are not to be decided by natural Reason but by the artificial Reason and Judgment of Law,
which Law is an Act that requires long Study and Experience, before that a Man can attain to the
Cognizance of it . . . ."); W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *73 (judges are "depositories of the
laws; the living oracles, who must decide in all cases of doubt, and who are bound by an oath to
decide according to the law of the land. Their knowledge of that law is derived from [the 'lucubrations
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not only have authority, they are authorities. 50
Recogition of judicial expertise does not render trivial the distinction
between norms and their enforcement.15 ' It should also be clear how ex-
pertise can be distinguished from judicial lawmaking. For one thing, law-
making is self-validating in precisely the way that expertise is not. In ad-
dition, any complete account of expertise would probably need to
distinguish between greater and lesser judges, and recognize whatever au-
thority is held by persons not possessing the judicial office, includ-
ing-dare I say it-legal scholars.152 Finally, expertise, in common with
decision management, can exist even in the absence of any legitimate leg-
islative jurisdiction. Thus, to say that judges speak the law is not necessar-
ily to say that they make the law, although they may in fact do some of
each.
To identify all of these phenomena is not to say that they can always be
told apart. For that matter, the easy post-modern position might be that it
would be impossible, even in principle, to untangle completely every last
of twenty years'] . . . and from being long personally accustomed to the judicial decisions of their
predecessors."); and United States v. United Mine Workers, 330 U.S. 258, 308 (1947) (Frankfurter,
J., concurring in judgment) (Founders "set apart a body of men, who were to be the depositories of
law, who by their disciplined training and character and by withdrawal from the usual temptations of
private interest may reasonably be expected to be as 'free, impartial, and independent as the lot of
humanity will admit.' "). But cf., e.g., Fiss, The Supreme Court, 1978 Term-Foreword: The Forms
of justice, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1, 12 (1979) (judges' "capacity to make a special contribution to our
social life derives not from any personal traits or knowledge, but from the definition of the office in
which they find themselves and through which they exercise power.").
The questions raised by these sources about the relevance of putative expertise to the definition or
legitimation of judicial authority must, of course, be placed in the broader context of philosophical and
social science debates about the nature and limits of political authority in general. See, e.g., G. CHRIS-
TIE, supra note 86, at 83-146; C. FRIEDRICH, TRADITION AND AUTHORITY (1972); Nomos I: Au-
THORITY (C. Friedrich ed. 1958) (collection of articles by various authors); Bell, Authority, in ROYAL
INsTITUTE OF PHILOSOPHY LECTURES, 1969-70, at 190 (1971); Winch, Authority, in POLITICAL
PHILOSOPHY 97 (A. Quinton ed. 1967).
On a possibly more mundane level, considerations of putative expertise often figure in legal doc-
trines and debates relating to the allocation of authority among different judicial and quasi-judicial
actors. See, e.g., Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Schor, 106 S. Ct. 3245, 3254-55 (1986)
(discussing relative expertise of courts and administrative agencies in interpreting agency's statutory
grant of jurisdiction); Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals v. Thompson, 106 S. Ct. 3229, 3242-43 (1986)
(Brennan, J., dissenting) (discussing relative expertise of federal and state judges in determinations of
federal law); In re McLinn, 739 F.2d 1395 (9th Cir. 1984) (holding, contrary to views of most other
circuits, that no special deference should be accorded to local federal district judge's determination of
state law).
150. Cf G. CHRISTIE, supra note 86, at 94-95 (discussing and rejecting this view).
151. For one thing, expertise, in any secular regime at least, is at best only highly presumptive.
We might defer to the views of judges-or, for that matter, scientists and lexicographers-but that
deference is rarely indefeasible. Indeed, even a commitment to infallible expertise in some religious
traditions confirms, by the special sorts of arguments necessary to defend it, an underlying distinction
between truth and its utterance.
152. Cf Fletcher, Two Modes of Legal Thought, 90 YALE L.J. 970 (1981).
Recall that I am assuming throughout most of this Article a commonsense statist political theory
that would limit positive lawmaking to the organs of the state. See supra text accompanying note 74.
To the extent that this assumption is relaxed, there is no bar in principle to a wider dispersion of both
lawmaking power and expertise, and the line between the two becomes more difficult and interesting.
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strand of lawmaking from every last strand of decision management from
every last strand of expertise in the judicial function. But if these
problems are subtle and even mysterious, that subtlety is best revealed,
and best confronted, through the Norm-Based view itself.
7. The World Beyond
The basic Norm-Based view of law does not necessarily imply that
there is nothing in life and society besides law. For one thing, there may
be whole departments of human activity not governed, except at their bor-
ders, by law. Moreover, even governmental entities have more to worry
about than the law. Many projects-fighting fires, building roads, shoot-
ing fleeing felons, and waging limited nuclear wars-may be constrained
by law, but they attempt neither to establish norms for the future nor to
judge the past; they are, sometimes literally, acts of engineering rather
than reading. The same might be said about a whole range of allocative
decisions made by government," 3 including the granting of television li-
censes and the managing of welfare programs."" The most interesting ex-
ample, discussed by both Hart and Fuller, is taxation. 55 Imposing a tax
and rendering a judicial judgment may seem similar, in that both impose
practical consequences by reference to a person's conduct or status. Ac-
cording to the Norm-Based view, however, taxation and adjudication are
profoundly different precisely because taxation does not imply a normative
conclusion. An assessment of a tax looks to the past, but is not concerned
with judging the past, only with using it as a measure through which to
meet the needs of the present.1 56 Indeed, recognizing a fundamental differ-
ence between taxation and adjudication may be as good a litmus test as
any of one's basic sympathies with the Norm-Based view of law.
Even within the adjudicative process, the Norm-Based view cannot
claim a monopoly. Many aspects of adjective law, for example, have tradi-
tionally and self-consciously been understood to include a present-looking
calculus otherwise excluded from the Norm-Based universe. Increasingly,
153. This is actually a subject of some controversy in administrative theory. See generally E.
BARDACH & R. KAGAN, GOING BY THE BOOK (1982); J. MASHAW, BUREAUCRATIC JUSTICE
(1983); Diver, The Optimal Precision of Administrative Rules, 93 YALE L.J. 65 (1983); Fuller, The
Forms and Limits of Adjudication, 92 HARV. L. REV. 353 (1978); Schuck, When the Exception
Becomes the Rule: Regulatory Equity and the Formulation of Energy Policy Through an Exceptions
Process, 1984 DUKE L.J. 163.
154. Admittedly, these activities are often carried out in quasi-judicial form, but this sort of confu-
sion of categories may sometimes disserve both allocative efficiency and the rule of law. See Fuller,
supra note 153.
155. See L. FUL.LER, supra note 100, at 75; H.L.A. HART, supra note 93, at 39.
156. Cf Graetz, Legal Transitions: The Case of Retroactivity in Income Tax Revision, 126 U.
PA. L. REV. 47 (1977).
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the same latitude is being asserted with respect to questions of remedy. 157
In addition, a few corners of legal process-the determination of child
custody for instance-are arguably entirely informed by considerations of
present welfare rather than retrospective judgment.1 5 These instances,
however, are the exceptions that prove the rule. To say that people come
to court with rights arising out of the effect of legal norms on events in the
world is not to say that courts do not have an independent interest in the
orderly and efficient processing of legal claims. Nor does it imply that the
vindication of rights can always proceed unproblematically from the sub-
stance of those rights. And if we believe that the custody of children
should not be treated as a reward or punishment for parental conduct, it
may make perfect sense for child custody determinations to be based as
much as possible on the best interests of the child. Indeed, it is no coinci-
dence that precisely in contexts like procedure and child custody, but
never in the basic task of determining substantive issues, legal regimes
routinely recognize, even encourage, a measure of the prerogative that I
earlier called affirmative discretion.
Still, this account leaves something very important unacknowledged.
The Norm-Based view of law makes certain claims about the nature of
legality and legal judgment. One can imagine a society that rejected the
institution of legality entirely-whose notion of conflict resolution cen-
tered entirely on the needs of the present. The existence of such a society
would not, however, prove that the Norm-Based view of law was wrong;
it would merely prove that not all societies govern themselves by law.
Even a society that takes the rule of law seriously might well recognize
other normative demands, coming from outside the legal discourse, which
would override the norm-generated rights of litigants.159 Imagine, for ex-
ample, a civil suit in which the defendant threatened to set off a small
nuclear explosion if he lost. That might not be the time to be fastidious
about the rule of law.1" But the possibility of such cases proves very little.
157. See supra note 94 (citing sources); see also, e.g., Local 28 v. EEOC 106 S. Ct. 3019,
3034-35 (1986) (plurality opinion) (courts vested with broad discretionary power to award appropri-
ate relief to remedy unlawful discrimination); Kakalik v. Bernardo, 184 Conn. 386, 395-96, 439 A.2d
1016, 1020-21 (1981) (availability of specific performance in contract suit is not matter of right, but
depends on equitable considerations).
158. See Chambers, Rethinking the Substantive Rules for Custody Disputes in Divorce, 83 MIcH.
L. REv. 477 (1984). To the extent that this account characterizes the child custody process correctly,
that process differs from typical adjudication not because the standards that come into play are less
determinate-one can easily imagine a child custody process guided by very determinate, indeed
mechanical, rules-but because the custody inquiry does not ground claims of right on the application
of law to a normative judgment of parties' conduct.
159. For a particularly powerful defense of this idea, see J. SHKLAR, LEGALISM (1964).
160. 1 use this melodramatic example only because more standard cases would raise the issue of
the extent to which the law already incorporates within it the demands of morality and common sense.
See supra note 139 (discussing debate on judicial discretion). Lord Denning, the now retired great
British judge, for example, once denied the accusation that his jurisprudence surrenders to the pleas of
1234
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In the first place, they are by their nature extraordinary.1 61 In addition,
each case would have to be justified by an extraordinary set of considera-
tions to explain not only why the rule of law should be put aside, but also
how an officer whose privileged place in the polity is defined and justified
by her service to the law is authorized to put it aside. Moreover, from a
Norm-Based perspective, there would always exist, even in such cases, a
"true" (or at least approximately "true"), distinctively legal answer to the
dispute in court, regardless of the fact that something as distracting as the
threat of mass destruction prevented that truth from being pronounced. 62
Extra-legal considerations that may come into play in an adjudication can
prevail only over against the more specialized normative demands of legal-
ity; the rule of law can be ignored, but it is there to be ignored, and the
result of ignoring it is in some sense not a legal judgment at all, but
merely a command.
Finally, and most importantly, although non-legal considerations may
come into play in an adjudication, this does not imply that judicial deci-
sion-making characteristically or necessarily consists of balancing legal
and non-legal considerations to achieve an optimal result. Indeed, the
Norm-Based view of law assumes that a judge can act coherently on the
basis of a legal conclusion that runs counter to the judge's own view of
what would be best, all things (including the law) considered.1 63 If, in
other contexts, disjunctions between all-things-considered judgments and
decisions to act are aptly characterized as examples of "incontinence '"164
or "unfree actions"' 6 5 that may be precisely why in the legal context
Bassanio, the character in Shakespeare's The Merchant of Venice, who begs Portia to "Wrest once the
law to your authority. To do a great right, do a little wrong . . . ." W. SHAKESPEARE, THE
MERCHANT OF VENICE, IV, i, 214-15 (K. Myrick ed. 1965). Instead, Denning called himself a
"Portia man," loyal to the law, but willing to avoid an "unjust decree" by construing the law "so as to
do what justice and equity require." DENNING, THE DISCIPLINE OF LAW 30-31 (1979). But cf C.
GILLIGAN, IN A DIFFERENT VOICE 105 (1982) (discussing Portia to very different effect).
161. This is not much of an argument as it stands, and the suspicious reader is urged to ignore it
and go on to the next point. Lurking behind this claim is not only an empirical guess, but also two
very personal, and decidedly vague perceptions: (1) that most actual normative systems are rich and
supple enough (vacuous and manipulatable enough, if you prefer) to avoid the need to discard them,
and (2) that a norm-centered worldview is powerful enough to redefine and transform the very con-
siderations that are weighed against it.
162. Cf R. UNGER, supra note 112, at 204.
163. See generally J. RAZ, PRACTICAL REASON AND NORMS 35-47, 143-44 (1975); G. VON
WRIGHT, NORM AND ACTION (1963); Rawls, supra note 90. For more general philosophical defenses
of the view that one can coherently act on a decision that runs counter to one's view of what is best all
things considered, see, for example, ARISTOTLE, THE NICHOMACHEAN ETHICS bk. VII, chs. 2-3;
Davidson, Freedom to Act, in ESSAYS IN ACTION AND EVENTS 63 (1980); Davidson, How Is Weak-
ness of the Will Possible?, in id., supra, at 21 [hereinafter Davidson, How Is Weakness of the Will
Possible?]; Frankfort, Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a Person, 68 J. PHIL. 5 (1971); Wat-
son, Free Agency, 72 J. PHIL 205 (1975).
164. Davidson, How Is Weakness of the Will Possible?, supra note 163, at 21; see ARISTOTLE,
supra note 163, at bk. VII, chs. 2-3 (discussing moral incontinence).
165. Watson, supra note 163.
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Norm-Based theorists strive for a "government of laws and not men.' ' "
And if this premise contains within it the seeds of both honor and tragedy,
then a Norm-Based theorist would argue that these merely reflect the po-
tential for both honor and tragedy in the enterprise of law.
C. The Decision-Based View of Law
The intellectual origins of contemporary Decision-Based jurisprudence
in the United States can be traced to Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. and his
famous aphorism: "The prophecies of what the courts will do in fact, and
nothing more pretentious, are what I mean by the law.' 61 7 For my pur-
poses, though, I want to identify the earliest expressions of the Decision-
Based view in modern American jurisprudence with the work of John
Chipman Gray and, even more clearly, Joseph W. Bingham, two promi-
nent precursors of American Legal Realism."6 ' In the Realist movement,
the Decision-Based view appeared as one theme among many. 16  Among
its most articulate defenders, at least at certain points in their careers,
were Karl Llewellyn, Jerome Frank, Underhill Moore, and of course,
Walter Wheeler Cook. In contemporary legal scholarship, the Decision-
Based view appears in three principal ways: (1) in the work of a relatively
small number of scholars who are the direct heirs to the more theoretical
and systematic branch of Realism; 17  (2) in some expressions of the Criti-
cal Legal Studies Movement;"'l and (3) as a background assumption,
rarely articulated and often diluted, in at least some corners of standard or
mainstream legal scholarship.'72
166. MASS. CONST. pt. 1, art. 30.
167. Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REv. 457, 461 (1897). Whether Holmes really
belongs in the Decision-Based camp, aside from his role as semi-mythical precursor, is an important
question about which I express no views.
168. See J.C. GRAY, THE NATURE AND SOURCES OF THE LAW (1909); Bingham, supra note 86.
169. Cf W. TwINING, supra note 37; Llewellyn, Some Realism About Realism, 44 HARV. L.
REv. 1222 (1931).
170. See, e.g., G. CHRISTIE, supra note 86; D'Amato, The Limits of Legal Realism, 87 YALE
L.J. 468 (1978).
171. See, e.g., Hutchinson & Monahan, Law, Politics, and the Critical Legal Scholars: The
Unfolding Drama of American Legal Thought, 36 STAN. L. REV. 199 (1984); Kennedy, Form and
Substance in Private Law Adjudication, 89 HARV. L. REv. 1685 (1976); Singer, supra note 134.
172. Two examples drawn almost at random are: Schwartz, Tort Law Reform: Strict Liability
and the Collateral Source Rule Do Not Mix, 39 VAND. L. REv. 569, 572-73 (1986) (assuming that
strict liability in tort is entirely independent of behavior of defendant or duty owed by defendant to
plaintiff, and that only rationale for strict liability is policy of risk distribution); Note, The LawlFact
Distinction and Unsettled State Law in the Federal Courts, 64 TEx. L. REv. 157, 159-65 (1985)
(assuming that only responsible way for federal court sitting in diversity to decide question as to
which state law is unsettled is to attempt to predict how highest state court would decide issue, and
that any effort by federal court to analyze underlying principles of state law represents nothing more
than impermissible exercise of "independent judgment").
The categorization of contemporary law and economics analysis in terms of the dichotomy I have
drawn between the Norm-Based and Decision-Based views of law presents a particularly interesting
problem. On the one hand, the emphasis in much of the law and economics literature on the incentive
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The Decision-Based view is most simply described as the antithesis of
the Norm-Based view. Specifically, the Decision-Based view rejects as
metaphysical nonsense or worse the two distinctions at the heart of Norm-
Based jurisprudence: the distinction between the existence of legal norms
and their enforcement, and the distinction between the varied purposes of
legal norms and the single-minded purpose of adjudication.
The first distinction strikes many Decision-Based theorists, in Joseph
W. Bingham's words, as "a manifestation of false fundamental notions of
logic": 173
Certainly there are rules and principles of law, as there are rules
and principles of biology or of architecture or of any other science or
art. . . A rule of law is a generalized abstract comprehension of
how courts would decide concrete questions within its scope. A prin-
ciple of law is an abstract comprehension of considerations which
would weigh with courts in the decision of questions to which it is
applicable. . . . There is nothing authoritative in the existence of a
rule or a principle. . . . If these generalizations accurately indicate
potential legal effects within their scope, or comprehend accurately
considerations which would be given weight by courts in the decision
of cases, they are valid rules or principles of law.'"
Indeed, some Decision-Based theorists go so far as to deny any particular
import even to the explicit considerations by which judges justify their
decisions, and instead look exclusively to the effects of their decisions on
actions in the world. 17 5
With regard to the second distinction, Decision-Based theorists take as
desirable, or even as logically or psychologically inevitable, exactly the ac-
count of adjudication that Norm-Based theorists reject-namely, that ad-
effects of legal rules leads to a view of adjudication consistent with, though by no means identical to,
the standard Norm-Based model. See Easterbrook, The Supreme Court, 1983 Term-Foreword: The
Court and the Economic System, 98 HARv. L. REV. 4, 10-12 (1984) (distinguishing ex post perspec-
tive in adjudication, which simply apportions gains and losses between parties, from ex ante perspec-
tive, which looks to articulation of rules to guide out-of-court behavior). On the other hand, that same
emphasis on incentives often leads law and economics analysis to deny any normative content to legal
rules over and above the behavior they can be expected to induce. See, e.g., A. POLsNSKY, AN INTRO-
DUcTION TO LAW AND ECONOMIcs 29-32 (1983) (discussing theory of "efficient breach" in contract
law). More generally, the consequentialist philosophy underlying much of law and economics often
leads to a view of legal process too instrumentalist to fit easily into the Norm-Based account.
173. Bingham, supra note 86, at 17 n.17.
174. Id. at 22 (footnote omitted); see also, e.g., J. FRANK, supra note 126, at 46 (law consists of
"actual law . . . a past decision . . . or probable law . . . a guess as to a future decision").
Decision-Based theorists do, of course, often distinguish between "law-in-action" and "law-in-
books" or between "law as it is" and "law as it should be." Nevertheless, although both of these
distinctions are valuable and entirely consistent with most Norm-Based theories, they do not capture
what Norm-Based theorists have in mind when they refuse to identify law with judicial practice.
175. See, e.g., K. LLEWELLYN, JURISPRUDENCE 81 (1962); Oliphant, A Return to Stare Deciss,
14 A.B.A. J. 71 (1928).
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judication is a generalized effort to achieve what is best between the par-
ties or in the world at large.' 8 Although most Decision-Based theorists
will admit that respecting settled expectations is in many instances impor-
tant, they see it as a contingent good-perhaps one good among
many-not the defining goal of the enterprise of law.177
As a consequence of its rejection of the fundamental premises of Norm-
Based theory, the Decision-Based view also denies the validity or impor-
tance of the whole collection of subsidiary distinctions so lovingly surveyed
above. If, for example, the most charged moment in a legal dispute is not
the "occurrence of an event or condition to which [a] norm applies,"' 78
but the occurrence of a compulsory judicial order, then the distinction be-
tween rights and remedies appears as either a muddle or a subterfuge. For
similar reasons, the distinction between substantive and adjective issues, in
the Decision-Based view, is at best a useful organizational principle,1 79
while concoctions such as residual discretion and presumptive expertise
are too obscure to worry about at all. Decision-Based theorists also reject
the principle of non-contradiction, taking particular delight in the unsur-
prising discovery that judicial decisions often contradict each other.1 80 Fi-
nally, Decision-Based theorists reject on two counts the notion that extra-
legal considerations in an adjudication can only prevail, if they are
brought to bear at all, "over against the more specialized normative de-
mands of legality." 81 First, no considerations are by their nature extra-
legal, and, second, all official decisions of judges are by their nature law.
Just as the Norm-Based view is broader than it seems at first glance,
the Decision-Based view is narrower. It represented only one (atypically
abstract) strain within American Legal Realism, and today represents
176. See, e.g., Posner, An Economic Approach to Legal Procedure and Judicial Administration,
2 J. LEGAL STUD. 399 (1973); Singer, supra note 134, at 65; Yntema, The Hornbook Method and
the Conflict of Laws, 37 YALE L.J. 468 (1928); cf. R. UNGER, supra note 112, at 192-242.
177. See, e.g., Munzer, A Theory of Retroactive Legislation, 61 TEX. L. REv. 425 (1982); Wil-
liams, The Aims of the Law of Tort, 4 CURRENT LEGAL PROBS. 137 (1951). I do not mean to suggest
that Norm-Based theories are themselves ultimately concerned with psychological expectations. The
circularity implicit in looking at bare expectations is obvious. In any event, a theory of law grounded
in such expectations would be difficult to defend in an area such as torts, in which actual expectations
are often attenuated. What is at stake in Norm-Based adjudication is not so much the vindication of
particular expectations but the vindication of a system of norms capable (subject to the limitations of
language) of giving rise to specific legitimate expectations.
178. See supra text accompanying note 96.
179. See, e.g., K. LLEWELLYN, THE BRAMBLE BUSH 84 (1930); Cook, "Substance" and "Proce-
dure" in the Conflict of Laws, 42 YALE L.J. 333 (1933).
180. See, e.g., Dalton, An Essay in the Deconstruction of Contract Doctrine, 94 YALE L.J. 997
(1985); Llewellyn, Remarks on the Theory of Appellate Decisions and the Rules or Canons About
How Statutes Are To Be Construed, 3 VAND. L. REV. 395 (1950); Powell, Current Conflicts Between
the Commerce Clause and the State Police Power, 1922-1927, 12 MINN. L. REv. 470 (1928); cf
Tushnet, Marxism as Metaphor (Book Review), 68 *CORNELL L. REV. 281, 288-89 (1983) (posing
existence of "rules and counterrules" as challenge to Marxist analysis of law).
181. See supra text accompanying note 163 (emphasis added).
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only one strain within Critical Legal Studies and similar movements."8 2
For example, the Decision-Based view should not be confused with a sim-
ple interest in the actual behavior of judges and other actors, provided the
interest falls short of the assertion that sheer behavior alone is necessary to
the complete study of legal phenomena. Nor should it be confused with
the critiques of conceptualism that remain perhaps the most important
legacy of the Realist movement; as I have made clear, a Norm-Based the-
orist need not be a conceptualist. Nor should it be confused with the ex-
pressions of rule-skepticism that were the second significant legacy of Re-
alism, provided the rule-skepticism tapers before denying any force or
meaning to rules.' 8 Nor, finally, should it be confused with efforts at
uncovering the social context, or class biases, or plain old power plays
behind the facade of particular legal norms or systems of norms,"8 4 as long
as those efforts do not deny any significance or independent meaning to
the facade once it is constructed.' 5
D. The Norm-Based View (Not Really) Defended
I have already promised that I will not try here to provide a full-
fledged justification of the Norm-Based view of law. Others much more
capable than I have done so with at least some success.' 8 6 I cannot resist,
however, trying to squeeze into the margin some account, abridged and
schematic as it is, of the leading arguments for the Norm-Based view,
182. Roberto Unger, for example, has been careful to disassociate himself from a thoroughgoing
Decision-Based perspective. See, e.g., R. UNGER, supra note 112, at 56 ("To arrive at a proper
appreciation of what the concept of a legal order is meant to describe, one must tread a narrow path
between opposite errors," one of which "consists of the tendency to treat the generality and autonomy
of a legal order as merely ideological pretenses that ought simply to be set aside by one who would
understand how law operates."); id. at 256 ("Whenever we set aside the fact of consciousness, we fall
into behaviorism. Whenever we disregard the limitations of consciousness, we slide into idealism.").
183. It might be worth noting, though, that an entirely unskeptical attitude about the determinacy
of rule-like language by no means constitutes acceptance of the Norm-Based view that those rules can
generate a distinctively legal set of rights.
184. See, e.g., D. HAY, P. LINEBAUGH, J. RuL.E, E. THOMPSON & C. WINSLOW, ALBION'S
FATAL TREE (1975); Frug, The City as a Legal Concept, 93 HARv. L. REv. 1059 (1980); Posner,
Economics, Politics and the Reading of Statutes and the Constitution, 49 U. CHI. L. REV. 263, 265
(1982); Stigler, The Theory of Economic Regulation, 2 BELL J. ECON. & MGMT. Sci. 3 (1971). As
these examples illustrate, materialist accounts of legal enactments do not come only from the political
left.
185. One particularly interesting and eloquent attempt at understanding both the social context of
particular legal norms and the independent significance of the rule of law is found in E.P. THOMP-
SON, WHIGS AND HUNTERS (1975). Within the Critical Legal Studies Movement, the "relative au-
tonomy of the law" remains a subject of interesting internal debate. See, e.g., Balbus, Commodity
Form and Legal Form: An Essay on the "Relative Autonomy" of the Law, 11 LAW & Soc'v REv.
571 (1977); Feinman, Critical Approaches to Contract Law, 30 UCLA L. REv. 829 (1983); Trubek,
Complexity and Contradiction in the Legal Order: Balbus and the Challenge of Critical Social
Thought About Law, 11 LAW & Soc'Y REv. 529 (1977).
186. See, e.g., R. DWORKIN, supra note 92, at 82-90; L. FULLER, THE LAW IN QUEST oF
ITSELF 53-62 (2d ed. 1940); H.L.A. HART, supra note 93, at 55-57, 79-88, 97-107, 132-44; Dick-
inson, Legal Rules: Their Function in the Process of Decision, 79 U. PA. L. REv. 833 (1931).
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while the text of the Article moves on to its own more narrow commission.
The arguments are diverse: Some defend the Norm-Based view by refer-
ence to the inadequacies 1 7 and internal contradictions'88 of the Decision-
Based view; others defend the Norm-Based view on its own merits, as
a descriptive proposition,'8 9 or a prescriptive one,190 or something of
187. The beginning of wisdom about the Decision-Based view may be the recognition that the
strain of legal realism with which it began was grounded in larger intellectual movements (primarily
outside professional philosophy) that were influential in the early part of the century, but are now
commonly considered naive or incomplete. See generally L. KALMAN, LEGAL REALISM AT YALE,
1927-1960, at 1-44 (1986) (discussing aspects of intellectual background of American Legal Real-
ism); W. TWINING, supra note 37, at 3-83 (same). These movements included modern forms of
positivistic nominalism that saw "word magic" as the main threat to clear thought, see C. OGDEN & I.
RICHARDS, THE MEANING OF MEANING 40-47 (1927), and theories of psychological behaviorism
that often reduced human consciousness to observable motions and responses, see, e.g., J. WATSON,
PSYCHOLOGY FROM "ime STANDPOINT OF A BEHAVIORIST 9-15, 346-56 (1919); and reduced human
decisionmaking to the aggregation of miscellaneous predispositions, see, e.g., K. LEWIN, FIELD THE-
ORY IN SOCIAL SCIENCE (D. Cartwright ed. 1951); E. TOLMAN, PURPOSIVE BEHAVIOR IN ANIMALS
AND MEN (1932). For instances of some of these premises in the work of the legal realists, see, for
example, W.W. COOK, supra note 17, at 8, 154-56; Cohen, Field Theory and Judicial Logic, 59
YALE L.J. 238 (1950); Green, The Duty Problem in Negligence Cases, 28 COLUM. L. REV. 1014
(1928); Moore, Rational Basis of Legal Institutions, 23 COLUM. L. REV. 609 (1923). Legal realism
also often displayed a wistful envy of the hard sciences, see, e.g., Cook, Scientific Method and the
Law, 13 A.B.A. J. 303 (1927); Oliphant, Facts, Opinions, and Value-Judgments, 10 TEx. L. REV.
127 (1932), and a commitment to a particularly unrestricted form of utilitarianism, see, e.g., Cohen,
Transcendental Nonsense and the Functional Approach, 35 COLUM. L. REV. 809 (1935).
For contemporaneous critiques of the reliance of legal realism on such premises, see, for example,
Cohen, Philosophy and Legal Science, 32 COLUM. L. REV. 1103 (1932); Cohen,Justice Holmes and
the Nature of Law, 31 CoLum. L. REV. 352 (1932); Fuller, American Legal Realism, 82 U. PA. L.
REV. 429 (1934); Kantorowicz, supra note 93. Today, nominalism, behavioralism, scientism, and
utilitarianism are all less potent cultural trends. Just as important, more recent dominant versions of
these trends have lost many of the special, mock radical twists that drove the legal realist enterprise.
See, e.g., R.M. HARE, MORAL THINKING (1981); E. NAGEL, LOGIC WITHOUT METAPHYSICS
(1956); G. RYLE, THE CONCEPT OF MIND (1949); Goodman & Quine, Steps Toward a Constructive
Nominalism, 12 J. SYMBOLIC LOGIC 105 (1947).
One way of understanding why all this should be so is to note that the common denominator of the
premises supporting Decision-Based realism was a species of metaphysical optimism. The realists
believed that, behind the illusions of the law, there was a solid, undeniable, and unitary reality about
which they could be "realistic." Current intellectual discourse is less confident, cf. supra text accom-
panying notes 131-37 (discussing interpretation), but has replaced that loss of faith with new respect
for the multiplicity of ways that human beings construct the world around them in an ongoing effort
at life and understanding. See, e.g., N. GOODMAN, supra note 128; R. RORTY, PHILOSOPHY AND
THE MIRROR OF NATURE (1979); W. SELLARS, SCIENCE, PERCEPTION, AND REALITY (1963); L.
WITTGENSTEIN, PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS (G. Anscombe trans. 3d ed. 1958). The lesson for
law here may be that, while it assimilates the insights and findings of past and present realists, it must
also remain skeptical of their limited vision of how to construct legal reality.
188. Quite apart from the grand arguments outlined in note 187, supra, the Decision-Based view
suffers from a more specific defect. As critics of legal realism have long pointed out, the Decision-
Based view must itself resort at some point to rules that are not merely identical with behavior. This
is because a Decision-Based account, even in its descriptive moments, must ultimately decide who a
judge is, and how a judge differs from a thief in the dark. See H.L.A. HART, supra note 101, at 133.
This constitutive decision must be based on some criteria independent of behavior or else it can never
get off the ground. And once a Decision-Based theory admits a role for such criteria, it is less clear
how the theory can dismiss the notion that law in general is not identical with the conduct of officials.
189. To begin with, the Norm-Based view simply gives a better description than do other ac-
counts of the ordinary understanding of law and legal norms. In common usage, and certainly in
internal discourse, we do tend to think that the content of law is distinct from the acts of officials, and
that legal judgments should on the whole reflect past behavior rather than present engineering. Simi-
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each.191 Whether all of the arguments are consistent with each other is a
good question, but an undertaking beyond the ambition of this Article.
larly, that a court might be wrong as a matter of law, or that there might be a right without a remedy,
strikes few of us as incoherent. Indeed, there is something to the idea that the realists, at their most
critical, could fashion apparent paradoxes out of the ordinary understanding of law only by exploiting
the very meanings that they rejected. See H.L.A. HART, supra note 93, at 132-44; Cf. J. SEARLE,
supra note 85, at 186 n.1 (questioning use of terms internal to institution to attack institution). Of
course, the very existence of a Decision-Based strain in the realist movement might itself pose some-
thing of a challenge to the descriptive claims of Norm-Based jurisprudence, but only to the extent that
the Decision-Based view was more than an external academic account, and actually ingratiated itself
into the law's internal understanding. Cf. infra text accompanying note 257 (discussing need for
inquiry into historical character and role of choice of law revolution).
The Norm-Based view of law also makes sense, in a way that the Decision-Based view does not, of
the "curious person" in legal culture. The curious person, unlike the "bad man" headlined by
Holmes, has moments when he wants to know what is legally right, and not merely what will keep
him out of trouble; he wants to know what a court should decide, as a matter of law, and not merely
what it will decide.
In addition to reflecting the ideology of legal culture, Norm-Based jurisprudence also makes sense
of a host of specific features of legal discourse, ranging from the substance/procedure and rights/
remedy distinctions to such notions as the difference between legality and immunity, the complexities
of breach of contract, and-of course-the ability of a court to apply the law of a foreign jurisdiction.
Finally, and perhaps most profoundly, the Norm-Based view is able to broaden the horizons sug-
gested by the secular nation-state and take seriously (although some of its versions are more interested
in doing so than others) the internal perspectives of legal regimes, such as those of religious communi-
ties and tribal societies, that are marked by an explicit reliance on the transcendent (and not merely
objective) character of law, a lack of powerful or clearly defined enforcement mechanisms, or a drive
to legal "curiosity" under circumstances no "bad man" could bear. See, e.g., E. EVANS-PRITCHARD,
THE NEUR 158-76 (1971) (discussing Neur legal system, including its strong conception of "rights");
R. KIRSCHNER, RABBINIC REPONSA OF THE HOLOCAUST ERA (1985); Cover, The Supreme Court,
1982 Term-Foreword. Nomos and Narrative, 97 HARV. L. REV. 4 (1983). For an eloquent dem-
onstration of the importance of recognizing the continuities between statist legal regimes and other
communities of legal discourse, see Cover, id.
190. The Norm-Based view can be commended, in purely instrumental terms, for promoting a
whole series of values important to a system of ordered liberty: procedural regularity, official non-
arbitrariness, protection of settled expectations, maximum substantive liberty, high moral drama for
the masses, the effective creation of efficient social incentives, and the like. See, e.g., F. HAYEK, LAW,
LEGISLATION AND LIBERTY (1973); R. POSNER, THE ECONOMICS OF JUSTICE 73-76 (1981); J.
RAZ, THE AUTHORITY OF LAW 219-22 (1979); cf. West, Law, Rights, and Other Totemic Illusions:
Legal Liberalism and Freud's Theory of the Rule of Law, 134 U. PA. L. REV. 817 (1986) (attempt-
ing Freud-influenced defense of rule of law). These consequentialist arguments for Norm-Based juris-
prudence differ from the consequentialist calculus that often figures within Decision-Based jurispru-
dence. A consequentialist account of Norm-Based jurisprudence can still insist that legal analysis itself
is in some distinctive way non-consequentialist.
Quite apart from its instrumental advantages, the Norm-Based account can also be defended in
Kantian terms as the only possible basis for legitimizing the law's regulation of private affairs. See I.
KANT, THE METAPHYSICAL ELEMENTS OF JUSTICE 36-39 (J. Ladd trans. 1965); R. DWORKIN,
supra note 92, at 82-86; J. RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 235-43 (1971); Hart, Are There Any
Natural Rights? 64 PHIL. REV. 175 (1955). In this view, treating a trial as simply one more opportu-
nity to realize some social good necessarily treats the litigants as mere means to an end. By contrast,
an account of law that treats a trial as a forum in which pre-existing rights and liabilities are vindi-
cated treats the litigants as ends in themselves-as autonomous beings bound to each other by entirely
reciprocal legal obligations and experiencing through the legal process the unfolding of the conse-
quences of those reciprocal bonds.
191. This last approach combines a number of the arguments made so far, and comports most
closely with this Article's general commitment to Norm-Based jurisprudence as a set of institutional
facts or thick concepts that are not usefully pigeonholed as either strictly descriptive or strictly pre-
scriptive. According to this view, law is a purposive enterprise with distinct characteristics and conse-
quences. Law is about legality and legal judgment, and these attributes, by their nature, imply a
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There are probably some readers who, before (or despite) my "margi-
nal" defense of the Norm-Based view, thought the alternative a straw
man. That would be delightful. My own view is that the issue is not so
easily settled. Indeed, despite my commitment to Norm-Based jurispru-
dence, I sometimes think in my (more skeptical) heart of hearts that the
controversy ultimately comes down to intellectual temperament and
commitments.
A possibly more important question, though, is whether any practical
consequences actually follow from adopting either the Norm-Based or the
Decision-Based view. In some contexts, such consequences seem limited: a
greater or lesser degree of judicial willfulness, perhaps; subtle differences
in the sorts of arguments that can legitimately be brought to bear in un-
derstanding and evaluating doctrinal results, probably; a different style of
legal scholarship, certainly. There are, however, fields of law in which
jurisprudence can inform legal doctrine forcefully and specifically. Choice
of law, because the issues it raises expose the legal enterprise to the bone,
is perhaps the best example. And that brings us back to the principle of
vestedness and its place in choice of law.
IV. VESTEDNESS (AT LAST) DEFENDED
A. The Negative Case
Let me begin with the negative case in favor of vestedness before going
on to an affirmative argument. It should now be obvious how strongly the
critique of traditional vested rights theory mounted by Walter Wheeler
Cook and Brainard Currie depended on the presuppositions of the Deci-
sion-Based strains of legal realism.192 Cook's work depended on Decision-
Based jurisprudence; indeed, his work was central to the task of defining
that jurisprudence as a component of the Realist agenda. And Currie, pre-
cisely because he was in so many respects not a legal Realist, illustrates
how commonplace the Decision-Based thesis became even for those histor-
ically or temperamentally separated from the movement in which the the-
sis did its most powerful work.
Indeed, at the risk of making this acount appear too neat, I would sug-
gest that Cook and Currie represent, respectively, the two faces of the
fundamental conflict between the Decision-Based and Norm-Based views
special internal morality to the functioning of the legal process. Other coercive institutions may be
guided by different moralities, but for law to make sense-for a legal judgment actually to be what it
purports to be-it must be consistent with the law's distinctive and singular purpose. See L. FULLER,
supra note 100; Fuller, supra note 153; Henderson, Expanding the Negligence Concept: Retreat
from the Rule of Law, 51 IND. L.J. 467 (1976).
192. Cf L. KALMAN, supra note 187, at 25-27 (placing Cook's attacks on Beale in context of
realist enterprise).
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of law. That is, Cook's criticism of the notion of vested rights seems
grounded precisely in a rejection of the Norm-Based distinction between
the content of rules and their enforcement, while Currie's affirmative pro-
posal to resolve true conflicts by sole reference to the law of the forum
seems equally grounded in a rejection of the Norm-Based distinction be-
tween the purposes of particular laws and the purposes of the adjudicative
function.
Cook's argument for a strictly local law account of choice of law turned
on the allegedly scientific insight that
"[R]ight," "duty," and other names for "legal relations" are. . . not
names of objects or entities which have an existence apart from the
behavior of the officials in question, but terms by means of which we
describe to each other what prophecies we make as to the probable
occurrence of a certain sequence of events-the behavior of the
officials.193
It bears emphasis, however, that this claim could not have sustained the
rest of Cook's analysis if it were only, as Cook sometimes implied, an
attack on the "reification" of the law: As suggested in Section III, there is
more than metaphysics at stake here. Similarly, Cook's premise should not
be mistaken for the hackneyed proposition that "law is what the judges
say it is." Cook was interested in establishing not only the content of the
law, but also its nature, and that nature apparently was not a matter of
norms, whether reified or not, whether judge-made or not, but a matter of
behavior. Since behavior has, by definition, only an external face, Cook
could not admit a difference between internal and external perspectives.
Nor could he admit the possibility of binding, self-imposed limits on judi-
cial conduct, or the possibility that choice of law might encompass a sec-
ond-order process of decision-making more complicated than the simple
act of applying local law. Nor, finally, could he admit that a court might
coherently understand a foreign-created right as something other than a
prediction of how a foreign court would behave if faced with the same set
of facts, and might enforce that right without necessarily conforming its
own behavior, in all respects, to that prediction.
When I discussed Currie's views in Section I of this Article, I asked
why he might have been so deeply convinced of the claim that courts, in
adjudicating particular legal disputes, were primarily charged with
"consistently advancing the policy of [their] own state[s]." 1 9 ' As it now
turns out, only a Decision-Based view of law would propose such an un-
193. W.W. Coox, supra note 17, at 30 (footnote omitted).
194. See supra text accompanying note 56.
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mediated and uncomplicated connection between the purposes of particu-
lar legal norms and the task of courts. Even more revealing is the fact that
when Currie did refer to legal values associated with the process of adju-
dication itself, he treated those values as simply one more set of state in-
terests, and then found that they were rather meager interests at that;
presumably, a different assumption about the nature of the values under-
lying the rule of law might have led him to a different assessment of their
importance.
For that matter, it might be said of both Cook and Currie that the
attention they devoted to the admittedly idiosyncratic subject of choice of
law only obscures the extreme implications of the views they held. If, for
example, there are as many rights in any dispute "as there are jurisdic-
tions which will give the plaintiff relief,"195 then it might also follow that
there are as many rights in that dispute as that number multiplied by the
average number of judges (or possible judicial outcomes) in any one juris-
diction. If Cook were unhappy with this amendment, the only way he
could demur would be to recognize that judges in a legal system are
united by a common set of legal norms to whose enforcement they are
pledged. 9 But that would admit into the analysis the idea that law em-
braces a normative framework conceptually distinct from its enforcement,
and would define that framework in terms of second-order constraints on
first-order decisionmaking. Admitting those ingredients into Cook's ana-
lytic apparatus might suddenly open up the possibility of second-order
criteria confining not only law itself, but also choice of law, and of courts
applying second-order criteria to enforce not only the norms of their own
legal system, but also, if appropriate, the norms generated by a different
legal system, without necessarily binding themselves to behave as if they
were a foreign court.
Similarly, Currie's rejection of judicial disinterestedness in choice of law
invites one to wonder whether there are any limits on the extent to which
courts should use the adjudicative opportunity to promote state "interests"
in cases that do not raise a choice of law issue. Indeed, can the notion of
legal "liability" itself survive Currie's account, or should courts simply
compensate favored classes and penalize disfavored classes whenever they
happen to appear in court? If Currie were not willing to go that far, he
195. See supra text accompanying note 28.
196. There is a superficially attractive alternative account to the effect that judicial outcomes in
any given jurisdiction should be grouped together, simply as a matter of expositional convenience, by
virtue of a relatively high degree of convergence in the predictions that can be made about them. This
story, however, is empirically suspect. In the case of two legal systems with relatively similar choice of
law doctrines, intra-regime variations in judicial behavior might in fact be greater than average inter-
regime variations.
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would have to explain why the considerations that led him to that conclu-
sion bore no relevance for choice of law.
Now, nothing I have just said demonstrates the truth or even the attrac-
tiveness of vestedness. Indeed, Cook and Currie, given their perspectives,
would be entirely justified in thinking vestedness to be as silly as tradi-
tional vested rights theory, if not more so. What I have tried to demon-
strate, however, is that Cook's and Currie's conclusions, by virtue of being
tied so closely to a particular, and I would submit radically barren, set of
jurisprudential premises, simply shift the debate to higher ground, and
that vestedness, seen in the light of somewhat different (that is, Norm-
Based) premises, appears considerably more sensible. The next step is to
demonstrate that, within a Norm-Based discourse, vestedness is not only
respectable, but is rationally entailed.
B. The Affirmative Case
The core of the affirmative argument for vestedness is very simple: As-
sume, as I will from here on, that the Norm-Based view of law is correct.
Then, if the defining function of courts is to enforce legal rights that exist,
in some sense, apart from their enforcement, any court committed to that
view cannot hold that the analysis of substantive legal rights depends on
the manner in which they are sought to be enforced or, more specifically,
on the forum in which an adjudication happens to be brought. Moreover,
if the (direct) function of any particular adjudication is not to further poli-
cies of one kind or another, but rather to judge human beings on the basis
of norms to which they were expected to adhere, then a court's primary
responsibility cannot be to represent its own sovereign's interests, or any-
body else's. Rather, a court's role is to discover and enforce whatever nor-
mative structure-that is, set of legal rights-applies in the case at hand,
whether that means looking to its own law or the law of some other au-
thority legitimately capable of creating normative structures and generat-
ing legal rights. In addition to the Rules of Assimilation and Rules of
Scope that Cook and Currie identified, therefore, there must be a further
set of principles that resolve, in some second-order manner that purports
to be forum-neutral, true conflicts among competing normative systems.
C. Objections and Responses
The argument as I have just put it is deceptively simple. For one thing,
I have not yet fleshed out its implications, or connected it in detail to the
full-fledged account of vestedness that I introduced earlier. Moreover,
even putting aside objections that reduce to disagreements with the Norm-
Based view of law itself, my argument remains potentially vulnerable to a
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number of serious objections from within the Norm-Based discourse. I
will attempt in the rest of this section to address both shortcomings by
canvassing and discussing the principal objections to my view, as well as
adding some nuance to the picture of vestedness in the process.
1. Decision Management Revisited
One possible Norm-Based argument against my position is that a choice
of law regime inconsistent with vestedness can be justified, not only on the
basis of the great metaphysical presuppositions of Decision-Based juris-
prudence, but simply in the name of what I earlier called decision man-
agement.1 97 For example, it is easy to imagine a choice of law rule gener-
ating lex fori through the back door by requiring that a court simply
apply "the law it knows best."
The flaws in this argument are evident. The choice of law process is
influenced by the imperatives of decision management; and issue preclu-
sion, stare decisis and similar principles are no less applicable to it than to
other fields of law. 98 There may even be rules of decision management
specific to the choice of law process motivated by a legitimate concern that
the courts of a forum are not always intimately familiar with the content
of foreign laws. In particular, it is consistent with the principle of vested-
ness to require litigants to raise choice of law issues in their pleadings"'
and to bear the burden of presenting evidence on the content of foreign
law.200 But the whole point of decision management is to direct and pre-
serve the process of substantive decision, not to replace it. Somewhere
through all the smoke and fuss, underlying principles must be visible, or
else decision management has become decision pure and simple.201
197. See supra text accompanying notes 145-46.
198. See supra note 63.
199. See, e.g., FED. R. Civ. P. 44.1; UNIFORM INTERSTATE AND INTERNATIONAL PROCEDURE
ACT § 4.01, 13 U.L.A. 357 (1962).
200. See, e.g., Tidewater Oil Co. v. Waller, 302 F.2d 638 (10th Cir. 1962) (applying Oklahoma
rule that, in absence of proof of applicable foreign law, court will assume foreign law to be same as its
own); Walton v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 233 F.2d 541 (2d Cir. 1956) (dismissing suit because plaintiff
failed to meet burden of proving foreign law); 2 A. DICEY & J. MORRIS, THE CONFLICT OF LAWS
1216 (10th ed. 1980) (discussing English rule that court will apply local law by default when foreign
law is not proved). It is also certainly consistent with vestedness to develop principles of jurisdiction or
forum non conveniens that would exclude the merits of a case from being heard unless the court could
in fact apply its own law. See, e.g., Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235 (1981).
201. Pleading and evidentiary requirements are such smoke and fuss; an unequivocal surrender to
lexfori-back door or front-is a fire out of control. Decision management adjusts the imperatives of
Norm-Based jurisprudence to the realities of human finitude. But human finitude cannot justify no-
tions of decision management that are inconsistent-necessarily as well as contingently-with the
premises of Norm-Based jurisprudence itself. Claim and issue preclusion prevent certain matters from
being relitigated, but "[tihere is no reason to expect that the second decision will be more satisfactory
than the first." Stoll v. Gottlieb, 305 U.S. 165, 172 (1938). Hierarchical ordering of courts requires
lower court judges to put the views of their superiors ahead of their own, but there is little reason to
think that lower court judges would be right more often without such hierarchies. Cf. Dalton, Taking
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2. Discretion Revisited
The second objection is as follows: Assume for the moment that it is
possible to distinguish purely domestic cases from cases in which choice of
law is a live issue. Presumably, in cases of the latter sort, the normative
system of one or another independent legal regime might legitimately gov-
ern the set of facts at issue. Every choice of law case, therefore, represents
an indeterminacy in the law and requires for its resolution the sort of
judicial discretion that I have already conceded plays a role in at least
some Norm-Based theories. Because the exercise of this type of discretion
is by definition an act of the forum, a forum-neutral view of choice of law
makes no sense at all.
This objection radically misconceives the function of judicial discretion
in Norm-Based theories. As I have argued above, the most pervasive and
important type of discretion recognized by some (but not all) Norm-Based
theories is residual discretion-interstitial decision-making that fills in
gaps or unresolvable indeterminacies in the normative structure. The goal
of any legal regime devoted to perfecting its Norm-Based jurisprudence
must, however, be to equip itself with a set of interpretive conventions
that will solve, or at least seriously constrain, the solution of as many legal
issues as possible. If interstitial decision-making is required, it is not be-
cause there are times when various solutions are possible, or various lines
of authority exist, but because there may be times when the set of pre-
existing conventions is incomplete. There are "hard" cases in choice of
law, just as there are "hard" cases in other fields of law; but there are also
a great many cases in which the choice of law issue can be reduced to
some predictable pattern just as amenable to solution by rules and inter-
pretive conventions as any other legal issue. The solutions contained in the
First Restatement (or for that matter the Second Restatement) may be bad
solutions, but they are still capable of generating relatively determinate
solutions to a whole class of choice of law problems.
The Norm-Based principle of non-contradiction, as applied both in the
choice of law enterprise and in purely domestic cases, does not require
the Right To Appeal (More or Less) Seriously, 95 YALE L.J. 62, 86-92 (1985) (justice of outcome
exists independently of appellate determination). Thus, if all judges were endowed with the unwaver-
ing ability to reach "correct" conclusions on matters of law, ef. R. DWORKIN, supra note 92, at
105-30, and all litigants presented their cases with infinite thoroughness, our present regime of deci-
sion management would be both unnecessary and innocuous. Claims subject to preclusion would al-
ways have been decided correctly the first time around, lower court decisions would never be reversed,
and rules of pleading would always be moot. Cf Risinger, supra note 61, at 205 (describing proce-
dural impact of judicial omniscience). On the other hand, a choice of law rule such as "apply the law
with which you are most familiar" would either be pernicious (if we imagine that even all-wise judges
are more familiar with the normative system of their own legal regime than with others) or radically
indeterminate (if we imagine them to be equally adept in all bodies of law). Consequently, such a rule
would be both pernicious and incomplete even in our own finite but struggling world.
1247
The Yale Law Journal Vol. 96: 1191, 1987
that there be no conflicting norms, but only that the interpretive enterprise
as a whole articulate a method for resolving them. Consider this classic
analogy: If a legislature enacts a law, and then enacts an entirely incom-
patible law some time later, we are in principle faced with a "conflict of
laws" in resolving cases whose underlying facts arise after the passage of
the later law.202 Yet very few of us would think this "conflict" gives courts
the license to apply their discretion to choose between the two enactments.
Instead, we expect them to apply the interpretive convention long ago
adopted to deal with this most predictable of "conflicts" and enforce the
later law.2" 3 This convention accords with our intuition and our political
theory, but it is not logically inevitable. Legal regimes have adopted the
contrary convention.20 4 What can be said, however, is that virtually all
legal regimes will eventually discover the recurring pattern established by
such conflicts over time, and will, if they are committed to the Norm-
Based view of law, seek to adopt some convention to resolve them. Con-
flicts over space, though more complicated, are in principle very much the
same.
20 5
202. Traditional choice of law literature routinely saw conflicts-over-time and conflicts-over-space
as two species of the same genus. See, e.g., I J. BEALE, supra note 5, § 1.1, at I n.1 (topic of
application of laws in time "makes use of similar principles" as conflict of laws); F.C.V. SAVIGNY,
PRIVATE INTIRNATIONAL LAW, AND THE RETROSPECrIVE OPERATION OF STATUTES 48 (W.
Guthrie trans. 2d ed. rev. 1880) (two forms of conflicts are "distinct yet analogous"). And, not sur-
prisingly, challenging the validity of this comparison has been one of the points in the attack mounted
by the choice of law revisionists. See, e.g., W.W. COOK, supra note 17, at 165-66; A. SHAPIRA, THE
INTEREST APPROACH TO CHOICE OF LAW 10 (1970) (vested rights doctrine probably "emerged by
means of an unfortunate misapplication of a concept meaningful in the area of intertemporal legal
problems to the utterly different sphere of the operation of law in space") (footnotes omitted). But cf.
B. CURRIE, supra note 40, at 458, 523, 598-99 (making limited use of analogies between intertem-
poral and interspatial conflict of laws).
203. The obvious exception to this convention in the American legal system is the case of an
earlier constitutional provision conflicting with a later ordinary enactment. See THE FEDERALIST No.
78, at 468-70 (A. Hamilton) (C. Rossiter ed. 1961); Ackerman, The Storrs Lectures: Discovering the
Constitution, 93 YALE L.J. 1013, 1045-49 (1984).
In countries with a tradition of parliamentary sovereignty and no written constitution, the power of
one legislature to bind its successors remains a subject of some controversy. See H.L.A. HART, supra
note 93, at 146-50 (discussing uncertainties in the rule of recognition); H. MAY, THE SOUTH AFRi-
CAN CONSTITUTION 22-56 (3d ed. 1970) (discussing roots of South African constitutional crisis in
1950's).
204. See, e.g., J. POCOCK, THE ANCIENT CONSTITUTION AND THE FEUDAL LAW: A STUDY OF
ENGLISH HISTORICAL THOUGHT IN THE SEVENTEENTH CENTURY 30-55 (1957) (discussing seven-
teenth century English theory that common law was validated by its sheer antiquity, and that no
presently ruling monarch could trench on rights guaranteeed by the immemorial custom of realm).
205. There is one qualification that needs to be made to the paragraph in text. It is possible to
imagine a legal regime responding to the principle of non-contradiction, at least on occasion, not by
resolving a particular legal question, but by self-consciously deciding to leave the question unresolved.
Indeed, Jewish law recognizes precisely that possibility in its doctrine of "teyku." See generally L.
JACOBS, TEYKU: THE UNSOLVED PROBLEM IN THE BABYLONIAN TALMUD (1981) (canvassing Tal-
mudic examples). Such a finding, however, must be recognized for what it is: an authoritative deter-
mination that no further answer is possible, not an invitation to the exercise of discretion in arriving
at an answer. As a consequence, when an actual case arises involving a legal issue that has been
determined not to be capable of authoritative determination, the resolution of that case must be rele-
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3. The Discreteness of Normative Systems
One might argue that the above response only proves the folly of my
project. My response assumes, after all, that the world's normative sys-
tems can be tossed together into one hypothetical super-system whose
"conflicts" can be resolved with simple hermeneutic tricks. But aren't the
normative systems established by different sovereigns grounded in com-
pletely divergent sources of authority, each conferring legal rights by its
own terms? Isn't the decision to defer to one source of authority rather
than another really a decision to pick among rights, rather than a discov-
ery, by reference to a super-law, that some of those rights did not exist
after all? Moreover, if what the court of the forum is really doing is
choosing among rights, each of which exists, why shouldn't it favor the
rights created by the sovereign for whom it is employed? In short, doesn't
the principle of non-contradiction coherently apply only within legal re-
gimes, and not across legal regimes?
At stake here are some central features of Norm-Based jurisprudence.
The principle of non-contradiction that I have been invoking is not merely
a formal or logical axiom subject to formal or logical delimitation, 0 6 but a
substantive proposition. Adjudication, in the Norm-Based view, is judg-
ment, and judgment (subject to all of the important qualifications I have
already discussed), consists of holding persons and events to the conse-
quences of the norms by which those persons and events should have ex-
pected to have been judged. If a legal norm is valid, and if it properly
applies to a given set of facts, it forms the basis for (legal) judgment of
those facts. Thus, if a court can entertain the possibility that a set of facts
were, as they occurred, legitimately subject to foreign legal norms-a con-
clusion the court is not compelled to reach, but which it very often will
reach if it has adopted the sort of common sense and commonplace politi-
cal theory outlined in Section 11207 -then it cannot simply treat those for-
eign legal norms as existing in some parallel universe unconnected to its
own. Moreover, if an adjudicator reaches the conclusion that a set of facts
is potentially subject to two valid legal norms arising from two legitimate
normative systems, the adjudicator cannot give priority to one of those
gated to some further set of principles that remain noncommital on the underlying substantive ques-
tion. See id. at 302-07 (discussing various solutions proposed in post-Talmudic halakhic sources, in-
cluding equal division of amounts in dispute, preservation of the status quo, and so on). Thus, even if
something like "teyku" were conceptually available in the general run of choice of law cases, it would
not vest the forum with the right to apply its discretion to decide which law properly applies to a case,
but would rather require the forum to admit that it cannot find which law properly applies, and to
fashion some fall-back solution consistent with that admission.
206. See infra text accompanying note 209.
207. See supra text accompanying note 74.
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norms after the fact unless it can explain why that norm or normative
system had priority during the fact.
In other words, the Norm-Based insistence on the objectivity of legal
norms is more than a proposition about the objective meaning of legal
norms;2 0 8 what is really at stake is the objective force of legal norms.
Therefore, the effort to sort out apparently conflicting legal norms is not
just a hermeneutic exercise that can be arbitrarily confined in any way
that seems convenient. It is instead an effort to sort out from potentially
competing candidates the norms that actually apply to a given set of facts
in the world.
How does this sorting-out process work in the face of competing norms
derived from equally legitimate but distinct normative systems? To deal
with this question, it is useful to look once again to the purely domestic
case. Consider that what we usually call a normative system, in its purely
domestic variety, is often something of a fiction. As H.L.A. Hart and
others have demonstrated, it is not always possible to trace the legal rules
governing a jurisdiction to the will of one "sovereign," past or present.
Indeed, many normative systems are made up of diverse and awkwardly
juxtaposed commands created at different times by different sources of au-
thority. The hermeneutic trick, as I suggested earlier, is to incorporate
into the system a set of principles or conventions that will, in any given
case, resolve the mess into a more or less determinate piece of a seamless
web. Resort to that hermeneutic strategy, the principle of non-
contradiction, is not required simply as a matter of logic or necessity.209
Rather, it arises out of an act of definition, even stubbornness, motivated
by the character of the legal enterprise. Even if two contradictory norms
logically can apply simultaneously to the same event in the world, a legal
analysis that attempted to judge behavior on the basis of one of those
norms while continuing to recognize the applicability of the other would
not be an act of judgment at all.2 10
Thus, the task of legal analysis might, for purely .heuristic purposes, be
seen to proceed in two distinct steps.2" The first step is to identify, on the
208. Indeed, it is perfectly possible, though rare in fact, for an opponent of Norm-Based jurispru-
dence to concede the objective cognitive content of norms.
209. Consider, for example, the argument of some contemporary philosophers that there is noth-
ing illogical about the co-existence of equally true but entirely contradictory normative propositions.
See B. WILLIAMS, Ethical Consistency, in PROBLEMS OF THE SELF 166 (1973); Marcus, Moral Di-
lemmas and Consistency, 77 J. PHIL 121 (1980). But see Foot, Moral Realism and Moral Dilemma,
80 J. PHIL. 379 (1983). Cf Donagan, Consistency in Rationalist Moral Systems, 81 J. PHIl. 291
(1984) (attempting to work through debate on moral consistency).
210. Moreover, any exercise of what I have called residual discretion vindicates the law's aspira-
tion to judgment (even as it compromises the purity of that judgment) by committing the adjudicator
to squeezing the last ounce of determinacy out of apparently indeterminate norms, and then stub-
bornly casting out whatever indeterminacy may in fact remain.
211. I do not mean to suggest by this heuristic model either that actual legal analysis does or even
1250
Vol. 96: 1191, 1987
Vestedness and Choice of Law
basis of some account of competent lawmaking, the legal norms that might
legitimately be said to apply to the case at hand. If this procedure yields
contradictory norms, the second step is to decide, on the basis of some
collection of formal or substantive principles or conventions, which of the
competing primary norms actually applies to the case at hand. In the
purely domestic case, the first step might yield a set of conflicting norms
arising out of different lines of authority or different moments of legisla-
tive activity. In that event, the second step would consist of the sort of
tidying and pruning that is among the most familiar tasks of the lawyer,
legal scholar, and judge. Expanding our horizons a bit and adopting the
sort of common sense and commonplace political theory to which I have
constantly referred, however, it may quickly become clear that among the
conflicting norms that are floating around are norms coming out of dis-
tinct legal regimes. In that event, the task of legal analysis would involve,
at least in part, the enterprise normally described as "choice of law." De-
pending on a number of variables-including the exact shape of the politi-
cal theory adopted for the first step, the way in which we go about distin-
guishing the first step from the second, 2' and how we fit in Rules of
Scope-it might turn out that there are no purely domestic cases at all,
but only a spectrum of cases with choice of law components of varying
difficulty.
None of what I have said should be taken to reject, either as a matter of
theory or of cold hard fact, the existence of independent sovereigns and
distinct legal regimes. Indeed, that part of the reigning political theory
that allows us to understand the existence of independent sovereigns may
well be the predominant influence in shaping choice of law rules. More
important, nothing I have said suggests that independent legal regimes are
required, as a matter of either legal theory or affirmative legal obligation,
to recognize the legislative pretensions of foreign sovereigns or to devise
particular choice of law rules that take one form rather than another. As
defenders of traditional vested rights theory have insisted, a domestic legal
regime's attention to foreign law need not arise out of any direct duty (or
perception of a duty) of deference to a foreign legal authority. Rather, the
source of that attention is a self-imposed obligation to act in accordance
with the rule of law. The choice of law exercise, as construed here, re-
spects the separateness and independence of legal regimes precisely be-
cause it describes itself as a solution to jurisprudential challenges that are,
as a matter of their legal import, entirely internal to such regimes. 1 '
should always treat these two steps as separate, or that much would be gained by attempting to detail
exactly which issues are properly assigned to which step.
212. But cf. supra note 211.
213. The foregoing argument is not just a tautological edifice constructed around the unremark-
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4. Political Theory Revisited
It might now be argued, however, that the degree of legitimacy ac-
corded by legal regimes to each other is in fact much more begrudging and
limited than I have acknowledged. Nation-states might, for example, be
thought to treat each other like some religious legal regimes treat secular
legal regimes (with tolerance but not much respect) or the way some secu-
lar legal regimes treat "natural law" (with respect but not much
tolerance).
This objection can be understood in two ways. It might simply be a
disagreement over the nature of commonplace political theory. In that
case, it is inconsequential to the main thrust of my account, since I have
repeatedly emphasized that I am using that political theory as an example
rather than an axiom. As I have made clear throughout this Article, the
constraint of vestedness will yield very different results given different un-
derlying assumptions of sovereignty and legitimate lawmaking capacity.21'
The objection might also, however, be another effort to have it both
ways-to cheat on a jurisprudential premise without explicitly rejecting it.
If this is the issue at stake, anyone defending a theory of diluted legiti-
macy must articulate exactly what the actors in one nation-state think is
going on, as a matter of law, in other nation-states, and whether that
account in any way reflects back on what those actors think is going on in
their own regime. My guess is that secular nation-states, in their estima-
tion of each other's legitimacy-unlike religious legal regimes' views of
secular legal regimes or secular legal regimes' view of natural law-could
not entertain a vision of diluted legitimacy without seriously impairing
their own right to govern.
Nonetheless, I should admit that my casual reliance on "common sense,
commonplace political theory" does bracket issues that any full-fledged
Norm-Based account of choice of law would have to confront. Consider, in
particular, the central dilemma of traditional vested rights theory: should
the courts of one legal regime enforce the truly unconscionable norms of
another simply because a set of formal choice of law criteria mandates
such deference? It should be obvious that a legal regime could, consistent
able proposition that independent political sovereigns recognize each other's legitimacy. A Decision-
Based legal theory could assimilate exactly the same unremarkable proposition, but understand it to
have entirely different consequences for legal practice. To a Decision-Based theorist, recognizing the
legitimacy of a foreign legal regime can mean no more than recognizing the legitimacy of its adjudica-
tions. Thus, recognizing the legitimacy of that regime's legal norms can mean no more than recogniz-
ing the legitimacy of the norms as enforced. Any further concern about the objective force of legal
norms and the unacceptability of legal contradiction would strike the Decision-Based theorist as meta-
physical nonsense, somewhat akin to the sort of nonsense that Norm-Based theorists propound in
purely domestic cases.
214. See supra text accompanying notes 72-74.
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with the principle of vestedness and an uncompromising commitment to a
Norm-Based view of judicial reasoning, respond in one of three ways to
such a dilemma: (1) enforce the foreign norm; (2) refuse jurisdiction as a
matter of "public policy" (though this does not help if the defendant
rather than the plaintiff is seeking the benefit of the foreign norm); or (3)
apply a substantive choice of law rule that renders application of that
foreign norm unacceptable. The third option, however, would require the
forum court to take the view that the unconscionable foreign norm could
not legitimately be enforced in the foreign court either, and to explain
how that conclusion could be squared with some more general theory of
sovereignty. This may certainly be possible, but it is fraught with ideolog-
ical controversies that cannot simply be elided.
In addition, a legal regime (or an individual adjudicator) in a given case
could decide, consistent with my account but not with an uncompromising
commitment to a Norm-Based view of judicial reasoning, that the rule of
law should give way to the rule of the good. As I suggested in Section
III,'15 this response is always open to an adjudicator, whether confronting
a choice of law issue or any other issue. But this sort of move, if faced
honestly, would raise a host of questions about the moral status of the
adjudicator-questions that might well be as disturbing as the original
concerns about the moral status of the norm being overriden. Moreover,
such a move can never be justified on the basis that it represents a better
legal judgment-for it excludes any legal judgment at all-but only on
the basis that it yields a better result.
The approach being defended in this Article raises new questions even
as it answers old ones. These questions are important, however, and they
risk being ignored if the commitment to the reality of law is casually whit-
tled away. More to the point, my account renders exceedingly difficult,
lawless, or illegitimate, precisely those moves that the choice of law
revolution considers most paradigmatic. And since most choice of law
cases do not in fact raise the sort of deep dilemmas that would lead a legal
regime to revise its view of sovereignty or abandon its conception of adju-
dication, the practical effect of that reversal of paradigms is uncompromis-
ingly profound.
5. Does Vestedness Prove Too Little?
A fifth set of objections share some common themes and call for a com-
mon strategy of response. Each of the objections, like the previous con-
cern, tried to turn the very catholicity of my analysis into its undoing.
Each concedes some formal validity to vestedness; in fact, each comes pro-
215. See supra text accompanying notes 159-62.
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gressively closer to accepting the full-bodied truth of vestedness. The point
of the objections, however, is that vestedness is either logically trivial,
practically inconsequential, or radically incomplete-in sum, too thin for
its own good. My response in each case will force me to do what I have so
far tried to avoid, which is to commit myself, however provisionally, to a
more specific version of the Norm-Based view of law as a working juris-
prudential instrument.
a. Triadic Legal Relations.
The first of the group of objections purports to refine the Norm-Based
story: Any Norm-Based theory must already admit what both legal theory
and doctrine have long recognized, namely, that normative structures are
often or always relational-that they establish not rights and duties in the
air, but specific claims between specific legal actors. Thus, the same act by
a potential defendant might constitute a breach of a legal norm with re-
spect to one potential plaintiff, but not with respect to another, and con-
tradiction, correctly understood, in no way violates the premises of the
Norm-Based approach to law.
Within any single legal system, the argument continues, the relational
feature of legal norms is adequately described in binary terms. In the par-
lance of Wesley N. Hohfeld, there is a right for every duty, a liability for
every power, and so on.21 But the existence of multiple legal systems
suggests that legal relationships are in fact triadic, with the sovereign and
its courts as the third element of the triad.2 17 Moreover, if we assume an
implicit jurisdictional rule that any court will consider only normative re-
lationships to which its own sovereign is a "party," what emerges is a
model of choice of law consistent with the Norm-Based approach but de-
void of the chimera of vestedness. The task of a court is to assess the
plaintiff's liability to the defendant according to the law (including Rules
of Scope and Assimilation) of the sovereign for whom the court does its
work. The possibility that a court of a different sovereign might reach a
different conclusion is no more relevant (and no more inconsistent with
the Norm-Based approach) than the possibility that the same court might
reach a different conclusion with respect to the claims pressed by a differ-
ent plaintiff.2"8
216. See W. HOHFELD, FUNDAMENTAL LEGAL CONCEPTIONS (1923). This Article does not
adopt Hohfeld's terminology, but instead, following Cook's example for once, uses words like right
and duty in their generic sense. See W.W. CoOK, supra note 17, at 53 n.15.
217. My formulation of this objection is based very loosely on Dworkin's own very brief and
somewhat obscure discussion of choice of law in R. DWORKIN, supra note 99, at 309-10. Hohfeld
himself, incidentally, seemed to adopt an essentially binary view of the legal rights at stake in choice
of law cases. See Hohfeld, supra note 37, at 493.
218. This argument, coming as it does from within the Norm-Based discourse, should not be
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This story is a disingenuous account of the legal imagination. The ob-
jection does, however, contain a germ of truth that, ironically enough,
helps to explain aspects of both classical choice of law and the notion of
vestedness as explained in Section II.
Sovereigns and their courts are often direct parties to normative rela-
tionships with the subjects of sovereign lawmaking. To begin with, recall
that neither vestedness nor traditional vested rights theory understands the
notion of forum-independent legal rights to apply to matters like jurisdic-
tion, procedure, and evidence. Such non-substantive or adjective fields all
refer to conduct that occurs during the course of judicial proceedings. The
general Norm-Based account sharply distinguishes adjective norms from
primary norms for exactly this reason, refusing to treat the one as necessa-
rily implicated in the realistic understanding of the other. Some specific
Norm-Based theories of choice of law might go further, arguing that be-
cause adjective legal norms involve powers conferred on specific courts, 19
and obligations owed to and by them, the content of such norms can differ
from one set of courts to another, much as primary norms can legitimately
differ with respect to different legal contexts or relations among different
legal actors. Indeed, establishing the adjective norms that apply in its own
courts is arguably one of the basic functions of a sovereign. It might be
surprising if adjective norms were not forum-dependent.220
Adjective norms are special because the forum itself is an actor in the
normative play. The same is true of primary norms that govern actions of
the sovereign. These two contexts, however, do not support the notion that
the forum (as independent sovereign) is in every case some sort of silent
partner in a triadic legal relation. Nor do these contexts provide any clear
sense of what such a triadic legal relation would look like, or what its
consequences would be.
If there is any support for the triadic model, it might be found in some
specialized areas of the law, such as criminal law221 and libel law.22 Such
confused with Cook's superficially similar claim, grounded in a Decision-Based view of law, that for
any set of facts there are as many rights as there are jurisdictions able to give the plaintiff relief. See
supra text accompanying notes 28, 195.
219. See supra text accompanying notes 140, 157-58 (discussing use of affirmative discretion in
application of adjective norms).
220. I do not mean to suggest that anything goes with regard to adjective norms. On the contrary,
I have assumed throughout this Article that a legal system worthy of the name would require its
adjudicative institutions to base their substantive legal judgments on an honest examination of primary
norms and their consequences. Any fully detailed Norm-Based theory of law would be required to
articulate the constraints that this fundamental obligation would place on the content of adjective
norms. This would resemble the main project of this Article, which is to articulate constraints, not so
much on adjective norms, but on the second-order primary norms that constitute the law of choice of
law. In the absence of a fully detailed account, however, suffice it to say that whatever constraints the
rule of law may put on norms of jurisdiction, procedure, evidence, remedy, and the like, enormous
latitude, hence potential for enormous variety, remains.
221. According to standard American doctrine, a single criminal act can give rise to distinct crimi-
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examples, however, are the exceptions that prove the rule. In these con-
texts, the same act involving the same parties and the same legal issue
sometimes gives rise, according to the mundane but important evidence of
legal doctrine, to a set of distinct cases arrayed according to jurisdiction.
In most other contexts, the contrary is true: The same act with respect to
the same parties and the same legal issue gives rise to the same case re-
gardless of where the suit is brought. The clearest evidence of this com-
mon understanding is that claim preclusion normally bars plaintiffs from
relitigating the same case in a different jurisdiction. Were it not for claim
preclusion, a Connecticut court, for example, could hold that a single car
crash constituted two distinct legal events governed by different legal re-
gimes, and that a Wisconsin court's determination of fault in the
"crashwisconsin" had no direct bearing on the "crashconnecticut."
nal offenses, not only with respect to different victims, but also with respect to different sovereigns. See
United States v. Lanza, 260 U.S. 377, 382 (1922); More v. Illinois, 55 U.S. (14 How.) 13, 19-20
(1852). As a consequence, federal double jeopardy law holds that neither acquittal nor conviction in
the courts of one sovereign (state, federal, American Indian, or foreign) bars prosecution by another
sovereign for the same act. See, e.g., Abbate v. United States, 359 U.S. 187 (1959) (upholding federal
conviction after Illinois conviction); Heath v. Alabama, 106 S. Ct. 433 (1985) (Alabama conviction
after Georgia guilty plea); Bartkus v. Illinois, 359 U.S. 121 (1959) (Illinois conviction after federal
acquittal); United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313 (1978) (federal prosecution after guilty plea in
Navajo Tribal Court); United States v. Martin, 574 F.2d 1359 (5th Cir. 1978) (federal conviction
after guilty plea in Bahamas).
Interestingly enough, this narrow view of the guarantee against double jeopardy runs counter to the
rule in many other jurisdictions. See, e.g., Treacy v. Director of Pub. Prosecutions, [1971] App. Cas.
537, 562 (H.L.) (Lord Diplock) (dictum) (referring to common law rule barring reprosecution in
England "whether the previous conviction or acquittal based on the same facts was by an English
court or by a foreign court" (citations omitted)); M. FRIEDLAND, DOUBLE JEOPARDY 357-70 (1969)
(reaching similar conclusion); Franck, An International Lawyer Looks at the Bartkus Rule, 34
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1096, 1100-01 (1959) (indicating that French and German law, among others, pre-
clude second criminal indictment when issue has already been resolved by recognized foreign tribunal
exercising jurisdiction); cf. 2 M. BAssIOUNI, INTERNATIONAL EXTRADITION: UNITED STATES LAW
AND PRACTICE ch. 8, § 4.3 (1983) (discussing constraints in extradition treaties and other sources of
international law against prosecution in one country after acquittal or conviction in another).
222. Some accounts of libel law suggest that the same defamatory message can constitute a series
of distinct torts if it is communicated in a series of distinct "publications." See RESTATEMENT OF
TORTS § 578 comment b (1938); Cook v. Conners, 215 N.Y. 175, 109 N.E. 78 (1915); see also
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 577(A)(1) (1977) (applying same rule to more limited set of
cases); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 149 (1971) (same). Moreover, liability for
such distinct publications may vary according to this view, depending, for example, on the law of the
place in which the publication landed. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 149
comment a (1971); O'Reilly v. Curtis Publishing Co., 31 F. Supp. 364, 365 (D. Mass. 1940). But Cf.
Prosser, Interstate Publication, 51 MICH. L. REv. 959 (1953) (vigorous attack on common-law "mul-
tiple publication" rule). Thus, a plaintiff who lost a libel suit in one jurisdiction could bring essen-
tially the same suit in another jurisdiction, subject to possible issue preclusion but not to claim preclu-
sion, and might well legitimately win that suit on the basis of law different than that applied in the
first suit. See, e.g., Sweeney v. Schenectady Union Publishing Co., 122 F.2d 288, 289 (2d Cir. 1941).
This view is now largely discredited, however, as to newspapers, magazines, and similar media of
mass communication. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 577(A)(3)-(4) (1977) (adopting
"single publication" rule in substantive law of torts); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF
LAWS § 150 (1971) (adopting "aggregate communication" rule in choice of law); cf Hartmann v.
Time, 166 F.2d 127 (3d Cir. 1947) (grappling with interaction of substantive and choice of law
principles).
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This argument is not just an exercise in tautology. What is significant
is not that cross-jurisdictional claim preclusion exists. Nothing in a bare-
bones Norm-Based account requires claim preclusion, and a Decision-
Based account could easily accommodate claim preclusion without ac-
cepting the principle of vestedness. The crucial point is that the existence
of claim preclusion, as understood in Norm-Based discourse, manifests the
understanding that different lawsuits brought in different jurisdictions can
be about the same case.223 This understanding, which should strike most
of us as both absurdly obvious and mysteriously powerful, requires rejec-
tion of the triadic account of legal relations. In fact, once we reject the
triadic account as a general hypothesis, even the examples that seem most
troublesome can be reformulated in purely binary terms. Criminal law
and similar public law fields are distinguishable because the sovereign is a
legal claimholder as well as a lawmaker. Libel law is distinguishable be-
cause in a physical as well as a legal sense the same process of communi-
cation constitutes a series of distinct acts.
A second flaw in the triadic account is evident in the hurried but crucial
gloss of an "implicit jurisdictional rule that any court will consider only
['triadic'] normative relationships to which its own sovereign is a 'party.'"
In fact, no such general rule exists, and courts do occasionally hear cases
in which their own sovereign, in its legislative capacity, has disclaimed
any substantive interest.2 24 The problem of what to do with the disinter-
ested forum, or what the disinterested forum ought to do, is well-known to
have thrown a monkeywrench into Currie's theory of interest analysis. 225
Whereas a Decision-Based theory confronting such a problem has the
wonderful advantage, however, of being able, when all else fails, to recom-
mend that the court simply decide, the disinterested forum problem may
be fatal to a strongly triadic Norm-Based theory. If a disinterested forum
could sift through all the alleged rights at issue in a litigation, whatever
223. I am not denying that our understanding of "sameness" in cases might turn on matters of
convention; I am emphasizing only that those conventions often recognize as the same case lawsuits
brought before different courts.
224. There are, of course, corners of traditional choice of law doctrine that would seem to rep-
resent applications of a jurisdictional principle limiting adjudication of a sovereign's governmental
interests to the forum of its own courts. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS §
427 (1934) (criminal law); id. § 611 (actions for penalty). Again, however, these are the exceptions
that prove the rule.
225. See, e.g., R. CRAMTON, D. CURRIE & H. HAY, CONFLICT OF LAWS 298 (3d ed. 1981)
(pointing out that Currie's system "seems to break down altogether" when third state with no interest
of its own is faced with true conflict between laws of two other states); Hill, Governmental Interest
and the Conflict of Laws-A Reply to Professor Currie, 27 U. CH. L. REv. 463, 477-79 (1960)
("Professor Currie's theory simply makes no provision for the treatment of a significant class of
cases-significant particularly in a federation like the United States."). Currie himself admitted this
difficulty, and the range of possible solutions he advanced in his most extended treatment of the issue
were, in his own estimation, tentative and not entirely satisfactory. See Currie, The Disinterested
Third State, 28 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBs. 754 (1963).
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their source, and regardless of whether such rights were binary or triadic,
and could reach some conclusion, surely an interested forum could do ex-
actly the same thing. More importantly, once we abandon an implicit ju-
risdictional bar, the interested forum, under the Rights-Based view, can-
not avoid performing exactly the same sifting of conflicting claims of right
in the exercise of legal judgment. And if that is so, what does the triadic
assumption add to the analysis of vestedness?
b. Legislative Intent.
The next objection relates to the previous one in numerous ways, but it
attempts a lateral, rather than a frontal, attack. Recall that one focus of
Currie's work was the claim that the judicial duty to resort to lex Jori
often derived directly from legislative intent. Currie believed that when
the legislative branch of a jurisdiction indicated a genuine interest in the
welfare of a class of its own citizens, and that interest could be served by
applying lex fori, the judicial branch of that jurisdiction generally had a
duty to honor the legislature's policy choice by applying local law. Simi-
larly, it could be argued here that the principle of vestedness must give
way to legislative will, and can play a role only in the absence of legisla-
tive interests or in the interstices of legislative policy.
At first glance, the objection seems so peripheral as to be irrelevant:
Vestedness is a normative proposition directed to legislatures as well as
courts. If some legislatures require their courts to apply lexfori, that does
not rebut or limit the normative force of the principle any more than
would judicial decisions to apply lex fori on their own. In either case, the
chosen course is simply benighted, and that is that.
The issue, however, is not so easily resolved. Put aside instances in
which legislatures intentionally regulate choice of law. According to one
reading of Currie, there remains, implicit in much legislation, a directive
that the courts of the jurisdiction do everything they can to advance the
substantive interests identified in the legislation. Thus, if a legislature
passes a statute expanding a certain species of tort liability, that legisla-
ture's own courts should give priority to the legislature's intent to protect
a class of tort victims over any impulse to apply some other jurisdiction's
tort law. Such a directive may be jurisprudentially pernicious, but that
does not make it go away. Despite their own inclinations, courts may have
a constitutional duty to a particular legislature to obey the directive de-
spite its conflict with the niceties of jurisprudential speculation. Conse-
quently, even if vestedness is correct as a normative principle, the norma-
tive project that I have undertaken extends-in this view-well beyond
judicial or legislative tinkering with choice of law doctrine. Vestedness,
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then, is too grand to be significant in the actual, day-to-day process of
litigation.
One rejoinder to this objection would emphasize that its reading of im-
plicit legislative intent contradicts what we know of the actual intent of
legislators, and reflects little more than Currie's own dogmatic prefer-
ences.226 There may be more at stake, however. The gravamen of the cur-
rent objection is that-at least under certain constitutions (very) roughly
like our own-legislative enactments, including substantive enactments,
are not only sources of law in the narrow sense generally assumed by the
Norm-Based view of law, but are also (or instead) bureaucratic directives
to the adjudicative branch requiring it to act in a certain way or to pursue
certain goals. This interpretation is certainly more congenial to a Deci-
sion-Based than to a Norm-Based view of law; but even the Norm-Based
view, alas, cannot reject it out of hand. In the first place, once a Norm-
Based perspective takes into account that legislatures are institutions ex-
isting under specific constitutions, and not just abstract generators of legal
norms, then it must concede that a legislature may have the constitutional
power to issue these direct commands. Second, a Norm-Based theory
might recognize that certain legislative enactments, such as those concern-
ing adjective norms and administrative matters like judicial salaries and
courtroom design, should be thought of partly in bureaucratic or hierar-
chical terms. Third, even if a Norm-Based theory stipulates that, at some
point, the intrusion of bureaucratic or hierarchical directives into the
realm of primary norms betrays the rule of law, this does not help judges
decide in individual cases whether an individual substantive statute is
more than a source of law, narrowly defined.
The only recourse I have at this point, I am afraid, is to canons of
interpretation. A judge may well have an institutional duty to obey a stat-
ute explicitly requiring the application of lexfori in a given set of cases.227
But if I have convincingly established a link between the rule of law and
vestedness, there would be no good reason, in a system of government that
considers itself bound by the rule of law, to interpret a substantive statute
that is silent on choice of law as requiring courts to pursue the legisla-
ture's interests in ways that violate vestedness. Just as courts routinely
interpret statutory silence on the issue of retroactivity to imply only pro-
spective effect, courts should-and ever so quietly do-interpret statutory
silence to imply that they should not intrude on the normative systems
established by foreign sovereigns.
226. See Brilmayer, supra note 1, at 399-400, 424-27.
227. 1 am assuming, as I have throughout this Article, that no independent constitutional con-
straint will come to the rescue as a deus ex machina.
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c. Vestedness and Vested Rights.
The last objection in this series is the least artful, but it is the most
general and in some respects the most serious: Put aside clever dodges; the
possibility still remains that vestedness ends up "vesting" far too little.
Traditional vested rights theory, after all, supposed that the rights associ-
ated with a transient cause of action were vested-more or less fixed-at
some defined time on the basis of some normatively relevant event in the
world: celebration of a marriage, breach of a contract, commission of a
tort, or the like. Although vested rights in choice of law and vested rights
in constitutional law are distinct notions, the same phrase has been used
in both contexts to signify a basic commitment to the ability of past events
to determine present entitlements. If vestedness is nowhere near this ro-
bust, its claim to have captured the purest kernel of vested rights theory
would be in doubt, and its practical import impeached.
Consider the following problem, which is inspired by actual cases.228
Traditional vested rights theory posited that the proper law to apply in a
fender-bender was the law of the place of the accident. A more general
commitment to the notion of vested rights might accommodate alternative
choice of law criteria such as "the law of the accident victim's domicile" or
"the law of the injurer's domicile," where domicile is understood as domi-
cile at the time of the accident. But what about "the law of [one or an-
other] domicile at the time of suit"?229 More generally, why does the
principle of vestedness select lex fori as the single villain of the piece,
while seeming to tolerate so easily the variety of other ways in which a
choice of law regime might allow later events to subvert legitimate expec-
tations that may have been created in the course of earlier, normatively
relevant events?
This objection-that vestedness "vests" far too little-is in some sense
228. See Miller v. Miller, 22 N.Y.2d 12, 237 N.E.2d 877, 290 N.Y.S.2d 734 (1968); Haines v.
Mid-Century Ins., 47 Wis. 2d 442, 177 N.W.2d 328 (1970); ef. Allstate Ins. v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302,
318-19 (1981) (citing residence at time of litigation as relevant to reasonableness of state choice of law
decision).
229. For some of the standard arguments on both sides of the question of post-accident changes in
domicile, compare R. WEINTRAUB, supra note 84, at 345-49 (post-accident changes in residence
should be taken into account when judging state interests) and Sedler, The Governmental Interest
Approach to Choice of Law: An Analysis and a Reformulation, 25 UCLA L. REv. 181, 241-42
(1977) (state interests should be determined as they exist at time case presented in court) with Reich
v. Purcell, 67 Cal. 2d 551, 432 P.2d 727, 63 Cal. Rptr. 31 (1967) (relevant residence and domicile of
plaintiff were those at time of accident) and RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS ch. 7,
Topic 1, introductory note, at 414 (1971) (suggesting that post-accident change in domicile should
have no effect upon law governing most tort issues, but declining to resolve question definitively) and
Twerski, On Territoriality and Sovereignty: System Shock and Constitutional Choice of Law, 10
HoFSTRA L. REv. 149, 155-60 (1981) (denying importance of interests belonging to state of post-
accident residence). See also R. DWORKIN, supra note 92, at 309-11 (questioning whether considera-
tion of defendant's post-accident residence reflects state's true policy interests).
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quite tangential, since it concedes that vestedness is completely successful
at its stated aim of enjoining the challenge to vested rights represented by
lex fori.2 30 On the other hand, the objection is not simply a broad-scale
attack on the much-emphasized fact that vestedness is not, and was never
advertised to be, a full-fledged theory of choice of law."' The point of the
objection, somehow, is that vestedness, whether or not too thin, is thin in
the wrong places, and that if all vestedness can do is to enjoin lex fori, it
has not captured the underlying principle linking lexfori to other betray-
als of vested rights.
One possible response to this objection is that the notion of "vesting" it
invokes is too elusive: Any choice of law rule will look to some set of
events to establish-as to one or more issues of law-the legislative juris-
diction of a particular sovereign, but those events often will follow other
events of equal normative relevance. A perfect example is the traditional
rule that the place of injury provides the proper law in a tort case, even if
the act causing the injury occurred much earlier and in a different
place. 23 2 Even outside the special world of choice of law, legal bottom
lines can change with alarming alacrity as events follow each other in
succession: Marriage can be dissolved, a breach of contract can be cured,
negligence can be neutralized by contributory negligence and then recalled
by a "last clear chance." Obviously, the objects of normative judgment in
a system of vested rights are not only individual acts by individual parties,
but whole transactions, or patterns of interactions, among parties.
Moreover, it is not even clear as a historical matter that traditional
vested rights theory was completely committed to some general principle
that rights should "vest" earlier rather than later. Certainly, Beale and
Dicey both would object strenuously to a choice of law variable such as
230. Recall also my earlier demonstration (or at least stipulation) that vestedness excludes choice
of law rules relying on transparent proxies for the forum, such as "the law of the place where the
parties or their agents were last to be found in the same room." See supra note 58 and accompanying
text.
231. Thus, for example, the objection is not directed to the possibility, mooted earlier, of choice of
law rules like "apply the law of Canada." See supra text accompanying notes 71-72. With respect to
such rules, vestedness is much less definitive than vested rights theory, but only because vestedness
separates jurisprudence from politics, and not because vestedness is any less committed to the "vest-
ing" of rights. If our governing notions of sovereignty were such that the legislative jurisdiction of
Canada were universal and exclusive, then a choice of law rule requiring a forum to apply the law of
Canada in all cases would be exactly the choice of law rule we would want, and would be as capable
of strictly "vesting" rights as anything found in the First Restatement. Similarly, the objection is not
directed at the entire, large class of possible choice of law rules consistent with the principle of vested-
ness and with governing political theory, but still outside the contemplation of traditional vested rights
theory. Classical territorialism is one way to imagine that rights are vested, but is by no means the
only way. See supra note 69. Even Beale, in criticizing choice of law theories grounded in personal
status, did not argue that they were inconsistent with the general notion that rights vested, but only
that they reflected a "medieval" sensibility. See I J. BEALE, supra note 5, § 5.2, at 52 (quoting Chetti
v. Chetti, [1909] P. 67, 69 (Barnes, J.)).
232. See RFsTATEMENT OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 377 (1934).
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"domicile at the time of suit." At least some of their hostility to such a
rule, however, would have to be ascribed to their brand of territorialism
rather than to some independent intuition about when (as opposed to
where) rights vest. Indeed, within the basic territorial paradigm, Beale
and Dicey do not seem to have been committed to a general principle that
earlier expectations trump later ones: The most obvious example is the
"last event" rule in torts, but one might also point to the "place of per-
formance" rule determining at least some contractual obligations, 233 and,
for that matter, to the fundamental shift away from domicile (usually an
early fact) to situs (usually a later fact) as the determining variable for
most choice of law issues. Whether vested rights theory stripped of the
certainties of territorialism would still pack more punch than vestedness,
then, is a difficult question, and perhaps a moot one at that.
Nevertheless, the objection that vestedness "vests" too little or too late
has something more to it than a disguised nostalgia for territorialism. Af-
ter all, it is no accident that when variables such as "domicile at the time
of suit" have come into choice of law, it has not resulted from some special
view of legal transactions, understood within a Norm-Based discourse, but
from a campaign justifying a retreat to lex fori or otherwise guided by a
Decision-Based jurisprudence. In fact, any effort to locate these moves
within a Norm-Based discourse would run afoul of both territorialist ob-
jections and more fundamental understandings within the legal culture
that there are conceptual boundaries to a legal transaction-limits on the
relevant sets of events and actors-that make some choice of law variables
irrelevant to any proper understanding of the exercise of legislative juris-
diction. Moreover, events like the initiation of a suit would be particularly
unsound benchmarks in an account of law that separates primary behav-
ior from legal enforcement. The time of suit is generally no more salient
to the underlying dispute than an astrological conjunction or the judge's
breakfast.
Vestedness as a formal proposition does not capture these sorts of un-
derstandings in itself. It can, however, play its usual catalytic role, and it
can also directly block trespasses whose real thrust is a resort to lexfori.
Within the context of the Norm-Based account as a whole, vestedness can
be a bridgehead-the first step of an inquiry that uses these understand-
ings and others to rethink the enterprise of choice of law.
Is it then a defect of vestedness that it is only a bridgehead? I think not.
Vestedness shares the task of defining and defending vested rights with
other principles, but its place in the project is conceptually distinct and
independently important.
233. See RESTATEMENT OF CONFLICT OF LAws § 358 (1934).
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The boundaries of legal transactions seem to be substance-specific, re-
flecting understandings of areas like tort and contract rather than law in
general. Vestedness is not substance-specific; it is an external constraint on
the working out of substantive principles. Thus, my focus on vestedness
extracts from traditional vested rights theory a formal, self-contained core,
derivable from jurisprudential premises that are themselves vital though
formal. Vestedness differs fundamentally from notions defining the bound-
aries of tort or contract disputes; its closest kin is probably the principle of
non-retroactivity-an equally formal constraint that attempts to regulate
choice of law across time rather than across sources of authority.
Vestedness also deserves special notice because it claims a universal
mandate. By contrast, the principles defining the boundaries of legal
transactions are context-specific (unless they are so vague as to be only
suggestive) and may vary significantly from one fact-pattern or area of
law to another.23 4 These scattered and particularized notions are impor-
tant and merit debate (as do all the other rules and sub-rules necessary to
a full-fledged account of choice of law). They cannot, however, constitute
the basic, practical test dividing classical Norm-Based accounts of choice
of law from their revolutionary counterparts.
Finally, vestedness is, perhaps uniquely, a principle of choice of law. It
therefore marks more than the difference between two different ap-
proaches to choice of law; it also marks the difference between a world
with only one sovereign, in which vestedness would be purely academic,
and a world-our world-in which many sovereigns cast their legislative
nets over a shifting sea of people and events. A bridgehead perhaps, but a
crucial bridgehead nevertheless.
d. The Bottom Line
My analysis of the current troika of objections has left in its track at
least one important concern. In answering the first objection, I relied on
understandings derived from the evidence of mundane but important legal
doctrine. In answering the second, I relied on realistic canons of interpre-
tation. In answering the third, I again invoked understandings within the
legal culture, not relying on them this time, but recognizing their place in
a full-fledged account of choice of law and locating the present project by
reference to them. Each of these responses begs important questions about
the nature and status of such understandings and canons, legal doctrine
and legal culture. Are these features of legal systems fortuitous, or are
234. It may not even be impossible to reject the notorious "time of suit" ploy out of hand; con-
sider, for example, a continuing tort in which the last event of legitimate normative significance at the
time of suit would, by definition, be occurring at the time of suit.
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they natural and inevitable? Would a legal world without them fall
outside the domain of a true Norm-Based jurisprudence?
The answers to these questions are crucial, and not just for the truth or
falsity of vestedness. On the one hand, the phenomenology of legal culture
to which I have resorted might have demonstrated that even a self-
consciously inclusive account of Norm-Based jurisprudence can, by a dia-
lectical process, unfold a series of rich, detailed, and necessary conclusions
about the life of the law.2 3 5 On the other hand, a more skeptical attitude
about legal understandings, canons, doctrine, and culture might suggest
that the story of vestedness is largely contingent: If a world filled with
triadic legal relations were tenable, then vestedness, in that world at least,
would be a charming, but empty, principle of law; if a world with self-
destructing notions of interpretation were tenable, then vestedness, in that
world at least, would be a weighty, but often irrelevant, principle of law;
if a world in which legal transactions had no boundaries were tenable,
then vestedness would be all right, but the rest of choice of law might be
lost at sea.
Out of uncertainty rather than orneriness, I must leave all these ques-
tions open. And if the truth be told, I am not sure that the story I am
235. The dissection of binary and triadic relations, for example, can easily be read to suggest that
private law-the law of individual binary relations-is logically prior to, or the model for, public law.
Cf. Amodu Tijani v. Secretary, [1921] 2 App. Cas. 399, 406-10 (P.C.) (deciding, in property case
arising in British colony, that "mere change in sovereignty is not to be presumed as meant to disturb
rights of private owners," and therefore upholding native usufructary title); Pilans & Rose v. Van
Mierop & Hopkins, 97 Eng. Rep. 1035, 1038-40 (K.B. 1765) (suggesting deference to law merchant
and needs of international commerce in deciding whether undertaking was supported by considera-
tion); H.L.A. HART, supra note 101, at 77-96 (suggesting conceptual origin of law in rules of con-
duct understood by private individuals); Monaghan, Constitutional Adjudication: The Who and
When, 82 YALE L.J. 1363, 1365-68 (1973) (discussing Supreme Court's historical adherence to pri-
vate rights model); Pound, Public Law and Private Law, 24 CORNELL L.Q. 469 (1939) (defining
"the new public law" and its threat to private law); Waters, The Property in the Promise: A Study of
the Third Party Beneficiary Rule, 98 HARv. L. REV. 1111 (1985) (third party beneficiary rule giving
intended beneficiaries of public programs access to courts otherwise unavailable); Weinrib, The Insur-
ance Justification and Private Law, 14 J. LEGAL STUD. 681 (1985) (outlining significance of "pri-
vate law" conception of torts). (As the varied character of these citations suggests, I mean this proposi-
tion to evoke a whole set of possible claims, not necessarily alike and not necessarily all consistent with
one another.).
Similarly, the discussion of legislative intent may support the view that legal interpretation is not a
hunt for mental states, but a purposive, constructive enterprise guided by the law's own demands on
itself. Cf. T.B. Baba Mezia 59a-59b (Talmudic narrative rejecting Heavenly Voice as arbiter of
meaning of religious law, because "it [Torah] is not in heaven"); id. Menakhot 29b (narrative con-
trasting Moses as traditional receiver of all law at Mount Sinai and Moses as individual incapable of
foreseeing or understanding all of the meaning to be found in that law); R. DWORKIN, supra note
115, at 313-54 (discussing idea of legislative intention as seen from perspective of "law as integrity");
Moore, A Natural Law Theory of Interpretation, 58 S. CAL. L. REV. 277 (1985); Radin, Statutory
Interpretation, 43 HARV. L. REv. 863 (1930) (criticizing use of legislative intent and proposing alter-
native methods).
Finally, the discussion of legal transactions and their boundaries may suggest a deeper, more com-
plicated intercourse than has often been supposed between the substance of the law and its inner
"morality." L. FULLER, supra note 100, at 152-86.
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telling suffers all that much for this indecision. Admittedly, the more
wide-ranging conclusions about the nature of law that I dropped into a
footnote 236 might have to remain purely speculative, but they were never
part of the central thrust of this Article. In any event, it is possible that
necessity and contingency might not be the most important variables in
the self-portrayal of a complex institutional phenomenon such as law.
More importantly, it should be clear that whether or not very different
legal worlds fall within the contemplation of Norm-Based jurisprudence,
those worlds would differ radically from ours not only in their under-
standing of choice of law but in the entire range of their exercise of legal
imagination. And that, I would venture, is a strong enough conclusion to
merit a place for vestedness in a this-worldly, practical jurisprudence.
6. Does Vestedness Prove Too Much?
The final objection to everything said so far is that it has proved not too
little, but too much. Vestedness requires that a forum take the content of
substantive legal rights to be forum-independent. Yet cheerfully built into
the very definition of vestedness is the idea that choice of law regimes
themselves, as well as particular choice of law rules, are entirely forum-
dependent. The content of choice of law rules, moreover, in contrast to
adjective law and even to directives requiring courts to look to choice of
law rules, are second-order primary norms defining which primary (sub-
stantive) norms apply in a given case. How then can the vesting of local
law be reconciled with the forum's complete control over the rules of
choice of law?
There are, it seems to me, at least two possible ways of meeting this
challenge. One strategy would be to retreat to a much-diluted form of
legal realism. The Norm-Based view of law, after all, is perhaps a meta-
phor-a way of telling courts and the rest of us how to think about the
law-rather than a description of the "really real." Although the Norm-
Based view tells courts and the rest of us to treat legal rights as existing
independent of the forum in which they happen to be enforced, courts
must have some means of identifying those rights, and autonomous legal
systems must themselves select those means. To ask for anything more in
a world with many autonomous legal systems would be to submit either to
paralysis or to a reductio ad absurdum. And no metaphor, however pow-
erful, should be taken that far.
This answer is not bad, and might even provoke some saccharine
thoughts about how the Norm-Based and Decision-Based perspectives re-
ally do converge after all. My own inclination, though, is to try another
236. See supra note 235.
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route, taking comfort in the vinegary thought that the best defense is a
good offense. Let me propose, as a better answer, that choice of law rights
do vest, that their vesting is consistent with vestedness, and that it results
neither in paralysis nor in a reductio ad absurdum.
Recall that, with regard to substantive legal norms, a forum can, consis-
tent with the principle of vestedness, look to its own understandings when
"the issue is not framed as one of choice of law, but rather of the interpre-
tation of the same law. '2 37 In such cases, courts reaching different conclu-
sions rightly consider each other not "to have made a different choice of
law, but to have adopted a mistaken view of the same law. ' 23 8 Choice of
law analysis therefore may be legitimately forum-dependent for the simple
reason that its body of specific rules and principles constitutes a single
trans-jurisdictional entity about whose content various forums happen to
disagree.
Lest I be misunderstood, let me emphasize that I am not finally resort-
ing to the claim that choice of law is a matter of public international law.
Even if choice of law rules constitute a single trans-jurisdictional entity,
the binding obligation to refer to that entity might arise solely out of juris-
prudential considerations internal to individual legal systems.2"9 Nor am I
urging that the choice of law canon constitutes a species of natural law,
although it might. The trans-jurisdictional need not be the transcendental,
and the sort of trans-jurisdictional "entity" I have in mind can be under-
stood as "natural" or "conventional"-a shared effort at positive legal en-
actment and analysis-or neither, that is, nothing more than a project
with a well-defined common end and varying views regarding the means
to that end.
One way to understand what I have in mind is to consider the follow-
ing analogy: Suppose that the United States Constitution had only one
provision, to wit, "Federal law exists." Suppose further that there were no
federal courts and no explicitly defined or centrally imposed principle of
federal supremacy. One might still imagine state courts (1) concluding
that they were bound by federal law, and (2) arriving at divergent views
regarding the content of federal law. Under these admittedly bizarre cir-
cumstances, could we still conclude that the state courts involved were
interpreting a real entity called federal law? A Decision-Based analysis
would, of course, find the idea somewhat deranged. And it might well
require a strong anti-nominalist stomach to take the plunge. Nevertheless,
I submit that we could answer in the affirmative: "Federal law" in that
237. See supra text accompanying note 66.
238. Id.
239. See supra text accompanying note 213.
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context would be very much the same sort of trans-jurisdictional entity I
have in mind in describing "the law of choice of law." '24
Indeed, the advantages of treating the body of choice of law rules as
trans-jurisdictional are not just formal. Consider again the truncated fed-
eral constitution just described. If such an arrangement actually existed,
the diversity of state views on the content of federal law would be unset-
tling in a way qualitatively different from the occasional annoyance pro-
voked by variations in the local laws of the various states. That discomfort
might even be so great as to provoke a call for some arrangement among
the states to reconcile their views of federal law-perhaps even a single
supreme court to pronounce in some authoritative way which of the diver-
gent views of federal law were correct.241
In light of this thought experiment, it should come as no surprise that
the diversity of official views about choice of law often provokes exactly
the same sense of disquiet, qualitatively different from the reaction to
cross-jurisdictional differences in tort or contract law, and sometimes lead-
ing to proposals for official joint action 2 , 2 or centralization.243 Moreover,
240. Somewhat more realistic examples include the law of admiralty, as it traditionally has been
distinguished from both public international law and purely domestic law, see RESTATEMENT (SEC-
OND) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 35 reporters' notes (1965); G. GIL-
MORE & C. BLACK, LAW OF ADMIRALTY 45-46 (2d ed. 1975), and the notion of general common
law articulated in cases such as Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842). The latter example is both
perilous and particularly interesting due to the enormous historical freight it carries. Indeed, the juris-
prudential assumptions at work in Swift v. Tyson were later attacked as incoherent by Oliver Wendell
Holmes, see Black & White Taxicab & Transfer Co. v. Brown & Yellow Taxicab & Transfer Co.,
276 U.S. 518, 532 (1928) (Holmes, J., dissenting), and eventually rejected by a Supreme Court work-
ing in the wake of the legal realist movement. See Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
But cf. W.W. COOK, supra note 17, at 138 (almost defending Swift v. Tyson). (An alternative read-
ing of the pre-Erie cases, I should add, is that they intended to recognize not a general common law
distinct from the domestic law of the states, but the coordinate power of the federal and state courts to
reach independently authoritative conclusions as to the content of state law. See, e.g., Smith v. Ala-
bama, 124 U.S. 465, 478 (1888) (dictum) ("A determination . . . of what that law is may be different
in a court of the United States from that which prevails in the judicial tribunals of a particular
State."); Burgess v. Seligman, 107 U.S. 20, 33-34 (1882) (noting existence of two coordinate jurisdic-
tions with power to construe state law). This would suggest less an example of trans-jurisdictional
law than the more general and not uncommon phenomenon of decentralized legal interpretation.)
241. A more realistic example is again close at hand: In the workings of the United States judicial
system, the Supreme Court's exercise of discretionary jurisdiction is commonly thought to be particu-
larly urgent in the resolution of issues of federal law on which the lower courts have split. See Sup.
CT. R. 17(l)(a); COMMISSION ON REVISION OF THE FEDERAL COURT APPELLATE SYSTEM, STRuC-
TURE AND INTERNAL PROCEDURES: RECOMMENDATIONS FOR CHANGE, 67 F.R.D. 195, 221 (1975);
Estreicher & Sexton, A Managerial Theory of the Supreme Court's Responsibilities: An Empirical
Study, 59 N.Y.U. L. REV. 681, 722-28 (1984). But ef. supra note 240 (drawing distinction between
decentralized legal interpretation in general and trans-jurisdictional law as a special subset thereof).
242. Among the most prominent proposals for choice of law unification on the international front
have been several conventions proposed by the Hague Conference on Private International Law. See
Droz & Dyer, The Hague Conference and the Main Issues of Private International Law for the
Eighties, 3 Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 155, 180-96 (1981).
243. See, e.g., Horowitz, Toward a Federal Common Law of Choice of Law, 14 UCLA L. REV.
1191 (1967); Trautman, The Relation Between American Choice of Law and Federal Common Law,
41 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Spring 1977, at 105; cf. In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 580
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this visceral sense of disquiet is entirely understandable: If "the law of
choice of law" is really one trans-jurisdictional entity with varying inter-
pretations, then the multiplicity of those interpretations suggests either
that most of them are false or that different forums have inconsistently
exercised their residual discretion, revealing in either event the baldly in-
exact character of the judicial craft.244
In light of all this, however, two questions still remain. The first ques-
tion is whether I have, in positing a trans-jurisdictional component to
choice of law, committed myself to an idea fatally inconsistent with the
premises of certain Norm-Based theories of law, and thus (at the very
least) jeopardized my claim that "accepting the basic elements of any
Norm-Based theory should lead one to embrace the notion of vestedness in
choice of law."24' My relatively confident answer is no. I have already
taken some pains to anticipate most potential objections from Norm-Based
theories adopting one or another version of legal positivism by emphasiz-
ing that the trans-jurisdictional entity I have in mind is sufficiently gen-
eral in its outlines so as not to require any commitment to the existence of
either natural law or public international law to get it off the ground.
Indeed, if I do run into any trouble at all, it would probably come only
from those versions of "hard-facts positivism" 246 for whom the very
vagueness of my idea of a trans-jurisdictional entity might cause some dis-
comfort. A satisfactory response to that corner of the field, however, might
well be that if the trans-jurisdictional canon of choice of law is nothing
but "a project with a well-defined end and varying views regarding the
means to that end," then the canon is not in itself a source of "law" at all,
F. Supp. 690, 698-99 (E.D.N.Y. 1984) (advocating application of "national consensus law"); B.
CURRIE, supra note 40, at 125-27 (advocating promulgation of federal conflict of law rule under full
faith and credit clause).
244. To say that a sense of disquiet is understandable, however, is not to say what, if anything,
can or should be done about it. Vestedness neither requires "a forum to adopt choice of law criteria
that will generate outcomes at trial identical or even similar to those in other forums" nor assumes
"that different forums adopt the same choice of law regime." See supra text accompanying notes
60-61. Even if a forum feels bound by vestedness, it need not subordinate its views as to the correct
construction of the trans-jurisdictional choice of law canon to the views of other forums. Thus, nothing
in the principle of vestedness requires a move to institutional centralization or coordination. Whether
such a move would be desirable in its own right is beyond the scope of this Article.
Nevertheless, the absolute interpretive freedom I am postulating is admittedly in tension with the
notion of a trans-jurisdictional canon of choice of law. Putting structural innovations aside, my
own-highly tentative-sense is that this tension is precisely the sort of problem to which the under-
standing of judges as experts in the law can fruitfully be brought to bear. Although judges in different
forums are not required to take into account each other's views on choice of law, it may nevertheless
be right and good that they do so, for the same reason that it is right and good that federal judges in
different circuits look to each other's views of federal law, or that judges interpreting any body of law
look to the views of scholars on that body of law. Moreover, the decentralization of the choice of law
enterprise may be a reason to try to steer it toward rules that are not only widely approved but also
sufficiently transparent to reduce subsidiary disagreements over their meaning.
245. Supra text accompanying notes 88-89.
246. See Coleman, supra note 147, at 145-48 (discussing "hard-facts" positivism).
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but only a description of how individual legal regimes can come to their
own understanding of governing law.
The second question I need to address is more serious and important:
By invoking the very idea that choice of law rights vest on the basis of a
trans-jurisdictional choice of law canon, however vague have I added
something radically new to my original account of vestedness itself? Ac-
cording to the definition of vestedness'at the beginning of Part II of this
Article, all a legal regime must do to remain within the strictures of the
principle is to "apply choice of law criteria that could be expected to gen-
erate the same set of substantive criteria if they were applied by any other
forum in an actual adjudication." In light of my latest revelation, how-
ever, it seems that in addition to complying with that formal requirement,
a legal regime must be careful to apply only those choice of law criteria
that it concludes are demanded by a trans-jurisdictional canon of choice of
law rules and principles.
Now, if the idea that the choice of law canon is somehow trans-
jurisdictional were read to impose some requirement on the inner psycho-
logical workings of judges and legislators, it might indeed represent a
change from the original definition of vestedness. That interpretation is by
no means necessary, however, any more than it would have been neces-
sary to understand the original definition of vestedness to look to inner
psychological processes to decide whether a particular choice of law crite-
rion was actually being "applied." Putting such state of mind analysis to
the side, then, I would argue that the idea that the choice of law criteria a
forum applies must be consistent with some coherent account of a trans-
jurisdictional choice of law canon in fact adds nothing new to the defini-
tion of vestedness; it was actually implicit in the account of vestedness all
along.
Part of what I have in mind can be found in the notion of "good faith"
that I invoked in discussing and dismissing the proposed rule requiring a
Canadian court always to apply the law of Canada.247 The requirement
of "good faith," though it must have seemed more than a little jerry built
when it first appeared, can now be understood to mean little more than
that a forum should seek, through choice of law, to discover the substan-
tive norms that actually applied to a given set of events as they occurred in
the world. And that, in turn, really amounts to the proposition that a
forum's choice of law rules should represent, at least according to the fo-
rum's own understanding, an account of those substantive norms that
would, or should, be credible to other forums.
Good faith, however, does not do the whole job that needs to be done. A
247. See supra text accompanying note 75.
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forum's choice of law criteria may be credible to other forums and still not
represent the forum's own best account of what would be required by a
trans-jurisdictional canon of choice of law. Consider, for example, a forum
that surveyed all the possible choice of law rules to govern a particular
issue, narrowed the list down to those rules that were generally reasonable
and consistent with other relevant principles, and then picked one rule at
random, with the avowed rationale that one result was no more arbitrary
than another. Has the forum complied with vestedness?
It turns out that it has not. Recall that the definition of vestedness
spoke in terms of choice of law "criteria" operating at every level of ab-
straction, and not just isolated choice of law rules.248 Thus, just as a fo-
rum would be violating vestedness if it selected its choice of law rules on
the basis of a meta-criterion requiring it to apply "the law of the place
selected by that choice of law rule-in itself consistent with vested-
ness-that in the aggregate of cases most often results in the application of
the law of the forum,' '249 so it also would be violating vestedness if it
selected its choice of law rules on the basis of a principle requiring it to
apply "the law of the place selected by that choice of law rule-in itself
consistent with vestedness and other sound principles-that was selected
by the pick of the draw." In neither case, after all, is there any reason to
expect that the meta-criterion, if applied by other forums, would yield the
same results. Indeed, it would appear that the only ultimate criterion that
could generate a system of choice of law rules and principles consistent
with vestedness would be a principle requiring the forum, to the extent it
was able, to apply those choice of law rules that represented its best read-
ing of the trans-jurisdictional canon of choice of law.
All of this is not to say that a forum must expend all of its available
intellectual energy in articulating choice of law rules, or that it needs to
abandon the demands of decision management.25 What is clear, however,
is that a forum cannot, consistent with vestedness, arbitrarily avoid the
imperative to universalize-the imperative to look beyond itself in reach-
ing its own decision. Indeed, it is precisely at this point that the principle
of vestedness finally can be seen to connect directly to ideas such as equal-
ity and the avoidance of forum-shopping, about whose significance I ear-
lier was somewhat skeptical. 251 Equality in the context of a Norm-Based
view of law does not mean-as some Decision-Based ethics might re-
quire-that courts should treat all persons equally, but rather that courts
should treat all persons according to law, and as equal under the law. Yet
248. See supra text accompanying notes 59-60.
249. Id.
250. See supra text accompanying notes 145-47.
251. See supra text accompanying notes 82-84.
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the common thread linking the idea of equality under the law to other
applications of the ideal of equality is, after all, the imperative to univer-
salize-to achieve that detached perspective in which no one set of paro-
chial interests or claims has inherent priority over any other. Similarly, it
should be evident now that (1) shopping for courts is distinctively prob-
lematic to a Norm-Based sense of the legal enterprise because legal rights
actually attach long before any court acts on the matter; (2) shopping for
courts also is distinctively problematic because it exploits judicial disagree-
ment over a set of issues about which, given the goal of universalization,
there should be no disagreement; and (3) there is something to be said for
the proposition that the first two statements are really one and the same.
7. To the Stars
But does this really go far enough? Even if the law of choice of law
vests in some attenuated sense, does it not still depend on certain underly-
ing legal and political assumptions? And how do those in any sense vest?
And what about the deeper propositions underlying those theories? Do
they also vest? Indeed, even if the entire planet were to coordinate all of
its thinking on choice of law, how would we guard against the possibility
that the law that really vested all along was the law of a distant galactic
government whose legislation is put on display in an office somewhere
near Alpha Centauri ?252
At this point, a version of my modified legal realist response may begin
to look more attractive. As all Norm-Based theorists not committed to a
strong version of natural law have long understood, internal legal analysis
must eventually run into sociology. Or, to put a Wittgensteinian spin on
the matter, the intimate connection between concepts and practice can be
avoided for only so long. Or, to put it yet another way, too fanatical a
search for foundations will eventually lead either to paralysis or to a
reductio ad absurdum.
Yet, I would submit, none of this really represents any sort of retreat at
all. To admit that law is ultimately a conversation rather than a self-
sustaining fact of nature does not reduce the imperative to render that
conversation consistent and coherent. To suggest that the law of distant
planets is somehow beyond the scope of the conversation is no excuse for
ignoring the law of Ontario.253 To suggest that interpretive communities
are not infinite or transcendent is not to argue that the very finite inter-
pretive communities in which we do participate should be denuded. To
252. See D. ADAMS, THE HITCHHIKER'S GUIDE TO THE GALAXY 34-36 (1979).
253. Perhaps it is also no excuse for ignoring the laws of non-state normative communities. See
Cover, supra note 189; Note, supra note 74.
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despair of the search for foundations is no excuse for gutting the rest of
the house. On the contrary, the decidedly Norm-Based insight that law is
a specialized normative discourse, lined up over against other forms of
discourse, suggests that building attics rather than foundations is a central
task of the lawyer.
Finally, if there is to be a convergence between the Norm-Based and
Decision-Based views, it may well be on the Norm-Based view's terms.
One of the premises of Norm-Based jurisprudence, after all, is that courts,
and other interpreters of law, can be wrong. Admitting the possibility of
error may be humbling and unsettling. In another sense, though, it is pro-
foundly liberating, for it allows us to forge ahead in the absence of final
answers. A legal system might decide one day that the law of some galac-
tic empire, or the law of nature, or the law of Nature's God, should have
governed its judicial decisions all along. Until that day comes, though, the
best a legal system can do is to attempt to discover, with all due humility
and audacity, which of the norms available for its consideration should
govern which of the cases brought to its attention. As long as it takes that
work seriously, it deserves to be called a legal system devoted to the enter-
prise humbly and audaciously called the rule of law.
V. BACK TO EARTH: THE ROAD AHEAD
So much for the cosmos. If vestedness is to prove its worth to a practical
jurisprudence, it will have to return to Earth and do some work. Four
related projects are at the forefront of what remains to be done.
The first project is the most obvious: to work on filling in the embar-
rassing gaps in the present account of vestedness and its role in choice of
law. In particular, the notion of "substantive criteria" and the attendant
distinction between substantive and non-substantive legal issues need more
attention than passing comments and tentative footnotes. In addition, ef-
fort needs to focus on the division of labor that can, or does, or should
exist between (1) second-order choice of law rules, which are in some
sense trans-jurisdictional, and (2) first-order Rules of Scope and Rules of
Assimilation, which may look like choice of law rules, but are really as-
pects of the local law of particular jurisdictions.
A second desirable project would be a review of current choice of law
doctrines and practices to test whether they conform, in their particulars,
to the constraint of vestedness (more of whose details would have been
illuminated by the first project). The results of such a review might be
surprisingly reassuring. Certainly, the purest forms of Currie's "interest
analysis" would not survive the filter of vestedness; others' attempts to
apply his methods and insights might. The same can be said, to cite only
one example, for a good deal of the Second Restatement, whose constant
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effort to find which jurisdiction has the "most significant relationship" to
a legal issue can be understood, on the whole, as aimed at deciding which
jurisdiction's law has "vested" as to that issue.2 4 Moreover, many of to-
day's doctrines and practices might look particularly good if the review
focused on their actual content rather than their theoretical
rationalizations.
A third project would involve making sure that those choice of law the-
ories and doctrines that do comply with vestedness are in fact plausible
structures in an analytic architecture governed by vestedness. Because ves-
tedness plays a catalytic role in choice of law, it should be possible to
work backwards, so to speak, recovering from choice of law propositions
the premises (or the set of alternative premises) necessary to justify them
in a Norm-Based discourse. If those premises then turned out to conflict
with other settled ideas about the nature or sources of law, it might be-
come necessary to modify those ideas, to look for other premises, or to
decide that the choice of law theories or doctrines in question could not,
after all, be accepted in good faith, in a choice of law regime that is con-
sistent with vestedness and the rule of law.
For example, a prominent and controversial suggestion in the choice of
law literature is to apply the "better law."25 The better law can, of
course, become a fig-leaf for the law of the forum;25 it can also be justi-
fied in a Decision-Based jurisprudence as the law preferred-in a Deci-
sion-Based calculus-by the forum's court. But what sorts of premises
would be necessary to justify the better-law approach and the possibility
of forum-neutral tests for "betterness," in a legal discourse governed by
vestedness? Would these premises include notions of natural law or gen-
eral common law? If so, could they be sustained consistent with every-
thing else we might think about natural law and general common law?
Similar questions can be asked about result-driven choice of law variables
such as "the law sustaining liability" (in tort) or "the law validating the
contract," and even about the established notion that parties to a contract
should be able, within broad limits, to choose the law that governs the
contract.
A fourth project follows in part from the first three, but flows more
254. Cf Reese, Conflict of Laws and the Restatement Second, 28 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS.
679, 692 (1963) (Second Restatement "is written from the viewpoint of a neutral forum which has no
interest of its own to protect and is seeking only to apply the most appropriate law.").
255. See Ehrenzweig, "False Conflicts" and the "Better Rule": Threat and Promise in Multi-
state Tort Law, 53 VA. L. REv. 847, 855-56 (1967); Leflar, Choice-Influencing Considerations in
Conflicts Law, 41 N.Y.U. L. REV. 267, 295-304 (1966). For cases adopting some variation of the
"better law" approach, see, for example, Milkovich v. Saari, 295 Minn. 155, 203 N.W.2d 408 (1973);
Conklin v. Homer, 38 Wis. 2d 468, 157 N.W.2d 579 (1968).
256. See Reppy, Eclecticism in Choice of Law: Hybrid Method or Mishmash?, 34 MERCER L.
REv. 645, 674 (1983).
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directly from the earlier skeletal intellectual history that tied the under-
pinnings of the choice of law revolution to American Legal Realism and
Decision-Based jurisprudence. That history, particularly to the extent that
it credits academics influenced by a Decision-Based jurisprudence with
affecting actual judicial practice, is in some tension with the claims of
Norm-Based jurisprudence to be a thoroughgoing account of law. The
tension is far from fatal, of course, because even the descriptive side of
Norm-Based jurisprudence, and certainly its prescriptive side, can easily
survive pockets of deviation.251 Nevertheless, it would be important and
interesting to trace, in the context of a story of jurisprudential clash, ex-
actly how the choice of law revolution was received in the working life of
the law. Did the Decision-Based prescriptions of the choice of law revolu-
tion (as opposed to its more moderate anti-conceptualist and anti-
territorialist insights) have a lasting impact on judicial practice? If they
did have such an influence, did it spill over into other fields of law, or was
the Cook/Currie revolution a localized phenomenon that pushed choice of
law to the periphery of legal practice and scholarship? Was whatever suc-
cess Decision-Based choice of law enjoyed in the courts the result of mis-
understanding, or greed, or real doubts about the nature of law and judi-
cial duty? Or was there really, as just implied, more smoke than fire in
the choice of law revolution-a striking gap between the enormous intel-
lectual ferment apparent in the academy and the results felt in the court-
room? If so, can the gap be explained in part by acts of resistance
grounded, self-consciously or not, in deep-seated jurisprudential intuitions
animated by the powerful attraction of the rule of law?
VI. CONCLUSION
A commitment to the existence, validity, and importance of an "inter-
nal" perspective in the law has been one of the recurring themes of this
Article. The internal understanding necessary to any Norm-Based view of
law is necessarily counter-revolutionary, for it encourages a form of argu-
ment that embellishes the spare, or clarifies the obscure, or makes explicit
the implicit, rather than one which shatters the vessels and starts anew.
At the same time, I hope this Article has shown that the internal need
not be insular. On the small stage of choice of law, the ironic thesis of this
Article is that, by lowering its sights from the contemplation of the state of
humankind to the adjudication of legal rights, a court will be forced to
look beyond its own spheres of concern, to confront and assimilate systems
257. Cf. supra note 85 (characterizing this Article's argument as neither strictly descriptive nor
strictly prescriptive). Indeed, the existence of deviant doctrines might play a role in the Norm-Based
view of law analogous to the existence of unenforced rights in any particular system of law. See supra
text accompanying notes 124-25.
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of values that are potentially alien and disturbing, and even to rely on
principles of law whose source cannot be traced to any single nation or
sovereign. On the larger stage of the life of law, the glory of the internal
perspective is its power, not only to build a bridge between the ideal and
the real, 258 but to build a bridge that holds up, and carries, the traffic of
great and small. Finally, the peculiar advantage of an internal perspective
whose own deepest structures are sufficiently thin is that it may have the
power to build a bridge that soars even as it spans, and that expands the
possibilities of both the ideal and the real even as it hangs suspended over
the chasm that, perhaps fortunately, remains between them.
258. Cover, supra note 124, at 181.
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